Are Cooperative banks different? The impact of the cooperative structure on organizational social capital by Stoop, E.A.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/187694
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-04-11 and may be subject to
change.
Are Cooperative Banks Different?
The Impact of the Cooperative Structure on Organizational Social Capital
Cooperative banks are reputed to be ‘different’ from banks owned by shareholders. This is because, 
as opposed to other banks, cooperatives rely on social capital in order to operate effectively. As 
a result, social capital has long been associated with the cooperative structure and its various 
ingredients: long-term relationships, reciprocity and trust. 
However, the link between social capital and banking cooperatives remains underexplored in research, 
particularly where it concerns the impact of the cooperative structure itself on organizational social 
capital. It has been widely assumed that social networks and the role of members in cooperative 
banks must necessarily enhance levels of organizational social capital, but in reality little is known 
about the circumstances under which this occurs. This unique study reveals the extent to which 
the cooperative structure actually influences organizational social capital in banking cooperatives. 
It draws both on existing research and on original empirical data, collected from within one of 
the world’s largest cooperative banks. The findings have far-reaching implications for the policy, 
governance and organization of cooperative banks. 
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Prologue
Challenging and rewarding – these are the first two words that spring to mind when family, 
friends and colleagues ask me about the last few years, a period I have spent writing my thesis 
while, at the same time, working as a senior banking professional during a period of financial 
crisis and turmoil. 
Both as a scholar and as a student, the crisis has provided me with invaluable research material 
and unique insights, from within the sector, into the workings of the financial world, and more 
specifically how Rabobank, as a cooperative bank, deals with the issues that arise during periods 
of crisis, such as those we have lived through in recent years. Organizational Social Capital – 
the specific subject of my research, defined as social networks within an organization based 
on reciprocity, trust and reputation – has been profoundly shaken by the challenges faced by 
Rabobank and the financial world. In this sense, I could not have been in a better place at 
a better time. But of course, it has also been an extremely challenging period, because as a 
scientist and as a student I have had to maintain an objective and open-minded approach even 
as the crisis was taking its toll on my friends, family, and, at Rabobank, on departments and 
colleagues. Here, the guidance of my tutors has been invaluable, helping me to maintain the 
proper approach towards both my study and my work. The need for objectivity has also meant 
that I have deliberately chosen not to accept any form of financial support, and that I have made 
it very clear to Rabobank how I would approach my thesis: as a scholar and scientist, it is my duty 
not to hold back any conclusions and to ensure that objectivity remains paramount at all times. 
Working at a cooperative bank during the financial and banking crises made me wonder from 
time to time about the use and benefits of the cooperative structure within the banking sector. 
Being closely involved in understanding the workings of social enterprises, and particularly 
cooperatives, due to my background in Public Administration and my work at Rabobank, 
Professor Taco Brandsen suggested that I should continue to study the relationship between the 
cooperative structure of Rabobank and its stability during the recent crises, focusing specifically on 
the impact of the cooperative structure on the bank’s social capital. During my studies, I worked 
at Rabobank Nederland, which was a subsidiary of the 136 local Rabobanks. At that time, it 
became apparent that Rabobank’s legal form may not be the only explanation for its stability, and 
that this stability also depended on several other factors, such as its reputation and relationship 
with its members. Intrigued, I went looking for possible explanations for the relative success 
of the cooperative as a corporate entity. As well as generating profits, developing sustainable 
strategies and translating these into long-term goals, the challenge for any cooperative lies in 
maintaining its relationship with its members/customers and keeping its finger on the pulse of the 
local economy. The growing prominence of the cooperative as an organizational form – during 
the run-up to the UN’s Year of Cooperatives (2012) for instance – also served to convince me that 
this was a field that merited a closer exploration. 
Being a senior banking professional, writing this thesis has been rewarding in the sense that 
working as a senior banking professional in risk management for Rabobank during a time of 
high demand has helped me both to develop my professional skills and to advance my career. It 
has also enabled me to work on the themes and policies that have helped shape Rabobank and 
helped the bank to chart a course through this period of crisis. It has been challenging in the 
sense that the crisis took its toll both on colleagues and on departments within the Rabobank, as 
well as having a major impact on society as a whole. 
When I began working on this study, banking was going through what seemed at the time to be 
a period of perpetual crisis, which began in 2008. Although preparations for my research were 
made during a time of economic turbulence, it seemed that the Netherlands-based cooperative 
Rabobank was performing better than non-cooperative listed banks in the Netherlands. Indeed, 
by the end of 2011, Europe’s cooperative banks seemed to have withstood the initial phase of 
the crisis better than listed banks, suffering only eight per cent of the total losses incurred by the 
entire European banking system during the financial crisis. These losses were relatively modest in 
view of their combined market share of about 24 per cent (Groeneveld, 2011). 
At the start of the study in 2011, in legal terms, Rabobank still consisted of a patchwork of 
independent banks of different sizes. Rabobank had previously made much of being different from 
the other listed banks, and based its perceived distinctive character on its roots in the principles 
and concepts of the cooperative; nevertheless, in 2011 it was facing the same enormous and 
ever-growing challenges as every other bank. My position within a financial cooperative gave me 
a unique opportunity to carry out research with full access to and cooperation from a cooperative 
financial organization during a period of economic turmoil. 
This study aims to provide an objective view from within a cooperative bank, as seen by a researcher 
who was, at the same time, working inside the financial world that he is describing. The design 
of my research incorporates additional measures to ensure objectivity and to apply reflexivity, self-
analysis and reflection, and I have adopted the origins of the methodological position (Bourdieu, 
2003) for the purposes of my research. Reflecting on Rabobank’s situation while it was engulfed 
in the crisis – including internal problems such as the Libor fraud (tampering with interest rates, 
and the aftermath thereof) – the cooperative principles that they apply suddenly seemed rather 
shallow concepts. The news that bankers had tampered with interest rates was a further blow 
to public confidence in the banking sector, Rabobank included. This and the issues mentioned 
above resulted in a tightening of internal monitoring by Rabobank itself and also made external 
regulators more vigilant. Developments followed one another in quick succession. The period of 
my research saw three different CEOs at the helm at Rabobank, as well as several changes to 
the board of directors. Rabobank Netherlands and Rabobank International were merged and, 
soon after my research was completed, there were significant changes in the governance of 
the cooperative Rabobank. In 2015 it was decided to merge all local cooperative Rabobanks 
(LCBs) with the cooperative central organization (Rabobank Nederland), with effect from 2016. 
The result: one cooperative Rabobank, one bank balance and one banking license. This meant 
a considerable loss of power and influence for the LCBs within the decision-making processes 
of the organization.1 Another change was that employees were excluded from membership of 
Rabobank, meaning that 15,000 members were lost.
This study aims to analyze and explain how the cooperative structure affects the organizational 
social capital within an organization and the implications that this has on policy, governance and 
organization within Rabobank. 
1 Since 2016 the former Local Cooperative Banks (LCBs) have been known as Local Banks (LBs).
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1.1 Introduction 
Between 2007 and 2016, a succession of (financial) crises and bank scandals took place. Instead 
of exercising prudence as members of the banking profession, it turned out that the actions and 
behavior of bankers had been more focused on their own short-term interests rather than the 
long-term interests of their customers. This has led to a significant loss of public confidence in 
institutions such as banks (Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2015). People feel that banks no longer 
have the best interest of the public at heart. Public outrage about the lack of transparency, 
corporate mismanagement and financial misconduct have led to stricter government measures 
and closer monitoring (Annual report AFM, 2012). Many of the banks that were responsible for 
this decline in (public) confidence seem to had a primarily commercial focus in the period leading 
up to the crisis, motivated by short-term profits and dealing in high-risk products. This focus 
affects the internal culture and behavior of these organizations. 
Joris Luyendijk, a Dutch news correspondent and writer, interviewed over two hundred direct 
and indirect stakeholders in the financial world for The Guardian between 2011 and 2013. After 
two years of research in the City of London, he presented his findings in his book: ‘Dit kan niet 
waar zijn’ (2015) translated into English as Swimming With Sharks. The common thread in this 
book is Luyendijk’s conviction that the banking sector is leading us straight towards a precipice: 
“The debt crisis that began in 2008 was only a symptom of a deeper underlying problem. And 
nothing has changed.”2 The root causes of these problems lie in the “perverse incentives in the 
system”, according to Luyendijk. He carried out his investigation from the inside and showed, in 
a shocking manner, that among the banks that he investigated, there is a culture of opportunism 
that is dominated by short-term interests and is at odds with the aim of creating organizational 
social capital. He mentions a number of causal factors: banks are “too big to fail”, credit rating 
agencies are paid by the same banks whose products they assess, and all efforts seem to focus on 
raising the banks’ short-term stock price. 
Luyendijk did not examine cooperative banks such as the local cooperative Rabobanks (LCBs) 
of the cooperative Rabobank Group in the Netherlands. This study focuses on cooperative 
banks. Cooperative banks are believed to be different. Unlike private banks, whose business 
models are based mainly on “profit maximization, shareholder governance and  executive-
centered management” (Mettenheim & Butzbach, 2014, p. 4), cooperative banks have business 
models based on sustainable returns, and are assumed to work towards long-term goals and 
horizons. Often these are defined as corporate missions that include “social and public policy 
goals and stakeholder-oriented, board-centered governance” (ibid. p. 4). Studies have shown 
that European cooperative banking groups performed relatively well during the financial crisis 
2 Source: http://www.nu.nl/weekend/4000251/joris-luyendijk-de-financiele-sector-gaat-weer-regelrecht-
richting-ravijn.html.
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of 2007-2008, and did not need the massive government support that many non-cooperative 
banks received (Ayadi, Llewellyn, Schmidt, Arbak, & De Groen, 2010; Groeneveld, 2011; Birchall, 
2013; Chiaramonte, Poli, & Oriani, 2013; Butzbach & von Mettenheim, 2014). During and after 
the crisis, cooperative banks considered themselves different from the other type of banks, the 
shareholder banks. Some presented themselves in a similar light to the isolated Gaulish village 
from the Asterix and Obelix comic books, standing up to the ‘big banks’ and refusing to accept 
their emphasis on profit and status, and less affected by the perverse incentives that Luyendijk 
describes in his book.
The cooperative structure is assumed to involve the application of a number of cooperative 
principles that promote good conduct and contribute to building and maintaining trust. At 
the same time, the cooperative model creates reciprocity in the relationship with its customers, 
because, through their membership, customers can directly affect and influence both the role 
of the financial services provided by the bank and the role and position that the bank takes 
within society. This is a fundamental difference with the position of shareholders, whose priority 
is generally the growth of their portfolio and how much profit is being made by the bank that 
they have a stake in. 
However, regardless of the structure of these banks – cooperative or non-cooperative – it is their 
disregard for the long-term interests of their clients that has led those clients and the wider public 
to question the motives of these banks and other financial institutions. While financial markets 
need supervision, supervision alone does not seem to have been enough to safeguard the private 
interests of customers and the public interests of citizens. 
According to some researchers, cooperatives have performed more successfully during recent 
crises than other organizational forms (Birchall, Ketilson, 2009; Challita, Sentis & Aurier, 2014) and 
they have contributed neither to bubble-making nor bubble-bursting (Novkovic & Webb, 2014). 
On the basis of research by Birchall (2013a), some drew the conclusion that banking cooperatives 
were a ‘safe bet during the crisis’. So why are cooperatives more successful? According to some 
researchers, the answer is social capital. 
Research on the link between social capital and cooperatives is available, but the link between 
social capital and banking cooperatives remains underexplored, particularly the impact of the 
cooperative structure on organizational social capital within the dynamics of banking cooperatives. 
In theory, cooperative banks are monitored and controlled by their own members. The social 
interaction that is required for this process contributes to the production and reproduction of 
organizational social capital. At the same time, this also contributes to trust in these organizations, 
since social interaction provides opportunities for the mutual alignment of varying viewpoints and 
opinions. In this way, cooperative banks have been able to contribute to higher levels of public 
confidence in banks.
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1.2 Aim and research questions 
Despite many reports and surveys which suggest that cooperative banks have suffered less than 
other financial institutions from the decline in public trust in recent years, the empirical evidence 
for this remains weak (Groeneveld, 2014). In addition, the data on which this suggestion is 
based is generally limited by the data used, which relate to the beginning of the crisis period. 
Most research on the relationship between social capital and cooperatives takes social capital as 
the independent variable and the cooperative as the dependent variable. In this study, however, 
the focus is on how the cooperative form affects an organization’s internal social capital and 
more specifically on organizational or internal social capital. Social capital is associated with 
the cooperative form and its various elements; long-term relationships, reciprocity and trust. 
Researchers such as Valentinov (2004) regard cooperatives as social-capital-based organizations. 
Based on their principles of ‘user-ownership’, ‘user-control’, and ‘user-benefits’ (Dunn, 1988), 
cooperatives need adequate levels of social capital to flourish. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that cooperatives, as member-based organizations, play a role in generating and fostering levels 
of social capital in wider society (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2000; Borzaga & Spear, 2004; Zamagni 
& Zamagni, 2010; Degli Antoni & Sabatini 2013). Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen (2012) also 
point out that the disappearance of certain large (and complex) cooperative organizations could 
possibly be explained by the decline in their levels of social capital. 
This study aims to explain the different elements of organizational social capital and the impact 
of various forms of banking cooperatives on these elements. It isolates the way in which the 
cooperative structure is implemented and the specific effect of the cooperative structure on 
social capital, relative to other organizational variables, by comparing different local banks within 
Rabobank. Carrying out multiple case studies, I will focus on the variables that play a role in the 
functioning of the cooperative structure.
The following central research question will be addressed: 
How does the cooperative structure of a bank affect its organizational social capital? 
The central question is addressed by means of the following secondary research questions:
1. What is the nature of cooperative banks and what is their position within the banking 
landscape? 
2. What are the features of cooperatives as organizations?
3. What is the theoretical relationship between cooperatives and organizational social capital?
4. How does the cooperative structure of cooperative banks affect their organizational social 
capital in practice?
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1.3 Societal and scientific relevance 
The intention of this study is to provide more clarity about the interdependence of organizational 
social capital and banking cooperatives. To date, the impact of the cooperative structure on 
organizational social capital in the banking sector has not been investigated in much depth, 
either theoretically or empirically.
Societal relevance
Although there are generally high expectations with regard to social networks and the role of 
members in cooperative banks (EACB, 2009; Mazzarol, Reboud, Mamouni Limnios, & Clark, 
2014), little is known about how the cooperative structure of banks affects their organizational 
social capital. An objective assessment of these assumptions will provide valuable information 
for policymakers and bank personnel regarding the impact of the cooperative structure on 
organizational social capital. A rigorous examination, which incorporates a range of different 
perspectives and provides insight into banking cooperatives may contribute to a public debate 
about the role of cooperative structures within society, and perhaps provide a better insight into 
the functioning of cooperatives as socio-economic financial entities, providing societal as well as 
scientific relevance. 
Scientific relevance
Unlike most other research, this study takes the cooperative as the independent variable and 
social capital as the dependent variable. Its scientific contribution lies in reversing the causality 
and asking the question the other way around. The empirical research conducted for this research 
provides detailed knowledge about the impact of the cooperative form on a bank’s organizational 
social capital. In addition, the comparison of five different cooperative banks provides data about 
how differences in the application of the cooperative principles can give rise to distinct features 
at a specific bank. In addition, there have been no studies on cooperative banks with regard to 
the functioning of the organizational structure and its impact on organizational social capital. The 
results of this study are therefore relevant for knowledge building within research on social capital 
and the cooperative structure.
1.4 Outline
Chapter 2 will reflect on cooperatives as part of the banking landscape, and provide a description of 
the Rabobank Group. Chapter 3 will then look at the features of cooperative organization, including 
the cooperative principles, and in Chapter 4, the concept of collective action and organizational or 
internal social capital will be explored more extensively. The research design of the study will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, and an analysis of the case studies, results and findings will be provided in 
Chapters 6 and 7. The final conclusions will be presented in Chapter 8. Finally, the epilogue presents 
some reflections on the future of cooperative banks and their use of social capital.
Chapter 2 
Cooperative banks as part of the banking landscape
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2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the subject, purpose and relevance of the study were discussed and an 
outline for this study was provided. This chapter will address the following secondary research 
question: What is the nature of cooperative banks and what is their position within the banking 
landscape? In section 2.2, the role of banks in society will be reviewed and section 2.3 deals with 
the various types of banks. Section 2.4 discusses the position of cooperative banks in both the 
national and international banking sectors. Section 2.5 elaborates specifically on the Rabobank 
Group, focusing particularly on its historical development and its current position within the 
Dutch banking sector. The final section summarizes the conclusions of this chapter.
2.2 The role of banks in society
Banks are an integral part of modern societies. They ensure the rapid flow of funds, provide 
payment services and act as financial intermediaries. As early as 1911, Schumpeter argued that 
banks as financial intermediaries are crucial for a well-functioning economy and that their services 
‘are essential for technological innovation and economic development’ (King & Levine, 1993, p. 
717). Banks contribute in the sense that they finance the real economy and innovate in the field of 
financial ‘products’ which in turn creates jobs and helps to educate people. All this makes banks 
crucial to the competitiveness of national economies. Banks are consulted when businesses start 
up, expand or buy and sell, and every day they provide loans to private individuals and firms. Bank 
credits enable businesses to invest and engage in international trade. Banks also often engage 
in local communities, supporting activities such as local sports and charitable organizations. In 
summary, banks have a special and prominent public utility function within society and play an 
important role as instruments and implementers of legislation and regulation, such as legislation 
on money laundering. Healthy banks are critical to a well-functioning and growing real economy 
(Berger, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2015, p. 535). If the banking system faces obstacles or runs into 
significant problems, this will almost always affect the economy and society as a whole. The 
crucial position occupied by banks was clearly visible in the successive crises that occurred after 
the financial crisis of 2007. The banking sector as a whole has been the subject of much negative 
media coverage in recent years and continues to be the subject of public debate regarding its 
future position and role in society. Modern market economies, however, continue to depend on 
a stable and effective banking system to function properly. 
The exact role of banks in society and in the economy becomes clearer when we look at the 
specific activities of banks, and the different types of banks, in more detail. 
Firstly, banks act as financial intermediaries for people and businesses with excess liquidities and 
or those in need of loans. According to Münz (2013), they perform three tasks in this respect: 
“the pooling of assets, maturity transformation and risk transformation.” As such, they provide 
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benefits for savers and those who provide capital, as well as for those who need loans or 
investment capital.3
a. Pooling of assets: banks accept small and medium saving deposits and pool these smaller 
volumes to grant loans of all sizes.
b. Maturity transformation: by balancing time horizons, banks transform short-term deposits 
into long-term loans. One vital precondition is that banks have sufficient liquidity.
c. Risk transformation: by performing financial transactions and providing loans, banks 
transform risks. Banks minimize the risks for small savers and guarantee that they will not 
lose out, by carefully evaluating potential borrowers and diversifying widely between savings 
and deposits. Banks appear to be better at resolving informational problems than markets. 
They have more detailed information about their borrowers, allowing them to get closer to 
their borrowers (Berger, et al., 2015, p. 49). Banks also undertake financial transactions on 
the exchange markets, assuming risks in relation to fluctuations in interest rates, exchange 
rates and commodity prices. Their large number of customers and transactions enables them 
to diversify maturities and risks, due to the volume of assets that they hold, and they aim to 
diversify as widely as possible.
Secondly, banks maintain and operate payment systems of payments between households, 
businesses and public organizations. In recent years, electronic payments and internet banking 
have gained in popularity, while the use of physical payment methods has decreased. Banks have 
structured and facilitated a large part of our monetary transactions through a system of electronic 
transactions. 
2.3 Types of banks
There are of course several types of bank. In view of the scope of this study, only the main 
distinguishing  elements will be discussed. Banks can be categorized according to their 
characteristics, market focus, business model and the services they provide. However, over the 
years, banks have significantly expanded the range of services that they offer and many banking 
institutions are now engaged in an even more diverse range of financial products and services 
than ever before. For this reason, it has become more difficult to make clear distinctions between 
the different types of banks. 
Banks vary in terms of their area of expertise, their financial products portfolio, the customer 
segments that they serve and their product-market combinations. Banks can also be divided into 
public banks and private banks, or stakeholder value banks and shareholder value banks. 
3 This description of the role of banks is based on Münz (2013). Source: [ErsteGroupAG]. (2014, April 29). 
The role of banks in the economy (February 2013). Rainer Münz. [Video File]. Retrieved from: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=NXzAAcbMydY.
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The most widely known banking typologies are listed below, along with the main focus areas of 
their activities:
•	 Commercial or Retail Banks: Provide general banking services; 
•	 Private Banks: Provide personalized banking services to wealthy customers; 
•	 Investment Banks: Provide investment management services; 
•	 Universal bank: All the above segments combined;
•	 Central Banks: National institutions responsible for monetary policy and the regulation of all 
other banks; 
•	 Rural Banks: Provide banking services to rural customers.
•	 Credit unions: Similar to banks, but these are not-for-profit organizations owned by their 
customers. Products and services are identical to most retail and commercial banks.
•	 Cooperative banks: Provide traditional banking services to the general public. Some 
cooperative banks are so large and diverse they can be classified as universal banks.
The distinction between stakeholder value banks (STV) and shareholder value banks (SHV) 
is based on differences in ownership structure, corporate governance, capital structure and 
business objectives (Ayadi et al., 2010; Coco & Ferri, 2010; Groeneveld & Llewellyn, 2012). SHV 
banks can be described as banks that strive to maximize the interests of their shareholders. The 
essential characteristic of STV banks, as Llewellyn points out, “is that, unlike SHV banks, their 
primary purpose is not to maximize profits but to focus more explicitly on the interests of their 
customers, who are also their owners” (Llewellyn, 2017, p. 552), or on the interests of a wider 
group of stakeholders – in particular customers/members in the case of cooperative banks, or 
society and the regional economy in the case of public and savings banks (Ayadi et al., 2010, 
p. 7). Cooperatives can be classified as STV banks. According to Mallin (2009), there are various 
stakeholder groups, some directly related to the bank, such as employees, providers of credit, 
customers and suppliers, and some less directly related to the bank, such as local communities, 
environmental groups and the government. This distinction ultimately comes down to the 
banks’ bottom line business objectives. In practice, the differences are complex. It is therefore 
important to note that although SHV banks aim more specifically at making profits, this does not 
automatically mean that maximizing shareholder value is their most important goal. Having said 
this, the orientation towards the desire of external investors for a return on the capital invested 
is much more dominant in the case of STV banks than in the case of cooperative and STV banks.
Member-owned banks are found all over the world and belong to the family of stakeholder 
value banks. The class of member-owned banks includes credit unions, building societies and 
cooperative banks. The latter are significant players in the European banking sector, but have long 
been neglected in economics literature. Most economics textbooks do not recognize cooperatives 
as a form of business organization (Mook, Quarter, & Ryan, 2010, p. 160). In the latest edition 
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of the renowned ‘Oxford Handbook of Banking’, for example, only one of its forty chapters 
(the chapter on banks in Japan) briefly discusses cooperative banks (Berger et al., 2015). The 
disappearance of cooperatives, including financial cooperatives, from economics textbooks has 
been noted by several academics, such as Lynch, Urban, & Sommer (1989), Parnell (1995), Hill 
(2000), Chamard & Webb (2004, p. 34) and Kalmi (2007). Kalmi points out that the importance 
of cooperatives is not based solely on their global economic significance, but also the fact that 
cooperatives also tackle social problems such as alleviating poverty and promoting local economic 
development. (2007, p. 625). Furthermore cooperatives have broader social goals that distinguish 
them from investor-owned corporations. Cooperatives can also be used to tackle important issues 
in economics (2007, p. 627), such as the empowerment of people and business in rural Africa 
by cooperatives that help to fund the development of social structures and networks. This, in 
turn, enhances knowledge – in both business and financial sense – and organizational skills, thus 
helping to create a climate for sustained economic development.
2.4 Cooperatives in the banking landscape 
Traditionally, a cooperative is jointly owned and democratically controlled by its members (Hill, 
2000; Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Birchall, 2013; Audebrand, 2016). The original goal of financial 
services cooperatives (or FSCs) was to serve members who did not have access to financial 
services and to act on behalf of a unified group of members and to satisfy the needs of those 
members. Nowadays, many cooperatives seek to differentiate themselves by offering above 
average services at competitive rates in the areas of insurance, loans and investment products, 
however this is not always enough to ensure that they are distinctive in the marketplace for 
banking services. Grosskopf, Münkner and Ringle point out that for some time now, in terms of 
the financial transactions and deposits of the entire cooperative banking sector, business with 
non-member customers has prevailed and has become entirely normalized, whereas previously 
most loans were given to members. Business with non-member customers is not seen as an 
exception or a response to economic constraints, but is now widespread. In large cooperative 
banks, business with non-member customers represents a considerable proportion of their total 
business volume. (Grosskopf et al., 2010, p. 154). Today, the member base is often much more 
diverse and less closely tied to the organization than it was in the past, which means that financial 
services cooperatives now find it difficult to distinguish themselves from their non-cooperative 
rivals when it comes to prices, products, distribution methods and services.4 However there is one 
important distinction that needs to be addressed: we can identify different forms of FSCs – there 
are cooperative banks and cooperative credit unions, as well as cooperative health insurers.5 
4 A heterogeneous member base complicates governance and strategic direction. Previously, financial 
cooperatives served more homogeneous member groups.
5 Menzis is a healthcare insurance company registered under a cooperative form in the Netherlands. Achmea 
is also a healthcare insurance company, is registered as an ‘N.V.’ (limited liability company) but chooses to 
apply cooperative principles in its operations. This type of organization is usually called a mutual insurer and 
customers are often unaware that they are also direct members of a mutual insurer.
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Credit unions are a form of financial cooperative, because they are owned and operated by their 
members. Credit unions have a ‘common bond’ that restricts them to serving an identifiable 
group of people; they are not allowed to offer membership to people outside this group. This may 
be a geographical community, an affinity group such as a church, or the employees of a particular 
company or public body. Cooperative banks, on the other hand, are not restricted in this way. 
The size of a financial cooperative can vary from only a few locations to thousands of locations. 
Many of these financial cooperatives offer products and services similar to those offered by the 
major listed banks.6 
2.4.1 Origins of cooperatives
Cooperatives date back as far as human beings have been organizing themselves for mutual 
benefit and emerge as a result of specific needs and purposes. The need for collaboration arises 
from collective problems. In the case of cooperative banks, they emerged to address the problem 
of financial exclusion and exploitation of particular groups of citizens. In around 1,500-1,300 
BC the existence of the cooperative model begins in the early civilizations of  China and Egypt. 
Around 550 BC, the first cooperative models in Babylon were used in the sale and exchange of 
agricultural products. Due to the fact that these early cooperatives also provided loans to poor, 
there were opportunities to escape from exploitation of money lenders (Groeneveld, 2015a, p. 
4). The modern cooperative model originated in the first half of the 19th century in the United 
Kingdom and Germany, when the emergence of producer and consumer cooperatives coincided 
with a depression in the agricultural sector during the Industrial Revolution. Facing a rise in 
poverty, greater exclusion from labor market participation and growing socio-economic inequality, 
those excluded proposed and created new ways to meet their financial needs: cooperatives and 
mutuals. There is actually no significant difference between a mutual and a cooperative. The 
principal distinction lies in their basic operating principles. Generally, a cooperative’s starting point 
tends to be ‘to each according to use’ whereas that of a mutual is more along the lines of ‘to 
each according to need’. The purpose of a mutual is to create a fund that all members can draw 
on in times of need. However, although mutual members buy insurance policies and pay annual 
insurance premiums, they hope never to have to call on this insurance arrangement. By contrast, 
members of a cooperative actively seek to use the services offered by the cooperative as often as 
possible in order to get the maximum benefit of their membership of that cooperative.
6 In the Netherlands, for a long time, the establishment of credit unions was subject to extensive regulation 
and supervision requirements by The Dutch Central Bank (‘De Nederlandsche Bank’ or DNB). This had a 
restrictive effect. In this respect, the situation has improved. The Credit Union of the Central Netherlands 
(‘Kredietunie Midden-Nederland’), established on October 2, 2013, is, as of January 21, 2014, the first credit 
union with a waiver of Section 4:3 Financial Supervision Act of the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) 
(Wft). The Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wft) regulates the supervision of financial institutions in the 
Netherlands. The Act came into effect on January 1, 2007.
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The first modern cooperatives were established in Great Britain in the mid-19th century. The 
Rochdale Equitable Pioneers Society, set up in 1844, is generally considered the first successful 
consumer cooperative enterprise. It represents a model for the development of the modern 
cooperatives which evolved in a number of other countries in response to the Industrial Revolution 
and the associated societal upheavals (Birchall, 1997). The mechanization of the Industrial Revolution 
forced more skilled workers into poverty. This group started to work together in cooperatives, 
opening their own stores, purchasing jointly, and thus forming their own economic structures that 
were less dependent on the more capital-oriented market structure that was emerging under the 
influence of larger businesses. Poor textile workers pooled their limited funds to open their own 
shops. Farmers organized their own cooperatives for purchasing and trade so that they would have 
a stronger bargaining position in negotiations with big business enterprises and government bodies. 
Because they were only accountable to each other and purchased food collectively, they could keep 
prices relatively low. The added value of cooperatives from the very outset is well known: “…Since 
their origins [cooperatives] have been important actors in supporting the most disadvantaged social 
groups, in guaranteeing involvement and community development, and in complementing public 
welfare systems” (Sabatini, Modena, & Tortia, 2012, p. 2).
2.4.2 The roots and history of cooperative banks 
A full history of financial cooperatives is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Only the most 
relevant points will be highlighted, starting with the origins of the modern cooperative bank, 
followed by a brief look at its subsequent history and development. 
Cooperative banks as we know them today are based on principles that can be traced back 
to 19th-century Europe, when many population groups and communities were facing financial 
exclusion. In the 1840s, famine and extreme hardship spread across Europe, with potato crops 
ruined by blight and rising prices for other food as bad weather caused poor harvests. Low 
fishing yields further exacerbated these food shortages (Zeuli & Cropp, 2004, p. 10). Two of 
the leading founders of the cooperative system (in Germany) were Friedrich Raiffeisen (1818-
88) and Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1808-83). Touched by the poverty and misery they saw 
around them, particularly during the famine of 1848, they chose to act. While Schulze wanted 
to help urban small business owners and artisans, Raiffeisen wanted to assist the rural poor. 
As the industrial revolution progressed, the emerging financial services sector focused mainly 
on supporting wealthy individuals and large enterprises in urban areas. The rural population, 
especially farmers, small businesses and the communities that they supported, were effectively 
excluded from the benefits of financial services (also see Oliver Wyman, 2008, p. 7 and Birchall, 
2014, p. 57). Financial cooperatives soon established a position in society, generally starting out 
as small-scale grassroots organizations. For many people, cooperative banks provided a solution 
to the failure of the market. Schulze-Delitzsch founded the first credit society in 1850, and the 
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concept spread rapidly and became known as the ‘Volksbank’ or people’s bank. Social capital 
played an important role in the success of these people’s banks: “Within small communities, 
relatively intimate knowledge of each other’s credit and trustworthiness guaranteed that loans 
were only provided to borrowers who could be expected to repay them. Financial incentives for 
members to monitor each other and the social relationships among members hence contributed 
significantly to the flourishing of co-operative banks.” (Groeneveld & Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2009, p. 
15). Most cooperative banks were established according to the ideas of Schulze-Delitzsch and 
Raiffeisen. Independently of one another, they set out to promote the idea of credit cooperatives 
(Groeneveld & Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2009, p. 15). Originating in Germany, the concept was later 
adopted in neighboring countries such as Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and 
then spread further west to France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, north to Finland and 
Sweden, and east to Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, China and Japan (Birchall, 2013, 
p. 9). 
In Britain and Ireland, cooperative banks have different historical roots. Originating in the 18th 
century, building societies as financial institutions were often affiliated with the Christian revivalist 
movement, which was particularly popular among the working class and lower middle classes 
of society. The second half of the 20th century saw the formation of the British and Irish credit 
unions, inspired by the Canadian adaptations of the German cooperative banking concept 
(Fonteyne, 2007, p. 8). In France, government involvement has been extensive throughout the 
history of the cooperative banking sector, while in Finland the cooperative banking sector was set 
up with government support and in a top-down process, and agricultural credit cooperatives in 
Portugal owe their growth since the 1970s in part to government support (Fonteyne, 2007, p. 8). 
In Catholic regions we also see the same development of cooperative entities from within 
agricultural and trade unions. The moral framework and strong social ties of the Catholic, post-
Rerum Novarum, and Protestant movements, proved fertile ground for the formation of cooperative 
banks. Hansmann points out that opportunistic behavior by banks, in particular excessive risk 
taking, gave rise to the emergence of non-profit banks. Savings banks were established from 
1810-1825 onwards in order to overcome these problems (2000, p. 262). Cooperative banks 
were established to overcome opportunistic behavior by borrowers, which was also experienced 
by Raiffeisen when he first established his credit institution to provide loans to poor people 
(farmers) financed by funds collected from wealthy donors. Because many borrowers could not 
be compelled to repay their loans, the institution failed and donors lost interest. In his later 
attempts, the relatively intimate knowledge of participant’s credit and trustworthiness within small 
communities guaranteed that loans would be provided only to borrowers who were considered 
able to repay those loans. In addition to financial incentives, the success of cooperatives can be 
ascribed to the existence of social ties (social capital) between members (Fonteyne, 2007, p. 9).
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2.4.3 The position of cooperative banks within the banking landscape
To determine the exact position of cooperative banks within the banking landscape, first an 
examination of their characteristics compared to other types of banks is necessary. Cooperative 
banks differ from shareholder banks in terms of their organizational structure, their goals, their 
values and their systems of governance. In the words of Rothschild & Whitt (1986, p. 21), they 
can be viewed as the ‘third road’. Cooperative banks occupy a middle ground between the private 
investor and public ownership, and for this reason, they are also known as hybrid organizations 
(see also Chaddad, 2009). Cooperative banks are controlled and supervised by banking authorities 
in most countries, and they are required to respect prudential banking regulations, which means 
that they operate on a level playing field with shareholder banks. Depending on the country, 
supervision and control is implemented directly by state entities or is delegated to a central body 
or cooperative federation. 
From the literature, it can be established that there are at least six distinguishing features specific 
to cooperatives in the banking landscape. The characteristics proposed distinguish them from the 
other forms of company. Even though organizational rules may vary according to the applicable 
national laws, all cooperative banks share these features. The features of mature cooperative 
banks that Groeneveld & Sjauw-Koen-Fa (2009, pp. 18-20) distinguish are as follows:
a. Specific form of corporate governance: member ownership 
b. Customers’ interests take precedence 
c. High capitalization, high rating and low funding costs 
d. Profit as a necessary condition 
e. Conservative business model: focus on retail banking 
f. Proximity to customers: dense network of branches 
The first three features are also mentioned by the International Cooperative Banking Association 
(ICBA), which is a sectoral organization of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). This 
worldwide organization, founded in 1895, represents the cooperative movement and serves 
cooperatives all over the world. According to the ICBA’s criteria7:
“1. Customer-owned entities: in a cooperative bank, the needs of the customers match the needs of the 
owners, as cooperative bank members are both. As a consequence, the first aim of a cooperative bank 
is not to maximize profit but to provide the best possible products and services to its members. Some 
cooperative banks only operate with their members but most of them also admit non-member customers 
to benefit from their banking and financial services.
2. Democratic member control: cooperative banks are owned and controlled by their members, who 
democratically elect the board of directors. Members usually have equal voting rights, according to the 
cooperative principle of ‘one person, one vote’.
7 Source: http://www.icba.coop/co-operative-bank/what-is-a-co-operative-bank.html 
Accessed 05/01/2014.
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3. Profit allocation: in a cooperative bank, a significant part of the yearly profit, benefits or surplus is usually 
added to the reserves. A part of this profit can also be distributed to the cooperative members, with legal 
or statutory limitations in most cases. In some cases, profit is re-allocated to members either through a 
patronage dividend, which is related to the use of the cooperative’s products and services by each member, 
or through an interest or a dividend related to the number of shares subscribed by each member.”
With respect to democratic control by members, it should be noted that in practice this is in many 
cases indirect. Local boards usually consist of non-executive members as well as professional 
bankers.
Cooperative banks face the dilemma of striking the right balance between the twin objectives 
of profit and purpose, which is a feature of social enterprises more generally (Besley & Ghatak, 
2017). Defourny & Nyssens (2012) state that “social enterprises do not only include organisations 
that are characterised by a total non-distribution constraint, but also organisations which – 
like cooperatives in many countries – may distribute profits, but only to a limited extent, thus 
allowing to avoid a profit-maximising behaviour.” There is discussion on whether, and in which 
cases, cooperatives are part of the third sector as defined by Salamon and Sokolowski (2016). 
At the same time, the call has been made  for further research in order to better understand 
the diversities that make up the “cooperative landscape and the fast developing landscape of 
social enterprises” (Defourny et al., 2016, p. 1551). One often-heard mantra concerning social 
enterprises is that they seek to balance profit-making with a social mission (Katz & Page, 2010). 
Cooperatives, which are in theory social enterprises, therefore need to adapt, evolve and reinvent 
themselves continuously.
Local Cooperative Banks (LCBs) have historically maintained their close member-customer 
networks in order to promote stronger links with the members and communities that they serve, 
and they continue to operate in relatively dense networks (Groeneveld, 2014). As a result, the 
cooperative, as a social capital-based organization and a social enterprise, appears to be able to 
survive by strengthening social ties in society. Rather than philanthropy, cooperatives emphasize 
the importance of the community, the democratic control of capital and mutual principles. 
Furthermore, it is important for cooperatives to strive to create a climate in which their profits, no 
matter how high, are a result of good policy and robust and transparent corporate governance 
and communication. In this way, they can also contribute to the social agenda of the communities 
in which they operate. 
2.4.4 The position of cooperative banks operating internationally
Cooperatives in banking and financial services are present in many parts of the world. They can be 
found in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Japan, the USA, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, 
Finland and India, for example. One exception is Russia, where the existing financial and credit 
infrastructure is mainly made up of commercial banks (ILO, 2009, p. 8).
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Table 1 (below) shows the position of cooperatives in relation to market share, numbers of 
members, customers, banks and offices. The table provides an overview of the key statistics of 
the European Association of Co-operative Banks.8 Each banking cooperative is listed according 
to its home country, complemented with key data regarding its impact on society, shown on 
the following page. These data include, for instance, important success indicators such as the 
market share of deposits and loans, and indicators for proximity, such as number of local/regional 
societies and banking outlets. 
From table 1 we can conclude that cooperative banks are well represented in European countries. 
Several of the cooperative bank groups have a close relationship with the agricultural sector, such 
as Desjardins and Rabobank, although they also serve many other types of customers. These 
groups are based on hundreds of local banks. (Birchall, 2014, p. 57).9 There are also banks that 
were originally sponsored by national governments to meet the needs of farmers. These began as 
state banks and some were later handed over to the farmers to be operated as cooperatives. In 
the USA, this system consists of local farm credit associations. These are served by four secondary-
level banks and a specialist bank, in this case the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation, 
which raises capital for them to lend to the local associations. (Birchall, 2014, p. 58).
8 Source: European Association of Co-operative Banks. The Co-Operative difference: Sustainability, Proximity, 
Governance. Key statistics as of 31-12-15 (Financial Indicators).
9 For example, until January 2016 Rabobank was effectively a secondary cooperative owned by a network 
of local cooperative banks across the country. A cooperative federation or secondary co-operative is a co-
operative in which all members are, in turn, cooperatives.
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2.5 Rabobank Group10
The Rabobank is among the top ten banking cooperatives in terms of revenue. In this section, after 
summarizing the history of the Rabobank and its position during the period of study, the internal 
organizational structure of the Rabobank will be discussed. Significant governance changes 
occurred immediately after the study period (2015-2016), and these governance changes are 
also described in detail.
2.5.1 The Rabobank Group, a historical overview: 1898-2015 
Raiffeisen’s focus was on farmers and rural communities. In the Netherlands, the agricultural 
orientation of the Raiffeisen model proved very attractive (Lavelle, 1998, p. 68). The first 
cooperative banks were established at the end of the 19th century in agricultural communities. 
The goal was to improve living standards and the economic situation. The Coöperatieve Centrale 
Boerenleenbank in Eindhoven, and the Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Bank in Utrecht were 
both established in 1898. These two central banking cooperatives existed side by side for three 
quarters of a century. Legal disagreements and personal differences played a major role in this 
continued separation within the cooperative banking sector. Although their structures were very 
similar, the two umbrella organizations operated differently. The Eindhoven organization had a 
Catholic inspiration, while the Utrecht organization was formally non-demoninational, but in 
practice was primarily Protestant. Another difference was that in Eindhoven, a management 
structure was in place that was tighter and more centralized than in Utrecht, where the emphasis 
tended to be on local autonomy.
The first forms of cooperation between the two cooperatives emerged in the 1940s. Three 
developments led to this cooperation, which ultimately resulted in a merger in 1972. The first of 
these developments was the increase in the numbers of offices, which led to increased competition 
at the local level. Secondly, the disappearance of ideological and religious segregation in the 
Netherlands meant that the ideological differences between Utrecht and Eindhoven became less 
important. Thirdly, there was a widespread trend towards mergers in the Netherlands, causing 
business to need more capital, leading to increasing concentration in the banking sector. The 
merger of the two banks’ activities seemed to open up new opportunities as a result of the 
new organization’s increased economies of scale. It also improved the cooperative’s stature and 
financial clout, enabling it to become a financial partner in at least one specific global market: the 
international food and agribusiness market. The new group became known as Rabobank after 
the merger between the trade bank Raiffeisenbank and the farmers’ bank Boerenleenbank in 
1972 (‘Rabo’ is a portmanteau of the first two letters of each bank’s name). ‘Neutral’ Amsterdam 
10 Subsections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 are based on Ayadi et al. (2010), ‘Investigating Diversity In the Banking Sector 
in Europe. Key Developments, Performance and Role of Cooperative Banks.’ Paragraph 3.5 The Netherlands, 
pp. 76-86.
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became its legal domicile and, being a cooperative, Rabobank was not listed on the stock 
exchange. The two largest branches of the joint bank are still located in Utrecht and Eindhoven. 
Since 1980, the new central bank has been officially known as Rabobank Nederland. The first 
years of the newly formed Rabobank Group were characterized by a focus on creating an integrated 
organizational structure that could respond adequately to changes in the external environment. The 
Rabobank Group’s total assets grew strongly from just over €11 billion in 1971 to almost €28 
billion in 1979. 
Figure 1: Timeline of decisive turning points for Rabobank (1895-2006).
•  Start and growth of credit 
cooperatives 
•  Financing F&A business of 
members 
•  Full reservation of profits 
and full member liability 
•  Establishment of 
cooperative central 
institutions (CCRB+CCB) 
•  Central Inspection by 
CCRB and CCB 
•  Economic and Financial 
crises 
1895 1952 1971 
•  Delegated 
supervision by CCRB 
and CCB on behalf 
of external 
supervisor 
•  Servicing of non-
members 
•  Changes in 
economic structure 
• Scaling up 
• Payments transfers 
• Home loans 
677,000 
1,202 
€ 11 bn. 
1979 
•  Merger of CCB and 
CCRB into Rabobank 
•  Central governance 
structure includes 
Central Delegates 
Assembly and 
Regional Assemblies 
•  Membership open to 
individuals 
•  First international 
activities 
•  Expansion domestic 
activities 
950,000 
978 
€ 28 bn. 
1995 
•  Cross guarantee 
scheme 
•  Internal compensation 
arrangements 
•  Limiting member 
liability 
•  Credit rating 
•  International 
expansion 
•  AllFinance in the 
Netherlands 
•  External funding for 
domestic and foreign 
growth 
595,000 
547 
€ 135 bn. 
•  Great Cooperative Debate 
•  Establishment of Rabobank 
International 
•  Abolition of member liability 
•  Partnership model, later also 
option for Executive model 
for local banks 
•  Issuance of hybrid capital 
instruments and member 
certificates 
•  Adaptation of central 
governance structure 
•  Virtualization of services 
2006 
1,641,000 
188 
€ 556 bn. 
# Members 
# Local Rabobanks 
Total assets Group 
310,000 
1,320 
€ 2 bn. 
Source: Groeneveld (2016, p. 7).
The broadening of the banking activities of the Rabobank Group and other commercial banks 
started in the 1980s when they began to take over mortgage banks. For the Rabobank Group, 
this process of broadening continued when it increased its stake in De Lage Landen, a company 
that specializes in leasing and financing concepts, from 75 per cent to 95 per cent in 1980. In 
addition to diversifying into new products and services, the Rabobank Group also widened its 
scope to include new customer groups, such as private individuals and small and medium-sized 
businesses. These changes resulted in continuous growth in Rabobank’s total assets towards almost 
€135 billion in 1995 and €556 billion in 2006 (see figure 1). By the end of the 1990s, Rabobank 
also attempted to diversify into international investment banking. However, this did not prove to be a 
good match for Rabobank and the project was short-lived. Thereafter, Rabobank focused its activities 
more on companies in the global food and agribusiness sectors. 
In anticipation of the deregulation of the financial markets in the Netherlands and as a result of the 
increasing trend towards individualization within society during the 1990s, Rabobank further inte-
grated its non-traditional banking activities into the services of financial institutions, known as the 
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Allfinanz concept (sometimes translated as AllFinance), which refers to the integration of ‘tradition-
al’ banking activities with investment banking and insurance products and services (also see Lavelle, 
1998, p. 86). Rabobank began to market itself as a kind of financial supermarket that customers 
could go to for all their personal and small-scale services. The merger of the Rabobank Group 
with Interpolis (1990) and its partnership with Robeco (1997), are examples of this concept, pro-
viding to integrated solutions for customers. 
Previously, Rabobank Nederland had been run by a Board of Directors, an Executive Board and 
a Supervisory Board but in June 2002, this management structure was simplified. The Board 
of Directors (‘Raad van Beheer’) and the Supervisory Board (‘Raad van Toezicht’) were merged 
into a new Supervisory Board named the ‘Raad van Commissarissen’, while the Executive Board 
(‘Hoofddirectie’) was renamed the ‘Raad van Bestuur’ (still called the Executive Board in English).
Rabobank’s strategic core objectives for 2009–2012 were as follows: firstly, to become the mar-
ket leader in the Netherlands; secondly, to build on Rabobank’s position as the world’s leading 
international bank for the food and agricultural sectors; and thirdly, to achieve further growth in, 
and greater synergy between, the subsidiaries of the Rabobank Group. At the same time, Rabo-
bank became the Netherlands’ leading mortgage provider in 2006, which it remains to this day. 
Rabobank’s diversification into a wider range of financial products and services secured financial 
stability for the bank. 
Figure 2: Timeline of decisive turning points for Rabobank (2007-2016).
2007 
# Members 
# Local Rabobanks 
Total assets Group 
2010 
1,801,000 
141 
€ 653 bn. 
2014 
 
•  Local Rabobanks 
apply Rabo model 
•  Direct member 
influence becomes 
indirect influence via 
member councils 
•  Libor affair 
•  Integration of 
Rabobank 
International and 
Rabobank Nederland 
1,959,000 
113 
€ 681 bn. 
2016 
•  Member Certificates are 
converted into listed Rabobank 
Certificates 
•  European Banking Union 
•  Great Governance Debate 
•  One cooperative, one banking 
license 
•  One consolidated balance 
sheet 
•  New articles of association and 
internal rules 
•  Abolition of delegated 
supervision 
1,927,000 
103 
€ 662 bn. 
1,638,000 
174 
€ 570 bn. 
 
•  Redesign of regional 
assemblies (from 20 to 
12) 
•  Redesign Central 
Delegates Assembly 
from 120 to 72 
members (ratio 2:1) 
•  Global financial crisis 
•  Great turbulences in 
Dutch Banking 
•  Solid Rabobank during 
crises   
  
   
 
Source: Groeneveld (2016, p. 17).
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In order for local banks (see Section 2.5.2) to respond to the changing needs of their members/
customers, the client service model was further adapted. The range of (virtual) services offered 
through direct channels (e.g. internet and (mobile) telephone services) was extended in 2011.
Along with cooperative banks across Europe, performance was inevitably affected by the banking 
crisis, which hit the Netherlands along with other countries. However, the impact of the crisis 
on the cooperative banking sector in the Netherlands appeared much less severe than on other 
banks in the country, mainly due to Rabobank’s strong capital position and the fact that it did not 
increase its leverage (Groeneveld, 2012). It was the only large bank in the Netherlands that did 
not need support from the Dutch government during this crisis. The collateral damage suffered 
by the bank was due to its indirect positions in the US sub-prime mortgage market which it held 
through its investments in structured instruments such as collateralized debt obligations and retail 
mortgage backed securities.11 
2.5.2 The network structure
Until 2016, and thus during the research period (2013-2014), the Rabobank Group had a two-
tier structure: local cooperative banks (LCBs) located throughout the Netherlands, and the central 
cooperative Rabobank Nederland (RN) located in Utrecht (the network’s central bank) along with 
the various subsidiaries of Rabobank Nederland. The cooperative central organization had a 
mandate to control the subsidiaries on behalf of the local banks. Formally, the local Rabobanks are 
the parent organizations of Rabobank Nederland, their central organization. The local banks are 
facilitated by Rabobank Nederland to serve their members and customers. Rabobank Nederland 
is the largest provider of financial services and insurance in the Netherlands. Rabobank group is 
active in 47 countries with an internal employee base of 40,029 staff (FTE, 2016). In 2016, local 
Rabobanks had almost 17,000 employees, while Rabobank Nederland employed around 14,000 
staff (FTE). Rabobank Nederland was, until 2016, the central cooperative organization of the 106 
member banks. The local banks were independent legal entities with their own banking license 
and their own balance sheet responsibilities, rather than being branches of Rabobank Nederland, 
since each of them has its own banking license from the Dutch central bank (De Nederlandsche 
Bank). There were two levels of membership, within this network structure: each member bank 
had its own local members, and each of those member banks was a member of Rabobank 
Nederland, The member banks as well Rabobank Nederland were fully cooperative in nature.12
11 See also Rabobank Annual Reports 2009 - 2011.
12 Members of local banks now have rights only, and no longer any obligations. Until 2016 Rabobank 
Nederland was fully owned by the member banks. Since 2016, the General Members’ Council acts as the 
owner of Rabobank.
36  •  Chapter 2
Figure 3: Number of Rabobank employees, offices and member banks.
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Both member banks of Rabobank (which were licensed as credit institutions) and Rabobank 
Nederland were cooperative banks. This is not the case for the subsidiaries of Rabobank are 
private or public limited companies under Dutch law, in which Rabobank is either the sole or 
the majority shareholder. Rabobank Group’s organizational structure in 2013 is shown in figure 
4.13 Local cooperative Rabobanks were members of Rabobank Nederland, which in turn has 
subsidiaries to offer services to member banks and their customers and members.
13 The number of clients, members and member banks has naturally fluctuated over the years, as has the 
number of subsidiaries, with some being acquired and other sold off. 
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Figure 4: Rabobank Group organizational chart, showing the situation as of 1-1-2013.
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- Paris Orléans (7%) 
 
Subsidiaries and associates 
 
Source: Adapted from Rabobank Group Annual Report, 2012. Numbers adapted to 2013 data.
2.5.3 Governance of Rabobank Nederland and Local Cooperative Banks
Until 2016, the Local Cooperative Banks were independent legal entities, but the network’s 
Cross Guarantee Scheme (CGS) ensured that all member banks were liable for the obligations 
of all other members as well as those of Rabobank Nederland and other banking entities in the 
Group.14 Banks were “able to draw on the scheme in the event of a shortfall [of funds], rather 
than a liquidity imbalance which” would be handled through the central bank as the banker for 
its member banks (Ayadi, 2010, p. 79). There was, therefore, full mutual support between the 
legally independent LCBs. Furthermore there was a mutual insurance scheme to cover the LCBs 
against certain operating risks that could affect LCBs. The networked nature of the Rabobank 
Group meant that LCBs in the Netherlands were locally focused (being geographically close to 
14 All participants were policyholders in a separate legal entity entitled ‘Mutual Insurance Rabobank’. The cross-
guarantee scheme has never been activated. This was mainly due to the existence of internal compensation 
arrangements between LCBs (Groeneveld, 2016).
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their customers and members) but also able to benefit from the national facilities of a large-scale 
bank, both for the LCBs themselves and for their members and customers. 
Figure 5: Local governance of a member Rabobank (LCB).
Member council (30-50) 
Member 
constituency 
Supervisory Board 
(5 to 7 appointed) 
Member 
constituency 
Board = statutory 
(3 or 4 appointed professionals) 
Management team 
 Board of directors 
-    Strategic course and   
     policy determination 
-  Policy realization 
-  Optimal functioning 
banking business 
-  Member influence and 
authority 
-  Relationship with 
supervisory board 
 Supervisory Board 
-    Appoint, judge, suspend  
     and fire directors 
-  Supervision of Board and 
safeguarding external orientation 
-  Approval of Board decisions 
-  Advice 
 Member council 
-    Say 
-  Influence 
-  Appointment 
Supervisors 
Member 
constituency 
Source: Based on public presentation made by Rabobank, 2012.
The range of services that Rabobank Nederland offers to the member banks also meant that 
comparatively small member banks were able to benefit from economies of scale and offer a range 
of services that they would not be able to provide by themselves. One of the roles of Rabobank 
Nederland was, therefore, to provide services to customers whose demands exceeded what could 
realistically be provided by a local cooperative bank. The local member banks were joint owners 
of Rabobank Nederland. Rabank Nederland itself described the structure as follows: “Rabobank 
Nederland is a daughter of many parents” but also “the parent of many subsidiaries” (Ayadi et 
al., 2010, p. 80). The two-way relationship between Rabobank Nederland and the member banks 
meant that prior to 2016 Rabobank was an integrated group of separate cooperative banks. 
Rabobank Nederland fulfilled several different roles for the benefit of both the member banks 
and their customers, and the customers of Rabobank itself:
•	 It acted as a holding company for a range of subsidiaries that provide services to member 
banks and customers both of Rabobank and of its member banks.
•	 It had a central supervisory role over the member banks, delegated to it by De Nederlandsche 
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Bank, the supervisor of banks in The Netherlands (including Rabobank itself).
•	 It acted as a central bank to the member banks and helped to intermediate their liquidity 
requirements and equalize surpluses and deficits in the flow of deposits and loans of 
member banks. In effect, it acted as an internal inter-bank market.
•	 It was a bank in its own right, conducting both wholesale and international retail, and both 
domestic and international business, including business for high net-worth individuals. 
•	 It was an important service provider to the member banks. This included the important 
tasks of product development, treasury management and risk management.
•	 The formulation of the strategy of the entire Rabobank Group was delegated to the 
executive board of Rabobank Nederland. Approval of the Corporate Strategy took place 
in the General Assembly.15
•	 It acted as an internal advisory service and outsourcing partner for member banks for a 
variety of services including back office administration, marketing and internal auditing.
Together, the roles described above are almost unique in the world, especially the combination of 
a bank, a central bank and an (internal) supervisory agent (Ayadi et al., 2010, p. 81).
The central bank had an important treasury function. The local cooperative banks were unable 
to operate in wholesale financial markets themselves due to their small size and the fact that 
they belonged to one group. They therefore had to transfer any surplus funds to Rabobank 
Nederland’s Central Treasury, which was able to access domestic and international wholesale 
markets, both as a source of funds and for investment purposes. An integral part of the network 
model was that Rabobank Nederland acted as the supervisory agency for the local cooperative 
banks on the basis of authority delegated from De Nederlandsche Bank.16 As the supervisor, 
Rabobank Nederland had the power and authority to set rules for the member banks, and the 
Cross Guarantee Scheme was an important reason for doing so. There was, therefore, a two-
way relationship between the central bank and the local banks: the member banks owned and 
influenced Rabobank Nederland, which in turn had supervisory and regulatory powers over 
the member banks. Furthermore, member banks could not expand or reduce their operations 
(branches) without the approval of Rabobank Nederland.
15 The governance changes at Rabobank Nederland and the member banks since 2016 will be reviewed in 
detail in section 2.5.3.3.
16 De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB, The Dutch Bank) is the central bank of the Netherlands. It is part of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). DNB is part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and is 
also an independent public body (zelfstandig bestuursorgaan). As part of the ESCB, DNB is partly responsible 
for determining and implementing monetary policy in the Euro area, while it is also an important link in the 
international payment system chain. Functioning as independent public body, DNB exercises prudent and 
efficient supervision over financial institutions.
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2.5.3.1 Capital and ownership
Just as the member banks are not entitled to the capital of Rabobank, it is also the case that the 
members have no entitlement to the equity of their local bank.
Although the member banks were shareholders in the equity of Rabobank Nederland, they could 
not acquire that equity themselves. Furthermore, no claim on the group’s equity is possible. In 
other words, the bank owns itself. No dividends are paid to member banks. Member banks have 
no access to external equity capital independently of their own members. For the group as a 
whole, the dominant sources of equity capital are retained profits, and around 75% of profits 
are retained as reserves contributing to Tier 1 capital (Ayadi et al., 2010, p. 81). Only a small 
portion of profits can be utilized for social activities, and distribution to members is not possible. 
The main source of capital is the bank’s retained profits. In 1999, however, two new sources of 
permanent equity capital were introduced (Capital Securities and Member Certificates). This was 
done because at that time the banks needed to expand faster than was possible based on the 
increase in equity capital from retained earnings. Capital Securities are similar to bonds, although 
they have no fixed term and only provide a dividend when profit is made by the Rabobank 
Group as a whole: they are a form of hybrid Tier 1 capital. Member Certificates were also offered 
exclusively to the members of local cooperative banks in the early 2000s (until January 14 2014).
Figure 6: Net annual profit, Rabobank Group.
 
 
 
 
0
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
Net annual profit in € mio
Source: Calculations based on data from Rabobank annual reports. 
2.5.3.2 Membership
Any customer can use the services of the local member banks, regardless of whether they are 
a member of it. Any retail customer can become a member provided they reside in the bank’s 
local catchment area and are not employed by the bank. As a result of a joint strategy to increase 
membership, the number of members increased from 550,000 in 2000 to 1.7 million in 2008, 
and the ratio of members to customers moved from 6% members to 94% customers in 2000 to 
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nearly 20% members to 80% customers by 2008. In 2013 Rabobank has 1.9 million members. 
Since 1998, members have had no formal obligations or duties and their liability has been limited 
to their membership stake, meaning that they have rights but no obligations.
There are several advantages to being a member of a member bank of the Rabobank Group, 
which accrue over time:
•	 members have voting rights;
•	 members can call for a General Assembly meeting, providing such a call receives the 
support of ten percent of the members;
•	 members are entitled to a series of member discounts on in the form of local and 
national offers of third-party products;
•	 members are able to attend and vote at General Meetings;
•	 members can be elected to the Board and the Supervisory Board of their bank.
2.5.3.3 Governance
In any network, cooperative governance structures exist at two levels: at the local member bank 
level and at the central bank level. 
Figure 7: Governance of Rabobank Group prior to 2016.
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Source: Based on public presentation made by Rabobank, 2012.
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Rabobank Nederland’s cooperative governance structure prior to 2016 is summarized in Figure 7. 
Four main elements can be distinguished:
1. the Central Delegates Assembly (CDA), which is like a ‘parliament’ within Rabobank Nederland;
2. the General Assembly of Rabobank Nederland;
3. the Supervisory Board, which supervises the Executive Board and Rabobank Nederland and its 
subsidiaries’ general affairs, and appoints the members of the Executive Board;
4. the Executive Board, which reports to the Supervisory Board, the Central Delegates Assembly, 
and the General Assembly of Rabobank Nederland.
The process of voting at Rabobank Nederland’s Annual General Assembly is based on shareholder 
ratios. These ratios are calculated on the basis of a formula which includes balance sheet totals, 
the member banks’ core capital positions, and the member banks’ commercial results. To reflect 
the changing positions of the different member banks, these ratios are recalculated and adjusted 
every three years.
The General Assembly performs the following tasks:
a. It appoints the members of the Supervisory Board;
b. It adopts or amends any changes to the Articles of Association of Rabobank Nederland;
c. It approves the annual accounts;
d. It allocates dividends and the appropriation of profits;
e. It decides on regulations regarding the organization and procedures of the Regional Delegates 
Assemblies and Central Delegates Assembly (CDA).
The local member banks are grouped into twelve geographic regions, each with between twelve 
and twenty member banks. Delegates from these local member banks are sent to the Regional 
Delegate Assemblies (RDA). Each of these RDAs has its own board and, in turn, these boards 
together form the Central Delegate Assembly (CDA). Also known as the ‘Rabobank Parliament’, 
the CDA is a crucial consultative body for the member banks. Four times a year, the CDA meets and 
issues generally binding rules and recommendations for all local member banks and formulates 
the overall group strategy for Rabobank Nederland. It also establishes the principles that guide 
the Supervisory and Executive Boards of Rabobank Nederland. The members and customers of 
all the different member banks are represented in the CDA through the local management and 
supervisory bodies in the Regional Delegate Assemblies. The CDA can therefore be considered 
the most important insitution within the Rabobank Group. 
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Changes to Rabobank governance, 2015-2016 17
A radical reform of Rabobank’s governance was triggered by internal and external factors, which 
pertained specifically to Rabobank. The decision was made to merge all 106 local cooperative 
banks (LCBs) and Rabobank Nederland (RN) into one cooperative bank at the beginning of 2016. 
The local banks are no longer independent legal entities under the new management regime. 
This means that under Dutch corporate law, the Departments of Members, Local Members’ 
Councils, Local Supervisory Bodies and Local Management Team and their chairs no longer have 
any formal legal status. However, their responsibilities and tasks are set down in internal rules 
and regulations, so they do have statutory status. All customers, members and employees of 
the former LCBs became customers, members and employees of the new unified Rabobank 
organization as a result of the merger. Within the new bank, local banks continue to operate in a 
decentralized manner, with the new structure being characterized by countervailing power (both 
local and central in scope) in the hands of member representatives. The new internal rules and 
statutes were designed to ensure these checks and balances. Figure 8 shows the new governance 
structure of Rabobank since 2016.
Figure 8: New governance structure of Rabobank.
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Source: Groeneveld (2016, p. 22).
The left section of the figure represents what Groeneveld calls the ‘cooperative pillar’, while the 
right section represents the ‘banking pillar’. A brief summary of the new governance structure 
of the cooperative pillar is given below. In the Netherlands, customers of the local banks can 
become members of the cooperative. Based on the rights and obligations that predate the 2016 
changes, there is still a link between members and their local bank. Members are grouped into 
Delegates’ Election Assemblies, which elect the members of the Local Members’ Councils (LMCs), 
which in turn consist of 30 to 50 members. The LMCs function as follows (there are no significant 
differences with the previous situation):
•	 the LMCs act as a sounding board and fulfill a signaling function as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the 
Local Management Teams. 
• the LMCs have certain formal responsibilities such as deciding on mergers or divisions of local 
banks. 
17 This section is based on Groeneveld (2016), ‘The Road towards One Cooperative Rabobank.’
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• the LMCs recommend, appoint, suspend and dismiss members of the Local Supervisory Body 
(LSB). 
• the LMCs help to define the local banks’ social role in local communities and to determine 
how cooperative funds are allocated.
Part of the corresponding department, an LSB has 3 to 7 members, each of which must be a 
member of the cooperative. These local supervisors are appointed by and remain accountable to 
their member bank’s LMC. In the current situation, the chair of an LSB fulfills an administrative 
role within the LMC, which is a considerable change compared to the old situation, where the 
chair of the LSB was the chair of the LMC only in a technical sense. Furthermore, the chairs of the 
LSBs represent the members of their local bank at the General Members’ Council (GMC).
In this way, all members of the local banks are represented at the GMC, which is the highest 
member-controlled decision-making body under the new governance model. 
The chairs of the LSBs participate in the GMC without any binding mandates or restrictions. 
The LSBs have fundamental responsibilities in upholding the decentralized or local focus, including 
a supervisory role. To fulfil these responsibilities, they rely on specific local governance powers 
delegated to the LSBs by the Executive Board. The LSBs’ main rights of approval include:
•	 the appointment, suspension and dismissal of members of the Local Management Team, 
except for dismissal of the chair; 
• the annual plan/budget; 
• membership policy; 
• specific Board decisions. 
The LSBs are also charged with monitoring the implementation of the policy plans and strategies 
that are developed by the chair of the Local Management Team. This includes evaluating how 
well the local bank is compliant with regulations and external laws, with the articles of association 
and with other rules and decisions that apply within Rabobank. The LSBs also monitor the degree 
to which the chair of the Local Management Team works on sustainable development in the 
bank’s local area, and on meeting their local responsibility to safeguard the long-term interests 
of their customers. Accordingly, the Local Management Team and the LSB are supposed to work 
to align locally determined goals with objectives and ambitions that are agreed upon collectively 
by the GMC.
The new GMC has about 100 member representatives and, from its formal role and responsibilities, 
fulfils the following functions:
•	 it acts on behalf of the members as the custodian of Rabobank’s collective values and ensures 
its continued ownership of Rabobank; 
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• it ensures compliance with the articles of association and determines the development of the 
cooperative and decentralized organization; 
• it evaluates governance and the operation of the banking business (based on commonly 
agreed strategic principles); 
• it adopts the financial statements of Rabobank Group; 
• it has the power to amend the statutes or to change the legal status of Rabobank; 
• it has the right to approve major decisions by the Executive Board; 
• it determines the strategy of Rabobank Group; 
• it evaluates the bank’s social impact in relation to its contribution to socio-economic 
development and its fulfillment of its public role in society. 
The GMC also appoints Rabobank’s Supervisory Board, which is accountable to the GMC for its 
monitoring role in relation to the Executive Board. The chair of the Supervisory Board is also the 
chair of the GMC. As a result of the merger into one cooperative bank, the Supervisory Board 
now has wider responsibilities than was previously the case; it is now also responsible for the local 
banks. The Supervisory Board appoints the members of the Executive Board, which is accountable 
to the GMC.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the nature of cooperative banks and their role in society, the roots and 
history of cooperative banks and the origins of cooperatives, and their position in the international 
banking landscape. Banking cooperatives were born out of economic necessity in around 1850, 
and were established to remedy a changing and sometimes poorly functioning market, enabling 
their members to mitigate individual risks in their (farming) enterprises. The original goal of these 
cooperatives was to act on behalf of a unified group of members and satisfy their needs. Through 
growth and by gaining financial power through their members’ contributions, the cooperatives 
were able to provide their members with financial support, advice and even loans. Cooperative 
banks therefore have an important function in society. Their success in that period can be partly 
explained by the presence of high levels of trust, interpersonal relationships and cooperation. 
Member-owned banks can be found throughout the world and belong to the family of 
stakeholder value banks. Cooperative banks differ historically from other types of traditional 
banks. In theory, these member-owned banks work according to the principles of the cooperative 
organization. In the case of Rabobank, the bank has responded to recent developments in 
supervision and legislation by adjusting its governance model. These changes in governance have 
been coordinated with regulatory authorities. This study, however, focuses on the impact of the 
cooperative structure on the bank’s organizational social capital. In the next chapter, we will look 
more closely at these principles and other features of cooperative organization. 

Chapter 3 
Features of cooperative organization 
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3.1 Introduction
Chapter two introduced the empirical object and the independent variable of this study: 
cooperative banks as part of the wider banking landscape. This chapter will address the following 
research question: What are the features of cooperatives as organizations? The chapter will start 
with the purpose, definition, structure and types of cooperatives in section 3.2, followed by a 
look at the cooperative values and principles in section 3.3. The conclusions are presented in 
section 3.4.
3.2 Purpose, definition, structure and types of cooperatives
In historical terms, cooperatives were set up to cater for specific needs and purposes. The need 
for collaboration arose from collective problems. In the case of cooperative banks, they emerged 
to countervail the problem of financial exclusion and the exploitation of certain groups of citizens 
(Birchall, 1997). Cooperatives can act as an organizational vehicle for people to work together, 
join forces and pool resources, thereby achieving collective goals or solving collective problems. 
The primary goal of a cooperative is not to maximize profits but to provide services to its members 
(Henein & Morissette, 2007). Nevertheless a cooperative must generate sufficient revenue to 
cover its expenses and ensure growth. At the same time, a cooperative requires coordinating 
mechanisms – governance – for collective action problems, such as eliminating the issue of free-
riding. 
Cooperatives are known for their close member-client networks in which individual cooperation 
to achieve common goals is paramount. Cooperatives are no different from other business 
models because they adhere to a set of values; the distinction between cooperatives and other 
business models lies in the fact that cooperatives apply the ‘cooperative principles’, which imply a 
special relationship between cooperatives and their members. These cooperative principles will be 
explained further in section 3.3. According to Dunn (1988, p. 85), cooperative organizations, as 
governance structures are based on the principles of ‘user-ownership’, ‘user-control’, and ‘user-
benefits’. As a result, the cooperative can be seen as a social enterprise, and because cooperatives 
and social capital are closely linked according to Valentinov (2004), cooperatives can be seen 
specifically as social capital-based organizations. Traditionally, cooperatives are committed to 
sustainable development, cooperation, reciprocity and trust. 
 
Various cooperative structures can be distinguished; however, all cooperatives share a common 
basic structure and must have the following organizational features for their day-to-day 
operations:
• General Assembly
• Board of Directors
• Set of Officers
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• Committee System
• Management and employees
An overview of the design of a traditional cooperative is presented in figure 9. The configuration 
and structure of different segments can differ between cooperatives.
Figure 9: Classic cooperative structure.
Members Members Members Members Members 
Board of 
directors 
     Members’        
      Council/ 
Annual meeting 
Board 
Executive    
    Board    
Members
Membership is the personal legal position of a person within the cooperative organization. This 
legal relationship is associated with a range of rights and obligations in relation to the cooperative 
(see figure 10). Three distinct relationships can be distinguished: (1) transaction, (2) finance and 
(3) control, and ownership (Van Dijk & Klep, 2005, pp. 87-128). These describe the types of 
general policies regarding the relationship between a cooperative and its members: (1) the user-
owner principle, (2) the user-controller principle, and (3) user-benefit principle (Dunn, 1988, p. 85; 
Barton, 1989b, p. 21).
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1. User-owner relationship. The users are simultaneously the owners, because they provide 
capital. Because it is financed by its members, the cooperative has stakeholders instead of 
shareholders. This means that the ‘user-owner’ and ‘user-controlled’ relationships are connected. 
2. User-controlled relationship. Since the members own and use the cooperative, they are involved 
in decision-making and policy-making and ensure that the cooperative acts in their interest. 
3. The user-benefit relationship. The purpose of the cooperative is to provide and distribute 
benefits to its users on the basis of their use, and therefore the user-benefit relationship is a 
transactional relationship.
Figure 10 shows an illustration of the possible structure of member-cooperative interrelationships 
within a cooperative.
Figure 10: Member-cooperative relationship.
      Member-Owners 
        Board of Directors  (Members) 
        Management (Members) 
    Employees (Members) 
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Hires 
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Elects 
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Reports to 
Reports to 
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In general, membership is personal and not transferable. The influence of the members on the 
control of the cooperative, often referred to as the corporate governance of the cooperative, is 
unusual in that a cooperative is an association that represents the material interests of its members 
by entering into agreements with them.18 Groeneveld points out that without members, there 
cannot be a financial cooperative, and a financial cooperative with voiceless members is not a 
cooperative (2015, p. 35). Cooperatives are a special kind of enterprise (Galle, 2012, p. 25), 
because they do not generate profits for investors but provide for the economic needs of their 
members. Several commentators, such as Fox and Lorsch (2012, p. 57), see this as the strength 
of this model: “Employees and customers often know more about and have more of a long-term 
18 This description corresponds in part to the definition of cooperatives used by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), a Dutch government body that compiles statistical information on the Netherlands.
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commitment to a company than shareholders do. Tradition, ethics, and professional standards 
often do more to constrain behavior than incentives do.” 
Cooperatives are commonly classified into five main categories (see table 2).
Table 2: Type of cooperatives and their members.
Type of cooperative Members
Consumer cooperative Consumers of various commodities such as food, insurance, funerals, 
financial services, travel services, etc. This model would include mutuals.
Small business (producer) 
cooperative
Small and medium-sized businesses such as farmers, fishermen, woodlot 
owners, plumbers, electricians, retail shop owners, hotel owners, etc. These 
are usually family-owned businesses.
Workers’ cooperative Those who work in the business. This could be in any sector, including food, 
agriculture, retail sales of goods or services, social services, etc. This model 
would include collectives (non-hierarchical working groups with consensus 
decision-making), although most workers’ cooperatives would not function 
as collectives.
Solidarity / Multi-stakeholder 
cooperative
There are different classes of members, which could include consumers, 
workers, community representatives, investors, suppliers, etc., and who 
could be engaged in any type of business, such as food, agriculture, retail 
sales of good or services, social services, etc.
Community cooperative People drawn from and representing a community.
Exceptions Almost every country has examples of some cooperatives that defy simple 
classification into the above categories, but which are still clearly subject to 
democratic governance.
Source: adapted from Novkovic & Webb (2014, p. 3).
The most commonly used definition of a cooperative is: “A cooperative is a user-owned and 
user-controlled business that distributes benefits on the basis of use.” (Barton, 1989a, p. 1). The 
three components of this definition are also present in the International Co-operative Alliance 
definition of a cooperative: “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations, through a jointly owned and 
democratically controlled enterprise.”19 This worldwide organization, founded in 1895, represents 
the cooperative movement and serves cooperatives all over the world. Regarding the functioning 
of cooperatives, the ICA has formulated what are known as the ‘cooperative principles’, seven 
core principles which enable cooperatives to achieve the objective of meeting their members’ 
needs and aspirations, when applied to day-to-day governance and management (ICA, 2015). 
The independent variable in this study is the variable on which I base my comparison: the way in 
which banking cooperatives have implemented the cooperative principles and how they manage 
these principles. More details will therefore now be given on these ‘cooperative principles’. 
19 Source: http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles.
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3.3 Cooperative values and principles
Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity 
and solidarity (ICA, 2015). According the ICA, cooperative values are a set of six ideals that 
underpin seven cooperative principles. These values are listed below in table 3.
 
Table 3: Cooperative values.
Cooperative value Explanation
1. Self-help The actions and decisions of the different members ensure that the cooperative, 
as an organization, directly benefits its members and the community. However, 
it is not charity. The cooperative is a means for individuals and groups to directly 
improve their lives and communities through their own work and effort.
2. Self-responsibility All members are responsible in a cooperative. Members must be responsible for 
their actions, responsibilities and duties. A cooperative can not function properly 
if its members do not take their responsibility on their role and responsibilities for 
the partnership as a whole.
3. Democracy Regardless of the size of their contribution each member is treated fairly and 
their voice or opinion is heard and respected. All members will be able to make 
suggestions for improving the services or products.
4. Equality The value of equality is about giving access to people of the same resources and 
treating each other in the same way.
5. Equity The value of equity revolves around the concept to both privileged and 
underprivileged people with fair accommodation and treatment according to their 
needs.
6. Solidarity This value can be interpreted as the ‘fellowship’ among the members of a 
cooperation and its community.
The seven cooperative principles are derived from these cooperative values. These principles 
are listed in table 4. These principles are rooted in the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers’ 
business guidelines for good store management, also known as the ‘Rochdale Principles’ for 
consumer cooperatives (Groeneveld, 2015a, p. 4). The rules set by these first cooperatives in 
Britain and other countries (e.g. in Germany under Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen) still apply today 
and continue to form the basis of the principles adopted by the International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA). These cooperative principles have been very influential across the cooperative 
movement, providing a standard for whether an organization is entitled to call itself a cooperative, 
and they have evolved gradually over time. The principles are guidelines by which cooperatives 
can put their cooperative values into practice. They are not rigid principles set in stone; they 
need to be applied with vision and proportionately to the national economic, cultural, social, 
legal and regulatory particularities and context within which each cooperative operates. They are 
intended as guidelines and recognized by the United Nations and by several countries in their 
(specific) legislation governing cooperatives (Fici, 2012). The principles also play an important role 
in describing the characteristics of the cooperative organization, because they influence its formal 
structure and governance. Residual power in a cooperative lies with the members (Novkovic & 
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Webb, 2014, p. 2). This is illustrated by the member-cooperative relationship shown in figure 10 in 
section 3.2. 
Table 4: Cooperative principles.
Cooperative principle Explanation
1. Voluntary and Open Membership Co-operatives are voluntary organizations, open to all persons 
who are able to use their services and are willing to accept the 
responsibilities of membership, without discrimination on the 
basis of gender, social class, race, political persuasion or religious 
denomination.
2. Democratic Control by Members Co-operatives are democratic organizations controlled by their 
members, who actively participate in setting policies and making 
decisions. Men and women serve as elected representatives and 
are accountable through membership. In primary co-operatives, 
members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and 
co-operatives at other levels are also organized in a democratic 
manner.
3. Economic Participation of Members Members contribute equitably to, and exercise democratic control 
of, the capital of their co-operative. At least part of that capital 
is usually collectively owned by the co-operative. Members 
receive limited compensation, if any, on the capital provided as 
a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for any 
or all of the following purposes: developing the co-operative, 
possibly by setting up reserves, at least part of which would be 
indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions 
with the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved 
by the membership.
4. Autonomy and Independence Co-operatives are autonomous self-help organizations controlled 
by their members. If they enter into agreements with other 
organizations, including governments, or raise capital from 
external sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic 
control by their members and maintain their co-operative 
autonomy.
5. Education, Training and Information Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, 
elected representatives, managers, and employees so that 
they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-
operatives. They inform the general public - particularly young 
people and opinion leaders - about the nature and benefits of 
co-operation.
6. Co-operation among Co-operatives Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen 
the co-operative movement by working together through local, 
national, regional and international structures.
7. Concern for the Community Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their 
communities through policies approved by their members.
Source: International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). (2015). Guidance Notes to the Co-operative Principles. 
According to Birchall & Ketilson (2009, p. 11), the first four principles are the core principles 
that define the cooperative identity: 1. voluntary and open membership, 2. democratic control 
by members, 3. the economic participation of members, and 4. autonomy and independence, 
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because these four principles guarantee the terms and conditions of the members, ‘under 
which members own, control and benefit’ from the cooperative business. The fifth principle, 
education, training and information, is a commitment to ensuring that members can fulfill their 
role effectively and is a requirement for democratic control (Goglio & Alexopoulos, 2014), while 
the sixth principle, cooperation among cooperatives, refers to business strategy. The seventh 
principle, concern for the community, recognizes that members of the cooperative are part of a 
local community (Birchall & Ketilson, 2009). 
3.4. Conclusions
This chapter has described the features of cooperative organization. This type of organization 
is an autonomous association of people, who come together voluntarily to meet and or fulfill 
their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned 
and democratically controlled business. This form has its own specific characteristics, which are 
based on a number of principles and together constitute the essence of being a cooperative. 
An overview of Rabobank’s cooperative structure was discussed in chapter two. Traditionally, 
cooperatives are committed to sustainable development, cooperation, reciprocity and trust. These 
are also characteristics of ‘social capital’. In this study, organizational social capital is defined as: 
social networks within an organization based on reciprocity, trust and reputation. Social capital 
can thus be viewed as both the ‘cement’ and as a ‘lubricant’ for the cooperative organization, 
while the cooperative itself can be seen as a ‘brewing pot’ for social capital. There is a strong 
theoretical relationship between social capital and the values and principles of the cooperative. 
The next chapter will explore the relationship between the cooperative structure, social capital 
and collective action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Chapter 4 
The cooperative: social capital and collective action
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4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the features and characteristics of cooperatives. The most important 
feature of a cooperative is that it exists for the benefit of its members. Without members, no 
cooperative can exist. This chapter discusses the cooperative as a result of, and a solution to, 
dilemmas of collective action. However, cooperatives can only tackle dilemmas of collective action 
when sufficient organizational social capital is present. As such, social capital can be regarded as 
the ‘fuel’ of the cooperative. This chapter will proceed to explore the relationship between the 
cooperative structure, social capital and collective action problems. Section 4.2 will address social 
capital theory. In order to review the relationship between collective action and social capital 
theory, the concept of collective action and collective action problems will be explained in section 
4.3. In addition to examining the definition of collective action and organizational social capital, 
the various elements and dimensions of organizational social capital and the manner in which 
cooperatives and organizational social capital are connected will be discussed in section 4.4. 
This chapter will end with an evaluation of the importance of commitment to the cooperative 
principles as a pre-condition for generating and nurturing organizational social capital within a 
cooperative.
4.2 Social capital theory
The concept of social capital, one of the most saliant concepts in the study of social sciences, has 
been and continues to be the subject of study, review and discussion by a large number of scholars 
and professionals active in a wide range of disciplines, applied sciences and practical applications.
The central premise of social capital theory is that social networks have and generate social value, 
with social capital being both an asset and a resource. The communities in which people live and 
the organizations that they work for are social networks. These have valuable features that affect 
many aspects of life (Christakis & Fowler, 2009).20 Research has shown that societies with high 
levels of social capital are associated, among other things, with better health (Veenstra, 2002), 
greater personal well-being (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004), lower crime rates (Sampson, Raudenbush, 
& Earls, 1997; Sampson, 2012) and better affordable housing (Brandsen & Helderman, 2012). 
Social capital also relates to the social content of ties and the ability of cooperative groups 
to achieve common goals. It is also regarded as the collective social value of social networks 
and the tendencies that emerge for people to support one another (norms of reciprocity). In 
order to identify an appropriate perspective on social capital, including a conceptualization and 
operationalization for this study, this section will first provide a brief overview of the various 
principal perspectives on social capital, the dependent variable in this study.
20 As Christakis and Fowler (2009) argued: social networks shape almost every aspect of our life. Furthermore, 
the transmission of information, the establishment of trust and the development of norms of collaboration 
are related to the mechanism that drives social capital.
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The first known use of the concept of social capital was by Lyda Judson Hanifan’s (1916) discussion 
of rural school community centers. As a state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia, he wrote 
to express the importance of community involvement for successful schools and used the term 
to describe those “tangible substances that count for most in the daily lives of people: namely 
goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families 
who make up a social unit” (Hanifan, 1916, p. 130). Since that initial description, the concept has 
evolved considerably.21 Although social capital is an increasingly popular theme in various areas of 
research, there is no definite, categorical, and settled definition. Instead, the particular definition 
adopted by a study depends on the discipline, unit and level of investigation (Robison, Schmid, 
& Siles, 2002). For this reason, the principal (different) perspectives on social capital will first be 
briefly discussed, followed by the choice of the particular perspective and definition adopted in 
this study, which corresponds to the discipline and the level and unit of investigation.
Social capital is conceived in different ways by different authors; for example Bourdieu, Coleman 
and Putnam all approach it differently (e.g. Field, 2008, p. 40). While Bourdieu focuses on power 
relations, concrete network links, logical strategies and individual benefits, Coleman focuses 
on socialism, families, rational participants’ strategies and social benefits, and Putnam tries to 
explain the subject in terms of civil traditions, political systems and social benefits (Waldstrøm & 
Svendsen, 2008, p. 1502).
According to Bourdieu, social capital is “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition” (1986, p. 248). From the Bourdieuan perspective, social 
capital in the form of social networks and connections can be used for example to (re)produce 
inequality, which explains the way in which people gain access to influential positions by using 
their social connections, whether directly or indirectly. 
The social capital theory, developed by Robert Putnam in his book ‘Making Democracy Work: 
civic traditions in modern Italy’ (1993), gained popularity in the 1990s. This book’s central thesis is 
that social capital is critical to high institutional performance and the nourishment of democracy. 
Putnam concluded that the presence of high levels of social capital – as seen in the northern 
part of the country – explained the differences between the institutional performance and the 
development of the regions of the country. Putnam’s contribution to social capital research 
continued in 2000 when he presented his book, ‘Bowling Alone’, regarding his research on the 
breakdown of social capital in American associations. Putnam found that people in the USA 
have become increasingly disconnected from one another, and that social structures such as 
21 It would be hard to come up with a clear and undisputed single definition, that satisfied everyone, because 
the variety of perspectives and definitions identified in the literature stems from the highly context-specific 
nature of social capital and the complexity of its conceptualization and (empirical) operationalization. 
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labor unions, religious groups and political parties have disintegrated. He argues that declining 
membership of civic institutions has led to a weakened civil society. According to Putnam social 
capital can be described as “social networks among individuals and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them’ (2000, p. 19) and ‘features of social organization such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” 
(1995, p. 67).
Putnam’s perspective is based on the shared, informal norms and values of the members of a 
specific group, which enable collaboration between them. He identifies five characteristics of 
social capital that contribute to the solution of social issues (2000, pp. 288-289): 
•	 Social capital makes it easier to solve common (resource) problems. 
•	 Social capital provides a reduction in (social) transaction costs. 
•	 Social capital contributes to the awareness of social dependence through the experience of a 
wide(r) variety of social contacts. 
•	 Social capital contributes to improved information flows through the creation of social 
networks. 
•	 Social capital positively influences mental and physical well-being. 
One difference that stands out concerns whether social capital exists at the individual level or at the 
collective level. For example, Putnam (2000) argues that social capital is a collective resource and 
not an individual one. Granovetter (1973) and Coleman (1990) look at interpersonal connections 
to identify collective benefits by looking at both the individual and group levels. Granovetter is 
known for his work on social network theory in economic sociology. His theory on the spread of 
information through social networks is known as ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ (1973). Granovetter 
focuses on the concept of embeddedness, because: when taking people’s social relationships 
into account, much of their economic activity occurs through social relationships. Fukuyama 
argues that social capital is necessary for a strong democracy and healthy economic growth and 
development, and that basic political institutions and a strong rule of law are needed to build 
social capital (2002, p. 32).
According to Elinor Ostrom, social capital is a set of values and relationships created by individuals 
in the past that can be drawn on in the present and future to help overcome social dilemmas. In 
‘Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action’, Ostrom specifically 
mentions cooperatives in her outline of the main forms of collective action. (Ostrom 1990, p. 25).22 
Ostrom regards social capital as an attribute that enhances a group’s ability to solve collective 
action problems. Nan Lin regards social capital as the “resources embedded in a person’s social 
networks, which can be accessed or mobilized through ties in those networks. […] Through social 
relations or through social networks in general, an actor may borrow or capture other actors’ 
22 By grouping cooperatives with Common Pool Resource management institutions, Ostrom is arguing that, 
like CPR institutions, cooperatives are forms of collective action (see section 4.3).
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resources (e.g., their wealth, power or reputation). These social resources can then generate a 
return for that actor” (Lin, 2005, p. 4).
The different perspectives and definitions in the literature suggest that there is some agreement 
among scholars that individual social interactions are at the core of social capital and that the 
added value of social capital lies in its focus on networks and relationships as resources. What is 
also clear from these definitions is that social capital generates positive externalities. Table 5 gives 
an overview of the principal authors and their perspectives on social capital. 
Table 5: Different perspectives on social capital. 
Social capital and their perspectives
Author Perspective
Hanifan (1916)
Social capital is made up of those tangible substances that count for most in 
people’s daily lives
Granovetter (1973) Access to embedded resources from social networks and social ties
Bourdieu (1986)
Social capital is an asset used by specific groups in order to secure social 
positions
Coleman (1990)
Social capital serves as a resource for the relatively disadvantaged and acts as 
an asset belonging to individuals or families
Fukuyama (1997)
Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain set of informal 
values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation 
among them
Nahapiet & Ghosal (1998)
Social capital is the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
within, available through and derived from the network of relationships of an 
individual or social unit 
Putnam (2000)
Social networks among individuals and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them 
Ostrom (2003)
Social capital is an attribute of individuals and of their relationships that 
enhances their ability to solve collective action problems
Lin (2008)
Social capital is defined as resources embedded in a person’s social networks, 
resources that can be accessed or mobilized through ties in those networks
The above brief exploration should provide an ample overview of the different perspectives on 
the concept of social capital. To conduct this research, I have specifically chosen the theoretical 
approach and perspectives of Ostrom and Putnam. These state that cooperatives were created 
primarily to solve problems and help to shape and organize collective action. By applying the 
cooperatives principles, the cooperative in theory ensures the organizational architecture required 
to maintain the necessary social interaction with its members and staff, which contributes to the 
creation and maintenance of the cooperative’s social capital and thus ensures its daily functioning. 
For this reason, the perspectives of these two authors (with their elements) fit this study the best. 
Putnam emphasizes that institutional performance is linked directly to the social context in which 
formal governance structures operate. Six et al., (2015) point out that Putnam was “influenced” 
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by the work of Ostrom in Governing the Commons, drawing on on her defintion of a successful 
institutional arrangement as one “that enable[s] individuals to achieve productive outcomes in 
situations where temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present” (Ostrom 1990, p.15). In the 
view of these authors, social capital can be defined as those features of social organization – such 
as networks, norms and trust – which facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit 
(Putnam, 1993, p. 35; Ostrom & Ahn 2003).23 
The theoretical approach of this study defines cooperatives as structures for cooperation. 
These are viewed as the basis of an ‘institution’, conceived in its formal dimension in terms of 
concrete organizational structures. Based on the cooperative structure and the application of the 
cooperative principles, these structures of cooperation are assumed to have a theoretical impact 
on its internal and organizational social capital. This study focuses on organizational social capital, 
and it is therefore sensible also to consider the various recognized dimensions of organizational 
social capital that have been used in empirical research. In addition to the interpretation of 
the selected perspective, therefore, it is at this point necessary to look at how the dependent 
variable – organizational social capital defined as social networks within an organization based 
on reciprocity, trust and reputation – can be operationalized. 
Before elaborating further on the dependent variable, organizational social capital, the concept 
of collective action will first be discussed in order to explain the relationship between social capital 
and collective action problems. 
4.3 Collective action 
Collective action takes place when a group of people work together to achieve some common 
objective. When a group of individuals stands to benefit from certain action(s), but the associated 
cost makes it hard or impossible for any individual to undertake these actions alone, cooperation 
to achieve shared benefit is an obvious solution. However, such cooperation needs to be structured 
and facilitated by rules and cognitive and normative frameworks. These rules and frameworks 
tend to become more dense and prescriptive when the size of the group increases. 
Collective action problems 
Collective action problems or dilemmas can be defined as the failure of a group of individuals 
to achieve an outcome that all the members of that group want the most, or want at least as 
much as the outcome that would result from all the members of the group acting in their own 
self-interest.
23 Ostrom and Ahn (2003) also consider trust an outcome of the forms of social capital and a key link between 
social capital and successful collective action, but do not consider trust itself to be a form of social capital.
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Collective action problems occur, firstly, when the joint decisions of two or more individuals 
result in socially undesirable outcomes. These problems emerge from the interdependence of the 
members of the group, because the pay-off for one individual depends on the decisions of others. 
Solving collective action problems requires changing individual decisions through governance 
arrangements that alter individual pay-offs and lead to a common result that leaves at least one 
individual better off without any of the other individuals losing out. In a situation that involves 
collective action, there is a distinction between cooperators and defectors. The defectors are 
referred to as free-riders, because while they benefit from cooperation with others, they are 
unwilling to cooperate on a reciprocal basis. 
According to McGuire (2005)24, collective action problems can be classified into two general 
classes. The first class relates to individuals failing to coordinate when coordination would be 
better than not coordinating (see also Taylor, 1976, 1987). The degree to which coordination is 
required may vary depending on, for instance, group size and the characteristics of the group. 
If the group is small and internally-oriented with low costs, only their activities may require 
coordination; for larger and more heterogeneous groups, much more coordination may be 
needed to prevent, resolve and overcome coordination problems. Groups with a high degree 
of social interaction, extensive networks and that are interlinked with subgroup organizations 
can overcome problems relating to collective action more easily than groups without these 
characteristics (Dowding, 2007).
The second class of collective action problems relates to the failure to achieve an outcome that 
all the parties involved are prepared to accept. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Tragedy of the 
Commons are two well-known examples of this class of collective action problem (Hardin, 1968; 
Taylor, 1976; Axelrod, 1984). The simple, one-shot “prisoner’s dilemma” game represents a 
situation that shows why two completely “rational” individuals may decide not to cooperate, 
even though it appears that it would be in their best interests to do so. It would be in the interests 
of both players to work together, but they do not ultimately do so because they can see the 
benefits of free-riding and fear the dangers of being taken for a ride (Dowding, 2007). However, 
by ensuring mutual trust, communication and binding agreements, the prisoner’s dilemma can 
be transformed into a positive sum game, meaning a ‘win-win’ situation in which nobody wins at 
other people’s expense, and the sum of profits (positives) and losses (negatives) is positive overall.
Scale and size
Why do some individuals who share a common interest find it to be in their individual interest to 
bear the costs of organizational work, while others do not? According to Mancur Olson in ‘The 
24 McGuire, V. (2005). The Collective Action Problem. [website]. Retrieved from: Link: http://spot.colorado.
edu/~mcguire/collact.html
The cooperative: social capital and collective action   •  65
4
Logic of Collective Action’ (1965), collective action can never be taken for granted: “When a 
number of individuals have a common or collective interest – when they share a single purpose 
or objective – individual, unorganized action [either will] not be able to advance that common 
interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest adequately” (1965, p. 7). Subsequently, 
Olson challenges the general optimism expressed in group theory: “The idea that groups tend to 
act in support of their group interests is supposed to follow logically from this widely accepted 
premise of rational, self-interested behavior. In other words, if the members of some group have 
a common interest or object, and if they would all be better off if that objective were achieved, it 
has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were rational 
and self-interested, act to achieve that objective.” (Olson, 1965, p. 1). 
Olson challenges the presumption that the possibility of benefit for a group of individuals is 
sufficient to generate collective action to achieve that benefit: “Unless the number of individuals 
in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion of some other special device to make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve 
their common or groups interests”. (Olson, 1965, p. 2). Sociologists such as Mary Douglas (1986) 
frame the benefits of small-scale, voluntary arrangements in this way: “Small-scale societies are 
different. Many who are well apprised of the difficulty of explaining collective action within 
the theory of rational choice are content to make exceptions. Smallness of scale gives scope 
to interpersonal effects.” (Douglas, 1986, p. 21). The importance of scale is also recognized 
with respect to cooperatives. Small cooperatives are presumed to have a closer relationship with 
their members than larger cooperatives (e.g. Poteete & Ostrom, E. (2004).25 Fonteyne (2007, 
p. 28) argues, in this regard, that “Cooperatives’ basic governance mechanisms were designed 
for small groups of people within close-knit communities, but are now being applied to large 
conglomerates. […] At present, it is by no means clear that they have been adapted to function 
well at the scale that many modern cooperative banks have achieved. In particular, collective 
action challenges appear daunting in large cooperatives.” 
Reducing the incentives for members to exercise effective oversight is an important challenge 
regarding the governance systems of cooperative banks. This is mainly due to the existence 
of ownerless endowment. The removal of the financial obligations and risks, which were 
previously collectivized, creates the risk that members’ involvement with the cooperative will 
decrease (further) and this may incentivize free-riding behaviour, because non-member contract 
arrangements do not require a contribution of capital from members of the cooperative as they 
once did. This effect may be amplified due to the lack of any (economic) difference in the service 
level that the cooperative provides to members and non-members. 
25 Ostrom focused her research particularly on smaller groups, for large groups she added an eighth design 
principle: nested enterprises.
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Group size is important in two ways. Firstly, the larger the group, the less significant individual 
contributions appear to be to the success of the group. As a result, the temptation to free ride will 
be greater. Secondly, the size of the group has an impact on the value and meaning of a certain 
contribution. The degree of interaction between the members of the group is more important 
than the size of the group alone. Face-to-face interaction between a small group of people can 
lead to subgroup mobilization, regardless of the size of the rest of the group, which overcomes 
the visibility problem. The degree of interactivity has more influence on the degree of visibility of 
individual members than overall group size (Dowding, 2007).  
A special type of collective action problem relates to so-called common-pool resources (goods 
that are based on a natural or man-made resource system), where the application of an economic 
rationale leads to the suboptimal use of the resource, and often to the exhaustion of that 
resource. This result is known as the Tragedy of the Commons (McGuire, 2005). Examples include 
the overgrazing of pasture, the overfishing of lakes, or global warming. Although common pool 
resources have been known to collapse due to overuse (such as over-fishing), Elinor Ostrom has 
shown that many examples exist where communities use common resources more prudently 
and manage to avoid such a collapse. She discusses the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which is the 
economic theory that describes a situation whereby individual users in a shared-resource system 
act independently and according to their own self-interest and ultimately behave in a way that 
is contrary to the common good of all users by depleting that resource. Ostrom sets out to 
discover the conditions under which individual interests and community interests can be aligned. 
Ostrom’s empirical research reveals that all successful cases of common self-governance shared 
eight principles of stable local common-pool resource management (Ostrom, 1990, p. 90). These 
principles are shown in table 6.
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Table 6: CPR Design Principles. 
Definition Operationalization
1
Clearly defined 
boundaries
The identity of the group and the boundaries of the shared resource are clearly 
delineated. Define boundaries for resources and appropriators. Effective 
exclusion of external, unentitled parties. Individuals or households with 
rights to consume resource units from  the common-pool resource and the 
boundaries of the common-pool resource itself are clearly defined.
2
Proportional 
equivalence between 
benefits and costs
Members of the group must negotiate a system that rewards members for 
their contributions. High status or other disproportionate benefits must be 
earned. Unfair inequality poisons collective efforts. Devise rules congruent 
with conditions.
3
Collective-choice 
arrangements
Group members must be able to create at least some of their own rules 
and make their own decisions by consensus. People tend to work hard for 
group goals that they have agreed upon. Allow most users to participate in 
developing rules and modifying operational rules.
4 Monitoring
Managing a common-pool resource is inherently vulnerable to free-riding and 
active exploitation. Unless these undermining strategies can be detected at 
relatively low cost by norm-abiding members of the group, the tragedy of the 
commons will occur. Hold monitors accountable to users.
5 Graduated sanctions
Authority to sanction is limited due to disconnection of parties. Users who 
violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending 
on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other users, from officials 
accountable to these users, or from both. 
6
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms
It must be possible to resolve conflicts quickly and in ways that are perceived as 
fair by members of the group. Low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms need 
to be in place.
7
Minimal recognition 
of rights to organize
Groups must have the authority to conduct their own affairs. Externally 
imposed rules are unlikely to be adapted to local circumstances and violate 
principle 3. Ensure that external authorities permit users to devise their own 
rules.
8
For groups that are 
part of larger social 
systems: nested 
enterprises
There must be appropriate coordination among relevant groups. Every sphere 
of activity has an optimal scale. Large-scale governance always involves 
finding the optimal scale for each sphere of activity and coordinating the 
activities appropriately, a concept called polycentric governance (McGinnis, 
1999). 
Source: adapted from Wilson, Ostrom and Cox (2013). Generalizing the core principles for the efficacy of 
groups, p. 22.
The cooperative principles bear a strong resemblance to the design principles found in lasting CPR 
institutions. The similarities between the cooperative principles and these design principles are 
particularly strong at the junction of members’ control and responsibility. We have the cooperative 
principles: democratic member control, autonomy and independence, and members’ economic 
participation; and we have the design principles: monitoring, congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules, and collective choice arrangements. Both emphasize the prevention of 
influence from outside the organization –through external capital for example.
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Having discussed the concept of collective action and collective action problems, the next step is 
to explain the dependent variable – organizational social capital – in greater theoretical detail in 
order to further investigate the relationship.
4.4. Organizational social capital
In this study, organizational social capital is defined as: social networks within an organization that 
are based on reciprocity, trust and reputation. This definition corresponds with the description 
of social capital by Putnam: ‘social networks among individuals and the norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness that arise from them’ (2000, p. 19). An organization’s social capital forms 
a clearly collective asset. It is unique to an organization and can be used and drawn on by other 
oganizations or individuals. From a resource-based perspective, social capital complements the 
assets of human capital and financial capital. These forms of capital can vary in terms of their 
rareity, value and tradability, and can therefore provide a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
Leana and Van Buren define organizational social capital as “a resource reflecting the character 
of social relations within the organization” (1999, p. 540). They also state that the range of social 
relations found within organizations comprises their distinctive ‘organizational social capital’ and 
that organizational social capital can be considered an asset that can create positive effects for 
the organization itself and for the people that are part of that organization. Most research into 
organizational social capital has been based on the idea that members of the same organization 
will, to some extent, share the same outlook. This helps the entire organization to build networks 
and relationships, and thus its levels of social capital, faster and more sustainably, since this is a 
joint effort and is perceived as such by a broad cross-section of the organization. Inkpen & Tsang 
regard organizational social capital as an organizational public good, where “members of an 
organization can tap into the resources derived from the organization’s network of relationships 
without necessarily having participated in the development of those relationships” (2005, p. 151). 
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), relationships between organizational members are “a 
valuable resource for the conduct of social affairs” (p. 243). Because this collectively owned asset 
can be utilized by members of the organization in order to improve performance and decision-
making (Andrews, 2007). Social capital is “a productive asset facilitating some forms of social 
action while inhibiting others” (Nahapiet & Ghosal, p. 245), and plays an essential role in the 
development of the “socially and contextually embedded forms of knowledge and knowing” (p. 
246), which are present within organizations (Andrews, 2007). It is the source of ‘organizational 
advantage’ (p. 243), a point further elaborated by Bolino, Turnley, & Bloodgood, (2002), for 
instance. Social capital is not only a critical resource, but also an asset that can provide decisive 
and sustained organizational advantages. It therefore follows that organizations need to be 
aware of their social capital, and of the factors necessary to create, nurture and sustain this asset.
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Nilsson, Svendsen, & Svendsen (2012) relate organizational social capital among staff to better 
coordination and less free-riding, which leads to better economic performance and an enhanced 
reputation. Additionally, they expect organizations with a good reputation, ‘where social capital 
is conducive to symbolic capital’, to be more likely to attract more qualified staff (pp. 189-199). 
4.4.1. Dimensions of organizational social capital
To identify the presence of social capital, the literature distinguishes several attributes or 
dimensions of social capital according to the object of investigation chosen (either an individual, 
a community or an organization). On the basis of various studies that adopt different approaches 
to measuring social capital, and due to its multidimensional nature, several models have been 
developed, one of which is Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s model. Their model has been used in several 
other studies that focus on organizational social capital, making it the most widely accepted 
conceptualization of organizational social capital (Tantardini, 2016, p. 34). In their study on the 
role of social capital in the creation of intellectual capital, Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) distinguish 
between the structural, relational and cognitive dimensions of organizational social capital. In 
their model, social capital comprises the relationships, orientations, norms and values that make 
it possible for people to act and behave cooperatively. 
Within this study’s research set-up, these dimensions are adopted as research perspectives when 
studying how the cooperative structure affects the organizational social capital of an organization. 
The six constructs, listed below in Table 7, are used in order to measure the three dimensions of 
social capital. 
Table 7: Dimensions of organizational social capital.
A. Structural dimension 1. Social interaction ties (SIT)
B. Relational dimension 2. Trust (TR)
3. Norm of reciprocity (NR)
4. Identification (ID)
C. Cognitive dimension 5. Shared vision (SV)
6. Shared language (SL)
A) Structural social capital
The structural dimension consists of the extent to which people in an organization are connected 
to one another, and the overall pattern of connections between them. As such, this term refers to 
non-personal links between individuals or units. It is an indicator of employees’ access to networks 
and the manner in which they interact in order to learn and exchange information, ideas and 
knowledge with each other. Social Interaction Ties (A1) are the channels used for information 
and resource flows (Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). The structural dimension of social capital is a matter of 
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network ties and specific configurations. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue that “network ties 
influence both access to parties for combining and exchanging knowledge and anticipation of 
value through such exchange” (p. 252). These relations based on connections could be described 
as the bonding, bridging and linking of connections (Woolcock 1998; Narayan 1999; Putnam 
2000). The concepts of bonding and bridging were developed by Gittell and Vidal (1998), but are 
in fact similar to Granvotter’s strong and weak ties (Granvotter, 1973) and could also be viewed 
as building on Woolcock’s (1998) concept of integration (Babaei, Ahmad & Gill, 2012). 
B) Relational social capital
The relational dimension consists of the kind of personal relationships that people have formed 
with each other based on a history of interactions. It refers to interpersonal relations between 
individuals (Granovetter, 1992). It focuses on particular factors, such as respect and friendship, 
which influence individuals’ behavior, and also shows the level of ‘trust’ (construct B2) among 
employees. According to Al-Alawi, Al-Marzooqi, Mohammed (2007, p. 25), interpersonal trust is 
an individual or group’s expectation that the promises or actions of other individuals or groups can 
be relied upon. Norms of reciprocity (construct B3) refer to knowledge exchanges that are mutual 
and perceived by those involved as fair Chiu, Hsu, & Wang, (2006, p. 1877), and also refer to how 
much they will help each other when needed. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 256) note that 
‘identification’ (B4) is: “the process whereby individuals see themselves as part of a whole with 
another person or group of people.” In this study, ‘identification’ refers to an individual’s positive 
feeling and sense of belonging toward an LCB. Unlike structural capital, which emphasizes the 
quantity of relationships, relational capital focuses on the quality of relationships in organizations. 
C) Cognitive social capital
The cognitive dimension concerns shared meanings, language and symbols across the members 
of the network (Upadhyayula & Kumar, 2004). The cognitive dimension refers to resources that 
provide shared interpretations, shared values and cultural elements, visions (C5) and concepts; 
these resources are mainly codes and narratives that are shared by individuals. Cognitive social 
capital shows the extent to which employees clearly understand and accept organizational 
goals and values, and the extent to which they are committed to these. Shared cognition 
acts both as a medium and as a product of social interaction. The construct of ‘shared vision’ 
(C5) comprises the aspirations and collective goals of the members of the organization and is 
defined as “a bonding mechanism that helps different parts of an organization to integrate or 
to combine resources” (Tsai & Ghosal, 1998, p. 467). When members share the same notion 
of how to interact, they are more likely to avoid mutual misunderstandings and to become 
partners who are prepared to share or exchange their resources (Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). Common 
goals also help people to see the potential value of resource exchange. When the members of 
an organization share a vision, they are also more likely to become partners who share their 
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resources (Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). In this study an additional element – ‘membership’ – will be 
added within the construct of shared vision. 
Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) give examples of shared codes and language (C6). Language is 
the means by which people discuss and exchange information; when people’s language and 
codes are different, this sets people apart and restricts their access to information. Language also 
influences our perception. 
4.4.2 Cooperative principles and organizational social capital
Organizational social capital, the dependent variable in this study, is defined as: social networks 
within an organization based on reciprocity, trust and reputation, and corresponds with Putnam’s 
description of social capital: ‘social networks among individuals and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them’ (2000, p. 19).
The institutional set-up of cooperative firms is an important framework for accumulating social 
capital – i.e. the written ‘rules of the game’ or statutes and/or by-laws. By applying these principles, 
the cooperative safeguards the organizational architecture and maintains the necessary social 
interaction with its members, which in turn contributes to the creation and maintenance of the 
cooperative’s social capital. The interaction between group members in Table 8, serves to support 
the functional role of social capital vis-à-vis cooperative principles (Valentinov, 2004). Social 
capital helps to overcome collective action problems because it allows for better coordination and 
cooperation between group members, helping them to create and maintain social relations that 
are based on reputation, reciprocity and trust. The cooperative structure provides and ensures 
the conditions required to foster, build, maintain and increase social capital, which is required 
to initiate and catalyse collective action. The relationship between the various concepts of the 
cooperative structure consist of social capital and collective action problems. They serve as the 
explanation for the use of the cooperative structure as an analytical solution to a collective action 
problem. This will be explained in further detail in the next section.
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Table 8: Rationalizing the social capital-supporting role of the cooperative principles.
Governance Instrument Main effect Explanatory remarks
Voluntary membership Anti- hierarchical Social capital can only be built on the basis of 
voluntary approaches; practicing these promotes 
social capital as an alternative to hierarchical 
authority, which substitutes voluntary action with 
directed action. 
Open membership Anti- commercialization A distinctive characteristic of social capital is 
that its value does not decrease if it is shared 
by an additional person; therefore, the size of 
membership can be indefinitely expanded with 
the effect of extending the beneficial economic 
effects of cooperation to all those who share the 
same norms and rules that constitute the essence 
of a given local social capital. 
Democratic control Anti- hierarchical The uniform voting rule reflects the fact that the 
amount of social capital is determined by the 
number of personal identities of its individual 
bearers; each bearer can have only one identity; 
therefore, practicing this voting rule is a direct 
expression of social capital as the organizational 
principle. 
Limited compensation on 
capital
Anti- commercialization This ‘repressive’ measure is evidently intended to 
reduce the incentives to build ‘economic’ capital 
through the cooperative, and thereby prevent the 
penetration of ‘price-based’ organization into the 
cooperative governance, which would destroy 
the stock of social capital. 
Autonomy, independence Anti- hierarchization This characteristic of governance also reflects 
the importance of voluntary approaches and 
prevents any attempts to substitute social capital 
with hierarchical authority. 
Education, training, and 
information
Investment in social capital These measures are directly intended to 
strengthen the internal stock of social capital 
by promoting the applicable norms, values, and 
rules, and also to increase the social capital of 
cooperatives in the eyes of the general public. 
Cooperation among 
cooperatives
Investment in social capital Since all cooperatives are supposed to share 
a set of common values, they have a basis on 
which to develop a certain social capital between 
themselves, and it would be rational for them 
to take this opportunity, since this would also 
reaffirm social capital as the major organizational 
resource of cooperatives. 
Concern for community Investment in social capital This measure is intended to build social capital 
in those communities where cooperatives are 
located, rather than only between members or 
with the general public. 
Source: Valentinov (2004, p. 15).
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Valentinov (2004, p. 15) points out that maintaining social capital as an organizational asset and 
resource may become increasingly difficult as the membership base expands and becomes more 
heterogeneous, leading to growing complexity in organizational goals and activities. Two major 
processes of such cooperative degeneration (i.e. economization) can be identified: 
1. Hierarchy formation, whereby administrative authority takes the place of social capital in the 
form of a disproportionate expansion of the competencies of managerial staff. 
2. Commercialization, whereby social capital is eroded by incentives for individual gain, 
characteristic of price-mediated economic relations. 
 
Illingworth (2012, p. 10) states that viewing social capital as a moral concept could allow us 
to address some of the vulnerabilities of cooperatives and, by identifying these, contribute to 
their growth. At the same time, scholars like Nilsson et al. (2012) suggest that large (complex) 
agricultural cooperatives are disappearing due to a loss of social capital. This is because a 
cooperative cannot operate at full capacity if its members do not fully participate and respect 
their membership requirements, duties and responsibilities. If lack of member participation is 
an ongoing issue, the cooperative risks losing the commitment of its members, and at the same 
time, devaluing membership of the cooperative for both members and non-members. The larger 
the cooperative, the less important an individual’s contribution may appear to their group goals, 
which can increase the temptation to free-ride.
Relationships between organizational social capital and cooperatives 
The creation of social capital requires a sustained investment of time and effort (Ostrom, 1994). 
Social capital is produced through interactions between individuals and organizations and 
systems (Gillies, 1998). Therefore, the interaction / activities between members and staff is key 
in terms of the relationship between organizational social capital and cooperatives. Although 
social capital can only be generated collectively thanks to the presence of communities and social 
networks, it can be used by individuals and groups. As discussed in Chapter 3, cooperatives 
are member-owned, member-controlled, and member-benefiting governance structures and, to 
this end, cooperatives apply the cooperative principles. The basic idea is that the cooperative 
structure and its governance ensure adequate coordination and rules. Consequently, interaction 
and coordination should take place among its members and within the cooperative organization. 
By interacting, the members fulfill the various roles that are required of them. According to Lin 
(1999, p. 32), “all scholars remain committed to the view that it is interacting members” who 
contribute to the maintenance and building of social capital. In the cooperatives’ daily operation, 
then, members should facilitate the process of interaction in order to build and maintain the 
cooperative’s organizational social capital. By connecting the elements of social capital, such as 
trust and reciprocity, the direct connection between cooperating and social capital can be shown. 
Figure 11 below (based on Ostrom, 1998, p.15) illustrates this.
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In the day-to-day business of a cooperative, keeping these elements in balance is a constant 
challenge. The active participation of the members helps to create social capital (cf. Wollebaek 
& Selle, 2002, 2003), and it also seems reasonable to assume that social capital is an incentive 
for members to participate in collective activities. However, when the size and/or diversity of a 
group increases, maintaining and growing social capital becomes increasingly difficult (Coulter, 
Goodland, Tallontire & Stringfellow, 1999; Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009). 
 
Figure 11: The core relationships of cooperating, according to Ostrom.
Reputation 
Trust 
Reciprocity 
Increasing levels 
of cooperation Net Benefits 
Source: based on Ostrom (1998, p. 15).
Increases in trust (defined as a firm belief in the integrity, ability, or character of a person or faith in 
the others’ intentions and actions; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1999, p. 281), reciprocity (defined 
as a reciprocal requirement or relationship) and reputation (the general opinion or judgement of 
the public about a person or thing) can create an upward spiral, because trust affects whether a 
person will be willing to act cooperatively in the expectation that it will be reciprocated. When 
there is trust (and where trustworthiness is monitored) between the members and staff, and 
when the cooperative is known genuinely to stand for the needs and interests of the group, its 
members will be much more likely to cooperate. In this context, cooperatives (as institutions) are 
understood as trust producers. This results in increasing levels of cooperation and simultaneously 
leads to an increase in social capital. As a mechanism for collective action, cooperatives are closely 
related to the process of generating social capital. The similarities become more evident when we 
compare the cooperative to Figure 12. This model by Luoma-aho demonstrates the extremes of 
social capital creation (2009, p. 243). 
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Figure 12: Model of the extremes of social capital creation, Luoma-aho (2009).        
Experiences of  
working together 
Expectations, trust and 
willingness to cooperate 
Generalised  
trust in other  
people in society 
   Social Capital 
			good               bad 
Reputation 
good                 bad 
									Trust																					Mis-trust 
		 high              low 
Source: Luoma-aho (2009, p. 243).
As is apparent from the theory, interaction between members and staff is required in order to 
establish and maintain social capital (this represents the relational dimension of social capital). 
The cooperative structure needs to ensure the facilitation of social interaction. This is why two 
focal points are important for this study, which are linked to the independent variable (banking 
cooperatives) and thereby the fundamentals of the cooperative structure: ‘Commitment of staff 
and management to cooperative principles’ and ‘member-customer related activities’. In the day-
to-day business of cooperative banks, social capital is important. At the same time, collective 
action undertaken by the members of cooperatives also creates challenges, such as free-riding 
problems. Particular attention was paid to the importance of commitment to the cooperative 
principles as a pre-condition for generating, fostering and maintaining the organizational social 
capital of a cooperative. In the next section, collective action and the role of the cooperative 
structure in solving collective action problems will be discussed.
 
4.4.3 The role of the cooperative structure in solving collective action problems
Cooperatives and social capital have a significant role to play in solving collective action problems, 
and there are relationships between the cooperative structure and collective action problems. 
The relationship between the cooperative structure and collective action problems becomes clear 
when we visualize and explain the cooperative structure as an analytical solution for a collective 
action problem. The basic reasoning followed in this regard is visualized in figure 13, where social 
capital is regarded as ‘fuel’ (a resource) for collective action.
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Figure 13: Theoretical reasoning.
 Cooperative    
    structure 
 Organizational    
  social capital 
    Collective    
       action 
As we saw in section 2.4.2, cooperative banks as we know them today emerged in nineteenth-
century Europe, where many population groups and communities were facing financial exclusion. 
They allowed groups of citizens a way to organize themselves to countervail the problem of 
financial exclusion and exploitation. This financial exclusion can be seen as an event – namely a 
collective disadvantage. To tackle this together as a group of individuals, a form of cooperation 
was required, a collective action approach. This is how cooperatives originated in society, and 
how they generally began as grassroots organizations, enabling people to become involved on a 
small scale. The basic reasoning is as follows: in the event of a collective disadvantage, a group 
of individuals can opt for a cooperative structure. The cooperative form (as a formal structure) 
provides the institutional infrastructure that members need to take collective action. Making 
this work requires organizational social capital. In this study, the focus lies on the impact of 
the cooperative structure on organizational social capital. The study focuses on group size and 
two focal points of social capital, which are linked to the basic structure of the cooperative and 
appertain to the structural social capital dimension: ‘Commitment of the staff and management 
to cooperative principles’ and ‘member-customer related activities’ within banking cooperatives. 
To this end, the moderating variables shown in figure 14 are used.
Figure 14. Conceptual model.
Moderating variable: 
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- Size (FTE  
    Independent variable: 
                 (X): 
Local Member Cooperatives  
        Moderating variables: 
                     (Z): 
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- Member-customer activities 
    Dependent variable: 
                (Y):  
    Organizational Social  
             Capital 
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen that cooperatives and collective action depend on a number of 
variables and factors, such as trust, reputation and reciprocity between members, in order to 
achieve net benefits as a group or individually. At the same time, we have seen that collective 
action by cooperatives leads to challenges, such as free-rider problems. The importance of a 
commitment to the cooperative principles as a pre-condition for generating, fostering and 
maintaining the organizational social capital of a cooperative is the focal point. 
Cooperatives act on the basis of cooperative values and principles, and adhere to these principles. 
This enhances the level of cooperation within these organizations. The formal working principles 
of these institutions, the ‘rules of the game’, are an important framework for the accumulation 
of social capital in cooperative organizations. 
Social capital complements human captial and financial capital as assets. These may be more or 
less rare, valuable and poorly tradable (Barney, 1991). While the workings of social networks are 
not always visible, they have a significant economic impact on enterprises and cooperatives. This 
illustrates the importance of developing better insight into the relationship between financial 
cooperatives and social capital. Furthermore, the loss of social capital is reflected firstly by a 
decrease in involvement for the sake of (potential) mutual benefits; secondly, by a decrease in the 
collaboration that is needed to achieve these ‘benefits’; thirdly, by members’ decreasing trust in 
their cooperatives’ leaders and governance; and fourthly, by decreasing trust in each other and 
decreasing social bonds (Nilsson et al., 2012). Due to cooperatives’ heavy dependence on social 
capital, the interpersonal relationships of the stakeholders involved determines to a large extent 
the proper functioning of the governance mechanisms of the cooperative structure. 
The ‘magic’ of social capital is that it increases whenever it is used.26 However, social capital does 
not just appear out of thin air. It is formed – or not – through social interaction, and it requires 
active use and regular maintenance; if this does not happen, organizational social capital will 
quickly evaporate (see Ostrom, 2000).
26 Ostrom goes on to argue that social capital does not wear out with use, but rather with disuse. See Ostrom, 
E. (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, 
American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review. 92(1), 1-22. And: Ostrom, E. 
(2000). Social Capital: a bad or a fundamental concept. In Dasgupta, P., & Serageldin, I. (Eds.), Social Capital: 
A Multifaceted Perspective (pp. 172-214).  Washington D.C: The World Bank.
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5.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have each introduced important aspects of the theoretical framework 
used for this dissertation. They have introduced various research questions regarding cooperatives 
and their impact on the performance of social capital. Chapter four discussed cooperatives as 
organizations based on collective action, with social capital as their main source of capital. 
This chapter describes the research design and methods that will be used to answer the central 
question and research questions presented in Chapter 1. With the aim of measuring the three 
dimensions of social capital (structural, relational and cognitive) of the Organizational Social 
Capital Model used by Nahapiet and Ghosal (described in Chapter 4), as the dependent variable, 
within five selected local member Rabobanks of different sizes, as the independent variable. 
This will enable us to identify factors which may have a positive or negative impact on the level 
of the social capital of these banks: group size and two focal points of organizational social 
capital, which are associated with the basic cooperative structure: ‘Commitment of the staff and 
management to cooperative principles’ and ‘member-customer related activities’
 
5.2 Design
This study adopts a mixed method approach to obtaining answers to the research questions. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative research designs is a helpful way to understand the 
concepts that are being explored and tested. It leads to the widest possible view of the concepts 
and thus provides valuable research opportunities. During the course of this research, every 
effort was made to gather as much qualitative data as possible in order to produce a rich and 
comprehensive picture of the constructs and enhance the study of the fundamentals of the 
relationships. The qualitative data were also used to provide anecdotal data that may contribute 
and support the validation of results and the interpretation and understanding of the statistical 
relationships identified. The quantitative data were obtained in order to examine the patterns of 
relationships between the constructs and to maximize the generalizability of the results. Insights 
from both the qualitative data, obtained through in-depth interviews, and the literature were 
combined to specify the theoretical domains of the constructs in order to develop a framework 
for the different relationships between the constructs. The research design reflects the purpose 
of this research – namely, to identify causal links between the factors (attributes) or variables that 
pertain to the main research problem: How does the cooperative structure affect its social capital?
The study focuses on group size and two focal points of social capital, which are linked to 
the fundamental cooperative structure and relate to the structural social capital dimension: 
‘Commitment of the staff and management to cooperative principles’ and ‘member-customer 
related activities’ within banking cooperatives. The objective of this chapter is to provide further 
insight into the preparation of, and the choices made during, the empirical research process, and 
to explore the possibilities with regard to replication, by showing how all the major components 
of the research project, the various steps within it, and the working methods, were combined to 
address the central research questions. 
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The choice of the case study approach as a research strategy emerged from my assessment that 
this method is best the suited to answer my research questions (Yin, 2009). Case studies are 
characterized by an investigation and description of relationships between certain variables, 
the intensive and extensive description of examples and the lack of specific predetermined 
variables, which is appropriate for this study. Case studies are generally suited to qualitative 
and ‘why’ questions (Yin, 2009). This case study can be characterized as an embedded case 
study design (Yin, 2009). This means that, within a similar context, more than one sub-unit of 
analysis (‘embedded units’) is studied. ‘Case study research generally serves to uncover the logic 
of empirical phenomena, rather than the frequency of their occurrence. It implies the detailed 
study of a limited range of phenomena. […] The cases will be confined to work areas, since it is 
here that ties are the strongest. Accordingly, this is where traditional group boundaries should be 
located’ (Brandsen, 2001, p. 106). 
In this study, the objective is to identify the (explanatory) factors which exist within the complex 
dynamics of the internal environment of cooperative banks in practice.27 To conduct the empirical 
study, in-depth case studies involving selected banking cooperatives were carried out.28 
Main measurement issues 
Techniques for measuring the concept of social capital are still developing but some consensus is 
emerging among scholars about how it can be measured. However, it remains important to test 
and validate different approaches to measuring social capital and to share the knowledge and 
insights acquired, because the measurement of social capital is an emerging and evolving area. 
For example, in Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences by Robert Putnam (2001), social 
capital is certainly far from homogeneous. It can nevertheless be a powerful predictor of a range 
of developments, which is reason enough to consider it well worth further study.
27 As Taylor, G. (2005, p. 91) points out, the production of valid and objective descriptions of phenomena 
is the primary purpose of quantitative research. Qualitative research, on the other hand, involves collecting 
and analyzing information in many different forms. It tends to focus on exploration in a detailed manner 
and assumes a dynamic reality. (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight 2002, pp. 64-65.) The qualitative research method 
is multi-method in focus, with an interpretive approach that is makes it suitable for developing a thorough 
understanding of the subject (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 5).
28 This combined explanatory research can be regarded as micro level research, because in this study the focus 
lies in the inner working of a complex organization and no or little research has been done into the monitoring 
or assessment of social capital within banking cooperatives themselves. Qualitative research is used in complex 
situations in which little research is considered to have been done. This is also known as ‘verstehen’. See: 
‘Weber’s Verstehen and the History of Qualitative Research: The missing Link’, Platt, J. (1985), P. 448.
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Stone (2002, pp. 2-3) summarizes four major principles that can be applied to avoid problems 
when measuring social capital: 
1. The measurement and ‘practice’ of social capital need to be theoretically informed. Otherwise, 
anything and everything may be labeled as social capital, and old ideas and concepts may be 
relabeled as social capital. 
2. Social capital should be seen as a resource for collective action. In cases where there is a 
desire to ascertain whether social capital produces a spectrum of other desired social and 
economic results, such as in active communities, the tautological pitfall of conflating social 
capital with either social action or some other phenomenon must be avoided.
3. Empirical work must recognize that social capital is a multidimensional concept. We first 
need to understand how the various dimensions of social capital interrelate and relate to the 
concept as a whole, before we can turn to how they relate to other relevant outcomes.
4. It is important to note that social capital will vary between social scale and types of networks. 
It may be that a dimension in one network does not correspond to a different dimension of 
social capital in another network, or to outcomes that may or may not be measured on a 
different scale again.
The principles outlined above have been applied consistently and taken as a starting point while 
carrying out this study.
5.3 Data collection 
Table 9 shows the relationship between the research and the two parts of the empirical research. 
Below the table, the methods and the associated process are explained in more detail.
Table 9: Answering the research questions.
Research question Method Chapter
1 Desk research 2
2. Desk research 3
3. Desk research 4
4. Survey, Interview, Desk research 8
5.3.1. Case study: Social Capital and Local member Rabobanks.
A multiple comparative case study was conducted involving a selected number of cooperative 
banks of different sizes to assess their existing level of social capital and to identify factors that 
may impact positively or negatively on their level of social capital. To conduct this part of my 
research, a purposive sample of five cooperative member Rabobanks was selected. To collect the 
data, 696 employees filled in a 50-item questionnaire which included the three dimensions of 
social capital (structural, relational and cognitive) of the Organizational Social Capital Model used 
by Nahapiet and Ghosal in their study (1998). This was followed by semi-structured interviews 
with 46 of the participants in order to add to and further clarify the data collected. Data collection 
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took place in the period 2013-2014. Within the qualitative design, a deliberate choice was made 
to use a comparative case study, because the main research question includes both a descriptive 
and an explanatory component. I studied five different cases to enable comparison, and opted 
for the hierarchical method. During the first stage, I examined the different cases individually. 
Analysis needed to be as independent as possible and I followed a predetermined pattern in 
order to carry out the comparisons in the second stage. In this second stage, the results from the 
first stage were used as input for a comparative analysis of the five cases investigated (also see 
Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2002, p. 172). The aim was to identify explanations for the similarities 
and differences between the five cases that had emerged in the first analysis.
In order to present and analyze the empirical findings appropriately, and to take account of the 
dynamic social and contextual nature of social capital within cooperatives, various methods that 
reinforced each other were used: surveys, qualitative interviews, document analysis. This enabled 
me to map the process of the impact on social capital as a phenomenon in its entirety and in its 
own context. (Yin, 2009). An external focus group was also used regularly to provide feedback. 
The aim of this focus group was not to obtain additional data but rather to increase the reliability 
of the research. Because the strategy concerning the membership policy of the different local 
member Rabobanks had yet to be finalized and was still subject to adjustments, it was decided to 
collect data openly while it was being examined (2011-2014). I included data based on subjective 
experience and perceptions, for example, from interviews, log descriptions and observations, in 
addition to data from more objective sources, in order to ensure that a particular perspective 
would not be adopted too quickly, which could have resulted in important data being missed. This 
ultimately resulted in a description that does justice to the complexity of the subject and enabled 
me to build up a comprehensive picture of the staff and higher management at the five local 
member Rabobanks. To answer the first three research questions, desk research was conducted, 
while the fourth research question was based on the descriptive framework of Nahapiet and 
Ghosal (1998). All data were collected in an open manner, and then analyzed using SPSS. 
To collect survey data, a 50-item questionnaire was used, which was designed on the basis of the 
three dimensions of organizational social capital (structural, relational and cognitive) in the model 
developed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998). The questionnaire had four parts: part one (the 
structural dimension) consisted of eighteen questions relating to interaction between employees 
for the purpose of learning and sharing information. Part two (the relational dimension) consisted 
of seventeen questions relating to trust (trust in the sense of relying on each other, trust regarding 
their needs as employees and trust in relation to important and sensitive issues) and norms of 
reciprocity and identification (sense of belonging and positive feeling towards the organization). 
Part three (the cognitive dimension) consisted of seven questions relating to the respondents’ 
(employees) acceptance of and level of commitment to shared organizational goals, values, and 
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vision. Part four included three additional questions (also concerning the cognitive dimension) 
regarding the impact and validity of members within the cooperation.
Against the background of the results of the survey, a selected group was asked to share their 
response to the results from their local bank. For this purpose, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with a selected number of participants from the five local member Rabobanks 
(chairpersons, directors, managers, team leaders and HR managers). A typical interview was 
designed to take one hour. However, in the event many of the interviews took 75-100 minutes to 
complete. The interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and written notes and observations 
were also made during the interviews. The questions asked during the interviews related to a 
range of subjects including but not limited to social capital. For the semi-structured interviews, 
I compiled the following list of topics on the basis of the central objective, secondary questions 
and sensitizing concepts: an introduction to the researcher, the research objectives, a discussion 
of the sound recording, and assurances of the anonymity of the respondents’ contributions. 
There was also time to clarify certain issues. A scoreboard was used to encode quotations. During 
the interviews, specific questions arose about events that had happened (which strategies and 
interventions were available at the team level), the persons concerned, the barriers and facilitating 
factors, the support received and desired, and the results of the research to date. This had two 
purposes: firstly, to complement and clarify the data collected, providing additional (background) 
information on the results of the survey. Secondly, it allowed us to verify the data from the desk 
research. These interviews focused on the results relating to the performance of social capital:
1. The commitment of the staff and management to cooperative principles.
2. Member-customer related activities. 
Besides these selected participants, I also selected participants from Rabobank Nederland who 
were subsequently interviewed. Again, Nahapiet and Ghosal’s model (1998) was the basis for 
the interview questions chosen. An example question from the interview; ‘What percentage of 
employees lives in the area served by this local bank?’ 
To ensure the accuracy of the analysis and as a check on the interpretation of the researcher, both 
points were validated by two employees, including an expert from Rabobank Nederland itself. 
This was done because the confidentiality agreement that was used to ensure the anonymity 
of the participants in the research included a specific control measure in order to validate the 
data. The final results were presented to the chairpersons of the participating local banks and 
the senior vice president and the director of Directorate Cooperative and Sustainable Business at 
Rabobank Nederland. This feedback also ensured reliability and validity of the data (Boeije, 2005). 
Desk research was the third method used to answer my research questions. This included an 
analysis of various strategic documents such as annual plans and policy documents. Various 
documents were studied in order to understand the background and context of the local member 
Rabobanks, the presence of social capital and the variables that influence levels of social capital, 
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the processes involved and the yields produced. All relevant documents relating to this were 
provided by the local member Rabobanks involved in the research. 
Documents are often written for a specific purpose and a specific audience (Yin, 2009, p. 105). 
This also applies to the documentation obtained from Rabobank. The main limitation was the total 
lack of documentation on the measurement (tools), control, or observation of social capital. No 
documentation was found within the organization regarding the application of the cooperative 
principles (Chapter 3), either. The little documentation on cooperative principles that was found, 
combined with the findings in this study, will be included in the analysis section in Chapter 6. 
I kept a log throughout the project period, containing short notes on, for example, preliminary 
discussions and e-mail exchanges with research participants. The log includes a great deal of 
information on the role of the assumptions that were made and how these may have affected 
the process. The log is an important addition to the more objective data. After reading the 
documents, relevant excerpts relating to key variables in the secondary questions were selected 
(context, strategy, destination, roles, phases, communication, control and income). The contact 
person and case supervisor then verified this process. The data were arranged chronologically, 
creating an overview of the process. The third step was to analyze this text by encoding segments 
according to a coding scheme. The coding scheme was designed on the basis of the descriptive 
framework and the operationalization described in section 5.6. The next step was to further 
summarize the data. Different sources contribute to answering research questions 3 and 4 (see 
Table 9). To get an indication of the reliability of the selection of data and its analysis, the results 
of the analyses were presented to the supervisors, asking them whether the summarizing process 
had led to the loss of relevant data and whether the interpretation was correct. Several discussions 
were held that helped to improve the results.
 
5.4 Case selection
There now follows a more detailed description of how the cases and participants were selected.
Choice of research units and respondents
Firstly, I will look at the case selection process used for the five LCBs, which are part of the 
Rabobank Group. Subsequently, a description of the research participants in the survey and the 
interviews will be given. These interviews were held with employees of the local member banks 
as well as staff members from Rabobank Nederland, mainly senior policy advisors and directors, 
although these were only indirectly involved in this study. 
 
The research population consisted of five LCBs that are part of the Rabobank Group. In order to 
protect the identity of the cooperatives that served as cases in the study, pseudonyms were used. 
Regarding the selection of cases, I started with a pilot case study. To select the pilot case and the 
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real cases, ‘convenience, access, and geographic proximity’ were the criteria used, as indicated 
by Yin (Yin, 2009, p. 93). To ensure the comparability of these cases, I first decided to investigate 
banking cooperatives that operate within the same Dutch region: Noord-Brabant. This region, 
also unofficially known as Brabant since 2001, is a province of the Netherlands, located in the 
south of the country, bordered by the Belgian provinces Antwerp and Limburg in the south, and 
the Dutch provinces of Limburg to the east, Gelderland to the north, and Zeeland to the west. 
Secondly, I chose the five local members banks in this region because these organizations were 
an appropriate size for my research, making it possible to interview a wide range of respondents 
in each organization and build up a comprehensive picture. Thirdly, I chose cases within the same 
region in order to control for culture as a possible additional factor. And fourthly, I looked for 
special and distinctive LCBs. Within the Rabobank organization, one local bank really stood out. 
This local bank was known among Rabobank staff at Cooperation & Sustainability as a leading 
player, but they had no evidence at all that this local bank actually performed better. The chair 
of this local bank had developed a specific cooperative strategy, based on his own ideas and 
had applied this new strategy within their bank. In addition to these factors, I also chose LCBs 
with different numbers of staff because scientific literature indicates that size may affect the 
performance of social capital. 
Five cases were selected, varying in size (in staff numbers (FTE)) from high to low: LCB A, LCB B, 
LCB C, LCB D, LCB E. Circa 1,200 employees of these five LCBs were contacted through their 
work e-mail addresses with an explanatory letter and an invitation (Appendix A1) to participate 
in an online survey on social capital consisting of 50 questions. Of the employees that were 
contacted, 696 responded to the online questionnaire, which was 58% of the total number of 
contacted subjects. Case D deviated notably from the average of the other four cases with a 
response rate of 38%. A response rate of 54% is adequate, since a survey response rate of 50% 
or higher is taken to be sufficient for analysis (Rubin & Babbie, 2005). The survey was designed to 
measure Nahapiet and Ghosal’s (1998) three dimensions of organizational social capital in these 
LCBs. Survey items reflecting each dimension of organizational social capital were included in 
the sections of the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed with each statement on a five-point Likert scale (1: Strongly Agree, 2: Agree, 3: Neutral, 4: 
Disagree and 5: Strongly Disagree). The results of the survey are shown in chapter 7. In addition 
to the survey, 46 employees were interviewed using semi-structured questionnaires, used both at 
the LCBs and at Rabobank Nederland (Appendix A2.). The interviews were always conducted at 
the relevant LCB or branch of Rabobank Nederland.
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Table 10: General data from the local member Rabobank cases.
Case A B C D E
FTE 350-400 300-350 250-300 175-200 100-125
Own banking license Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Offices 8 7 5 3 2
Member/Customer ratio 18.7 22.8 27.2 31.2 25.3
The scope of the pilot-testing related to both content and methodological issues, and had the 
following goals: firstly, to collect test data and perform a check on the depth of the survey 
questions, ensuring that the design and methodology would be adequate for the continued 
rollout of the cases by enabling the development of a draft protocol representing the areas of 
interest in the rest of the case study (Yin, 2009, p. 63). Secondly, to test the data and prepare the 
interviews. This was done both within the LCB setting and that of Rabobank Nederland, where 
five staff members as well as an independent advisory board, which falls outside the respondents’ 
feedback, were asked to provide feedback. Pilot-testing ensured the reliability of the methods 
chosen. As a result, the data provided the required insight into the basic issues being studied.
 
Staff and management of the local member banks
Before we turn to the respondents, it is first necessary to describe the staff and management 
of the participating local member banks. Although the respondents participated continuously 
throughout the entire study period of the research (2011-2014), there were staff position 
changes during this period. The case of the local member banks located in the region of Noord 
Brabant embodies five LCBs, which were designated A, B, C, D, E, which together operate 
from a total of 25 offices, with approximately 1290 FTE and serving approximately 423,000 
retail customers and 325,00 businesses. Every Rabobank LCB is made up of different divisions. 
There is a distinction between serving private individuals, customers and private banking 
(PA and PB) and (business) organizations (BA and ZR). A further distinction is made between 
commercial functions and support or back office functions. The support divisions include 
control, administration, human relations and public affairs. The employee cooperative business 
is often placed within human relations. The employees of Rabobank LCBs can be divided into 
those that have member-customer contact and those that do not. In addition, a local member 
Bank is managed by a chairperson who works alongside directors, who themselves manage 
(team) managers and team leaders. Employees have their own competencies, responsibilities 
and activities that can sometimes depend on the size of the local member Rabobank and 
its catchment area. The increase in legislation and regulations means that all employees of 
local Rabobanks must meet increasingly strict requirements. Across the entire banking sector, 
this increased focus on regulation and oversight has had an impact on the overall workload. 
Employees often come from within the catchment area and have varying backgrounds and 
levels of education due to the various functions they occupy. Interaction between colleagues, on 
Research design and methodology   •  89
5
the one hand, and between members and customers on the other hand, and their perceptions 
of this interaction, was a key factor in scoring the level of social capital. 
Participants’ survey and interviews
All employees of the five local member banks were invited to take part in the social capital 
performance survey. The more staff that participated in the survey, the more empirical support 
there was for (significant) statements regarding the participating local banks and thus the 
research population. In order to study the impact of the organization on social capital and then 
build up a more general picture, it was important to explain the purpose of the research to 
all the employees that were invited to participate in the survey. During the research, I looked 
in particular for anomalies and explanatory factors. The results of the survey provided the first 
empirical building blocks to draw the bigger picture, which, after analysis, gave me the chance to 
conduct interviews to clear up questions, in the subsequent step in my research. The participants 
in the survey provided information on social capital at their local member banks. To establish an 
idea of the impact of commitment and interaction on social capital at the local member banks, 
I decided to collect data through interviews with respondents who had been actively involved in 
the survey. The survey research was taken as a key source in the interview stage. This was done 
to gain insight into the scores attributed to social capital and possible explanations for this for 
the rest of the research. The qualitative data were obtained from various managers and directors 
at the five local member Rabobanks. For this reason, I will provide more information on these 
respondents. The number of participants from each participating local member Rabobank varied 
from six to nine individuals, including chairpersons, directors, team leaders, managers, (senior) 
account managers, HR advisors and cooperative advisors. The interview data and results were 
translated by a professional translator. This was done to eliminate any possible bias caused by 
interpretation on my part.
5.5 Ethical considerations
While I was carrying out this study I was also working as a Senior Risk Manager at Rabobank 
Nederland (head office, Utrecht), which may give rise to a suspicion that the results of my work 
may not be entirely objective. To allay any such suspicions and with the aim of assuring the 
objectivity of the research, I made certain choices to strengthen the objectivity of my work. 
While the boards of the five LCBs investigated and Rabobank Nederland were interested in the 
research objectives, they had no control of or influence over the content of the survey or the way 
in which it was administered, nor over the interviews with the staff. Whether or not the survey 
was completed, and how it was completed, was entirely up to the staff members involved. The 
same applied to participation in further interviews. Participation in the survey was also completely 
anonymous. Participants of the study were assured that any information obtained through the 
survey and interviews would only be used for this PhD research, and that no personal information 
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would be disclosed or be recovered, with the exception of the supervisors for validation and 
supervision reasons only.
I also built in additional measures to ensure objectivity and reflexivity; I applied self-analysis 
and reflection to my own background and the origins of the methodological position adopted 
(Bourdieu, 2003) during my research. My reflection on my position and its potential impact 
resulted in the following points:
- I am transparent from the start about my job and research, by constantly reiterating my 
position as both a Rabobank employee and independent researcher. 
- I specifically chose to conduct this research in my own time and entirely without  compensation 
or allowance from my employer, and I have not received, or asked for any donations or fees.
- The study is consistent with existing research (design) in relation to the measurement of 
organizational social capital.
- Interviews were recorded with a voice recorder.
- Quotes from interviews and documents have been translated into English by a professional 
translator.
- The study is clearly defined and described, and therefore replicable.
- presented my interim study externally at Euricse and EMES and presented  my research 
design and ethical considerations in a presentation at the 5th EMES International Research 
Conference (2015) on Social Enterprise (Chair: Prof. Dr. P. Kalmi). Furthermore, I worked with 
an external focus group, with people from outside the Rabobank: Dr. P.M. Karré and Dr. R. 
Tews. In addition, Radboud University Nijmegen has critically monitored this study and there 
are no ties between my academic supervisors and Rabobank.
5.6 Operationalization
To carry out the two parts of the empirical study, it was necessary to choose scales in order 
to measure the different variables precisely according to different indicators. Within the Dutch 
cooperative bank sector, there was no clear way to measure these values.  In fact, no measurement 
of social capital whatsoever could be found. A number of variables and concepts were therefore 
developed into concrete indicators in order to begin the research. The indicators measured are 
described below for each case study part, and I will also explain how exactly these were measured.
5.6.1. Social Capital and Local Cooperative Banks
Case study part 1 began by measuring social capital in its various dimensions within the five 
different local member Rabobanks by conducting a digital survey. This was followed by semi-
structured interviews to gather complementary data and further clarification. For both the survey 
and the semi-structured interviews, the social capital dimension framework of Nahapiet and 
Ghosal was used. To measure the results of the case study based on this framework, the different 
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variables required (further) operationalization.
Operationalization of banking cooperatives and social capital
The main research variables are related, and it is assumed that something in those banking 
cooperatives leads to or has an effect on other things. Thus, the dependent variable (social 
capital) is expected to be affected by the independent variable (banking cooperatives). See Figure 
15, for a schematic representation of the conceptual model.
Figure 15. Conceptual model.
Moderating variable: 
          (Z): 
- Size (FTE  
    Independent variable: 
                 (X): 
Local Member Cooperatives  
        Moderating variables: 
                     (Z): 
- Commitment of the staff and   
   management to the cooperative  
   principles 
- Member-customer activities 
    Dependent variable: 
                (Y):  
    Organizational Social  
             Capital 
1. The dependent variable: organizational social capital 
Organizational social capital is, presumably, affected by the independent variable: cooperatives, 
whereby size is the main differentiator (see figure 15). I follow Nahapiet and Ghosal, who use 
three dimensions of social capital: structural, relational and cognitive dimensions. Table 11 
provides an overview of the input and output indicators that were selected. 
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Table 11: Operationalization of the social capital survey
Dimensions of 
Social Capital 
(Nahapiet & 
Ghosal, 1998)
Indicators of 
Social Capital Indicators
Survey 
questions
Structural
Social 
interaction 
ties (SIT)
- Living in the operating area of the cooperative where one is 
employed
- Membership of a sports or fitness club
- Membership of multiple local networks
- Participating in a number of (online) networks 
- Level of encouragement, facilitation or participation by 
manager
- Adequate time available for customers/members allocated by 
cooperative (Rabobank)
- Number of family members
- Number of close friends
- Amount of contact with former colleagues
- Good contact with neighbors
- Recognition of customers/members
- Contact with customers/members every year
- Presence of annual meetings with customers/members
- Number of annual meetings
- Importance of contact with customers/members
- Importance of needs and wishes of customers/members
Q 6 through 
Q 23
Relational
Trust (TR)
- Generally speaking I trust most people
- Most people in my (working) area can be trusted
- Most customers/members can be trusted
- Most of my colleagues within the cooperative (Rabobank) can 
be trusted
- Trust regarding friends and family acting in your interests
- Trust regarding colleagues acting in your interests
Q 24 through 
Q 29
Norm of 
reciprocity 
(NR)
- Degree of readiness to help family
- Degree of readiness to help friends
- Degree of readiness to help colleagues
- Degree of readiness to help customers/members
- Following the local news
- Willingness to help people in general with a question or 
problem
- Participation in volunteer work
Q 30 through 
Q 36
Identification 
(ID)
- Feeling a degree of alliance with the local cooperative 
Rabobank
- Feeling a degree of solidarity with the local member cooperative 
Rabobank
- A strong positive feeling about the local cooperative Rabobank
- Feeling proud to be an employee of the local cooperative 
Rabobank
Q 37 through 
Q 40
Cognitive
Shared vision 
(SV)
- Level of awareness of cooperative goals of the organization
- My manager spends sufficient time on cooperative action in our 
daily work
- My colleagues generally know what the cooperative philosophy 
stands for
- The local management of the cooperative (Rabobank) is a good 
advertisement for being a cooperative
- Working for a cooperative (Rabobank) is a deliberate choice
Q 41 through 
Q 45
Shared 
language 
(SL)
- Colleagues of the cooperative (Rabobank) communicate clearly 
during conversations with customers/members
- Colleagues of the cooperative (Rabobank) communicate clearly 
in writing with customers/members
Q 46 through 
Q 47
Membership
Role & 
influence 
members
- All customers must also be a member of the local cooperative 
(Rabobank)
- The influence of members of my cooperative (Rabobank) is 
clearly noticeable in my working area
- Members are very important for the continued existence of a 
cooperative
Q 48 through 
Q 50
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This survey mainly used existing scales from the literature. Likert-type or frequency scales are 
designed to measure opinions or attitudes and involve fixed choice response formats (Bowling, 
1997, Burns, & Grove, 1997). These ordinal scales measure levels of agreement or disagreement. 
In the final form of this study, the Likert Scale was a five-point scale, which was used to enable 
respondents to express how much they agreed or disagreed with a particular statement. 
Respondents could choose between the following options: strongly agree / agree / neutral / 
disagree / strongly disagree.
There are multiple social capital proxies or indicators for measuring social capital. For instance: 
bonding, bridging and linking connections, trust, norms of reciprocity, identification, shared 
vision and shared language. The level of social capital is measured by the outcome of the three 
dimensions. Furthermore it was interesting to discover whether the management also directed 
and controlled these indicators. For that reason, the in-depth interviews focused on these two 
focal points: the commitment of the staff and senior management to cooperative principles 
and member-customer related activities. These points were discussed in addition to the social, 
relational and cognitive dimensions. The validity of the instrument measuring social capital was 
ensured by assessing the degree to which its questions related to the subject being studied. The 
reliability of the instrument was tested and approved statistically.
2. Independent variable: The independent variable is the variable I used to compare, the five 
different local member Rabobank cooperatives: their implementation of the cooperative principles 
and their conduct in this regard (see Table 4).
 
3. Moderating variables: In the empirical study I searched for the possible effects of certain 
variables. Group size and the size of the organization measured by full-time employees (FTE) were 
also part of the investigation. By comparing the five local Rabobanks, of different sizes, I searched 
for the specific effects of the organizational form itself. This study will apply the dimensions to 
the study of ‘affecting’ social capital by cooperatives in the banking sector. This may either be 
human interaction, or the effect of the cooperative being bound by its organizational structure. 
As mentioned previously, two focal points of organizational social capital were chosen, which 
are linked to the basic cooperative structure: ‘Commitment of the staff and management to 
cooperative principles’ and ‘member-customer related activities’
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Table 12: Operationalization of ICA Cooperative Principles 
Definition Operationalization Indicators
1
Voluntary and open 
membership
Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to anyone able to use their 
services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without 
discrimination on the grounds of gender, social, racial, political or religious.
- How many members are there in relation to non-members?
- What are the reasons for becoming a member of the cooperative?
- Are all new customers asked to become members?
- On what grounds may membership be denied to new customers?
- What are the differences between customer service for members and non-members?
2
Democratic member 
control
Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members, 
who actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. 
People serving as elected representatives are accountable to the 
members. In primary cooperatives, members have equal voting rights 
(one member, one vote). Cooperatives at other levels are also organized 
in a democratic manner.
- In which ways can members participate in monitoring and influencing the policies of the cooperative?
- In which parts of the organization can they serve?
- How many members are democratically active (in percentage terms)?
- How do local banks as members have democratic influence on policy and decisions?
3
Member economic 
participation
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the 
capital of their cooperative. At least part of that capital is usually the 
common property of the cooperative. Members usually receive limited 
compensation, if any, for capital provided as a condition of membership. 
Members allocate surpluses for the following purposes: developing their 
cooperative, possibly by setting up reserves, at least part of which will be 
indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the 
cooperative; and supporting other activities approved by the members.
- Are there any economic or other benefits, for members and non-members (customers)?
- Are there any differences in rewards for members and non-members (customers)?
4
Autonomy and 
independence
Cooperatives are autonomous self-help organizations controlled by 
their members. If they enter into agreements with other organizations, 
including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so 
on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain 
the autonomy of the cooperative.
- What is the hierarchical relationship with Rabobank Nederland?
- What is the hierarchical relationship between Local Banks?
- How is the bank registration determined by law?
- How do local members have influence at the relevant Local Bank?
5
Education, training 
and information
Cooperatives provide education and training for their members, elected 
representatives, manager, and employees so they can contribute effectively 
to the development of their cooperatives. They inform the general public, 
particularly young people and opinion leaders, about the nature and 
benefits of cooperation.
- How are employees educated and trained about the nature and benefits of cooperation?
- How are members educated and trained about the nature and benefits of the cooperative form?
- How are non-members (customers) educated and trained about the nature and benefits of 
cooperation?
6
Cooperation among 
cooperatives
Cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the 
cooperative movement by working together through local, national, 
regional, and international structures.
- In which way does Rabobank Nederland cooperate with the local banks?
- In which way do the local banks cooperate?
- In which way do other parts of Rabobank Group work together with Rabobank Nederland and the 
Local Banks?
7
Concern for 
community
Cooperatives work for the sustainable development of their communities, 
through policies approved by their members.
- In which ways do the Local Bank’s propagate commitment to the community?
- In which way does the Local Bank contribute to the local community?
- In which way are the members of the Local Bank involved in the concern for community?
- How do employees of the Local Bank assess the impact of the local members on the local community? 
- In which way does Rabobank Nederland propagate commitment to the community?
- In which way does Rabobank Nederland contribute to the community?
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5.7 Conclusions
This chapter has provided an overview of the empirical research carried out and has described 
the main approaches and methods that were adopted in order to answer the research questions. 
The main goal of this study is to explain how banking cooperatives have an impact on their 
organizational social capital. My approach was to examine the behavior of five banking cooperatives 
within their own contextual dynamics. This study involved collecting quantitative and qualitative 
data for analysis. The methods developed and presented in the previous sections helped to 
interpret the raw empirical data in terms of theoretical possibilities and (further) explanations. 
The proposed methods for interpreting the empirical data are multiple; studying the variation 
among cooperatives will reveal whether they have the same impact on social capital individually 
or collectively. Investigating whether the decisions of local member Rabobanks are in harmony 
with organizational strategies will show how collective choices affect the impact of social capital 
within the cooperative itself, and whether similarities are only superficial or more meaningful. 
Finally, the reconstruction of the impact on the social capital of employees of the organizations 
themselves serves to consolidate the conclusions and add information that was previously lacking. 
The focus of the multiple case studies was to clarify specific strengths/weaknesses associated 
with the cooperative form and whether differential effects can be attributed to the strengths/
weaknesses. The research focuses on the differential effects, and seeks to answer the question of 
whether the cooperative form has (certain) effects on organizational social capital. 
Chapter 6 
The five Local Cooperative Banks 
and cooperative principles: results
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter will look at the manner in which the cooperative principles are applied, based on the 
operationalization in table 12. Section 6.2 will discuss two points that are directly linked to the 
cooperative structure: ‘Commitment of the staff and management to cooperative principles’ and 
‘member-customer related activities’. In respect of Rabobank and organizational social capital, 
I will discuss the role of Rabobank Nederland with regard to organizational social capital and 
present the key findings of the case study. Finally, the conclusions of this chapter are summarized 
in section 6.3. 
6.1.1 Local cooperative banks and the cooperative principles
The cooperative principles define cooperatives and the specific features of their corporate 
governance. These principles affect their mode of corporate governance and distinguish 
cooperative businesses from other business models. Members join a cooperative on a fully 
voluntary basis and are then able to participate in its decision-making and control processes. 
Rabobank Nederland is responsible for the Rabobank Group’s general cooperative policy. 
According to its own official description, the Rabobank Group is “a full-range financial services 
provider that operates on cooperative principles.”29 Despite the fact that the seven cooperative 
principles have not been specifically deployed within the organization or integrated into existing 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and are thus not benchmarked, this does not mean that the 
seven principles are not (at least partially) put into operation. At the time of this study, Rabobank 
had not incorporated the seven cooperative principles into its organizational DNA in explicit terms, 
even though these principles are intended as guidelines and recognized by the United Nations 
and several countries in their (explicit) legislation regarding cooperatives (Fici, 2012). According 
to scientific research, the decline of cooperatives is associated with the loss of social capital and 
the alienation of members, but it appears that the seven cooperative principles are very seldom 
operationalized within Rabobank policy documents, and were scarcely discernable at all in annual 
reports and other publicly available documents. However, Rabobank does mention the roots of 
the bank and the link to cooperative principles: “Rabobank Group is an international financial 
services provider operating on the basis of cooperative principles.”30 And in more concrete 
terms: “This cooperative foundation is characterised by a focus on the long-term interest of the 
customer and the readiness to work together. This structure means that Rabobank sets itself 
stringent standards regarding its dealings with customers, members, employees and society in 
general.”31 And: “Cooperative principles make Rabobank operate differently from other banks. 
We concentrate on adding value through our relationships. This is why Rabobank always works 
in partnership with the client, adopting a long-term vision necessary to understanding the cycles 
29 Source: https://www.rabobank.com/en/locate-us/europe/netherlands.html. Accessed 08/08/2014.
30 Source: https://www.rabobank.nl/particulieren/english-pages/ Accessed 1/08/2014.
31 Source: This is us, code of conduct Rabobank May 2015, p. 23.
100  •  Chapter 6
in the segment.”32 Rabobank did not mention or operationalize the cooperative principles in its 
annual report during the research period, apart from one brief reference: “The bank’s founding 
principles provide guidance in the day-to-day activities for everyone who works at Rabobank. 
The employees of the local member Rabobanks and Rabobank Nederland aim to provide top-
quality, conscientious services.”33 This finding is consistent with the findings of other researchers, 
who also state that they discovered little or no references to the seven cooperative principles 
in reports by other cooperatives (Rixon, 2013, p. 76). However, there are banking cooperatives 
which draw specific attention to these in their annual report, such as the Canadian Desjardins 
Group, where preserving the cooperative basis of the company is identified as the responsibility 
of the Board of Directors: “The Board of Directors is responsible for preserving the cooperative 
nature of Desjardins, which is defined by the cooperative values and principles as established 
by the International Co-operative Alliance.”34 The following section describes and explains the 
application of the seven cooperative principles, insofar as this occurs, within the five member 
banks, which are of course subject to the umbrella policy of Rabobank Nederland.
6.1.1.1 Voluntary and open membership
Local cooperative banks, being cooperatives, are organizations that are open to all those who 
wish to use the cooperative’s services and accept the responsibilities of being a member. These 
members gain influence on the course, operation and governance of the organization. The fact 
that membership is non-discriminatory with respect to age, gender, race and ethnicity, social 
background or political and religious beliefs is critically important. Historically, membership of 
member banks used to be compulsory for entrepreneurs who borrowed money from the member 
bank. Other customers could not become members until later. For Rabobank, there was a limited 
liability of €2,270 per member prior to 1998. During the centenary of the Rabobank in 1998, 
however, Rabobank decided to modernize its member cooperatives, allowing all customers to 
become voluntary members and abolishing the liability.
A brief survey conducted among members by Rabobank Nederland in 2012 (Groeneveld, 2013) 
indicated that trust, reputation, good products at a reasonable pricing and appropriate distribution 
channels for customers were the main reasons for becoming a member. Another reason relates 
to ‘identification with the brand’. Rabobank’s contribution to the sustainable development of the 
(local) environment by giving away part of its profit (cooperative dividend) was also mentioned 
as a reason, as was the sharing of Rabobank’s knowledge of economic sectors and publications. 
Finally, the desire to participate in the decision-making processes of the Rabobank was cited as a 
32 Source: http://www.rabobank.com.br/en/content/sobre_o_rabobank/nossos_diferenciais.html. Accessed 
08/08/2014.
33 Annual Report Rabobank Group 2013, p. 109.
34 Annual Report Desjardins Cooperative Bank, 2012, p. 186.
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reason to join for approximately five percent of members (Mooij & Groeneveld, 2015, pp. 37-38). 
At the start of this PhD project, a senior policy advisor at Rabobank Nederland (40) stated that an 
estimated 20% of existing members were not fully aware of their Rabobank membership. 
Each member bank sets its own membership policy. The decision to accept a prospective member 
is based, in part, on that prospective member’s links with the cooperative’s catchment area and 
ability to contribute. Until recently, customers who made use of three or more of the bank’s 
products were asked to become members. In the case of the member banks that I examined, 
certain groups of customers were actively approached in writing with an invitation to become 
a member. For example, customers in the private banking segment were sent the members’ 
magazine ‘Dichterbij’ (‘Closer’), with an accompanying invitation for membership.35 
There are also a number of grounds for exclusion from membership. For example, it is not 
possible to be a member of another Rabobank simultaneously, members must use at least one of 
the bank’s services, they may not be at risk of bankruptcy and the customer may not have a high 
‘customer due diligence’ rating.   
6.1.1.2 Democratic member control
In theory, cooperatives are democratic organizations that are controlled by their members. A key 
issue is that a financial cooperative with voiceless members is not a cooperative (Groeneveld, 
2016, p. 35). In practice, this means that those who join as members should be able to participate 
actively in making decisions and setting the cooperative’s policies. As a member, it is possible 
to stand for election to the local member council. The member council of every member bank 
consists of thirty to forty cooperative members, who are accountable to the wider membership. 
Rabobank Group consists of several cooperatives and is organized in a democratic manner; 
this arrangement is known as a ‘secondary cooperative’. Rabobank Group consists of several 
cooperatives and is organized in a democratic manner.
Members’ interests are represented in the local member council by means of a layered system 
of member representatives (e.g. elected board members) who have the required expertise in 
complex (banking) activities. The members elect these member councils from among their peers. 
The establishment of an elected member council diluted the direct control of the members during 
the period of this study. The members’ council almost entirely replaced the previous function 
of the General Members’ Meeting (ALV). Now, the General Members’ Meeting only has the 
power to decide on the dissolution or withdrawal of the cooperative Rabobank from Rabobank 
Nederland. Cooperative bank members elect local boards that meet four times per year. Members 
discuss and decide on policy and ensure that the local banks remain in touch with their local 
35 Rabobank has been issuing this free membership magazine since 2006. The magazine is published quarterly.
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social environment. Via the Member Council, members can exercise influence and express views. 
Member influence is essential to the running of the Rabobank cooperative, and members monitor 
and influence the course of the bank. The members ‘bring the outside world in’ and thus shape 
the external orientation of the member bank. The influence of the members on the functioning 
of the local cooperative Rabobanks is most evident within the member councils. The limited size 
of the members’ council ensures that there is extensive dialogue with the members. 
 
The Members’ Council has the following decision-making powers:
a) Establishing financial statements
b) Granting discharge to the directors for the policy
c) Granting discharge to the Supervisory Board for their supervision
d) Adopting changes to statutes, advising the Board on membership policy and internal regulations
e) Appointing members of the Supervisory Board
f) Deciding on the appropriation of profits
g) Deciding on mergers
Members can participate in the local Supervisory Board of the member banks. However, members 
have no say at all regarding the governance of all Rabobank’s foreign branches. At the start 
of this study, there were 136 member banks, each with about 30 active members in their 
respective member councils. This effectively means that about 2% of all members were actually 
democratically active. Arguably, the approximately 10 million customers also play a role – although 
it is not a clear which role – within Rabobank in terms of their involvement and commitment to 
the welfare and performance of Rabobank. 
The local cooperative banks are members of and shareholders in the cooperative central organization, 
Rabobank Nederland, which advises the member banks and supports their local services. Rabobank 
Nederland also acts as an (international) wholesale bank and as the bankers’ bank for the whole 
Group, and is the holding company of a large number of specialized subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
Rabobank Nederland supervises the solvency, liquidity and administrative organization of the local 
cooperative Rabobanks on behalf of De Nederlandsche Bank. 
6.1.1.3 Economic participation of members
Members contribute to the capital of their cooperative, and they exert democratic control 
over this. Typically, a part of that capital is the common property of the cooperative, and is an 
instrument. This capital is necessary for the successful operation of the business. However, profit 
is regarded as ‘a means to an end, rather than an end in itself’ – a means to provide benefits to 
their members and communities.
There are only limited material benefits in the form of local and national offers of third-party 
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products. Members receive the members’ magazine ‘Dichterbij’ four times a year. Members 
can participate in physical and virtual networks, and are invited to themed meetings and other 
activities. 
Members can participate in the capital of Rabobank by buying Rabobank certificates on a 
voluntary basis. Until January 14th 2014, members had an advantage over customers because 
they were able to purchase these membership certificates. These membership certificates are 
now called Rabobank Certificates, and are a kind of perpetual bond and until recently they 
were only available to members and employees of the bank. Now, however, these certificates 
are also traded on the stock market, allowing the bank to enhance its capital position, but also 
making itself dependent on non-members, such as institutional investors and other investors. The 
interests of these investors may diverge from those of members and staff, and they may be more 
inclined to prioritize profits. 
There are no differences in the rewards available for members and non-members (customers). One 
reason cited for this is the assumption that if discounts were to be offered for financial services 
provided to members, all the banks’ customers would of course want to become members. 
However, Rabobank wishes to attract members who have affinity with the working area of the 
member bank in which they participate. Meanwhile, there is also the concern that, in response, 
other financial service providers would immediately adjust their pricing, so that the difference 
in price would quickly be cancelled out. In any case, the possibility of a discount on that scale 
appears unlikely to be financially feasible. This situation seems to be contrast with the Dutch 
article 53, paragraph 4 of BW II (Civil Code): provided that it is permissible under the statutes, 
the cooperative is allowed to make agreements with third parties, such as those that are made 
with its members, but this article prohibits agreements from being made with non-members 
insofar as these would make the agreements with members less significant. By making use of the 
powers granted by the law in this area, the cooperative breaks with the closed character principle; 
after all, the statutory objective of meeting the economic needs of the members, and making 
agreements with those members, implies a private character. 
6.1.1.4 Autonomy and independence
As autonomous self-help organizations, cooperatives are, ideally, controlled by their own members. 
When entering into agreements with other organizations, including governments, or when raising 
capital from external sources, cooperatives only do so on such terms that democratic control by 
their members is ensured and the cooperative autonomy is maintained. This principle is intended 
to help protect the member-based ownership structure of the cooperative. The cooperative 
Rabobank is autonomous and independent, yet there is ample regulation and supervision. Since 
Rabobank Group comprises many independent local Rabobanks, their umbrella organization 
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Rabobank Nederland, and a number of specialist subsidiaries, each of the 136 member banks 
has its own banking license. However, Rabobank is a self-appointed customers’ cooperative, 
servicing both members and customers. Rabobank Group also has overseas branches that do not 
operate as cooperatives. The local member banks form the heart of the Rabobank organization; 
all Rabobanks are members of and shareholders in Rabobank Nederland. The Local Executive 
Board and the Supervisory Board exert considerable influence and play a controlling role in the 
collective, and furthermore they are responsible for representing the organization’s interests in 
local policy.
Rabobank Nederland was created to develop policy and products, to process transactions, and to 
manage systems. The local banks have an important influence on the policies of their umbrella 
cooperative Rabobank Nederland. To this end, the representatives of the local banks meet in the 
‘Rabobank Parliament’, called the ‘centrale kringvergadering’ (CKV). The CKV decides on the 
direction of Rabobank’s national and international momentum and sets the general rules that the 
local banks must comply with.
What is the hierarchical relationship between the local banks and the central organi-
zation?
The local banks are members of the central umbrella organization, Rabobank Nederland. The central 
cooperative is also referred to as the ‘daughter’ of the associated banks or the central institute. 
The existing governance structure focuses strongly on achieving consensus between the local 
Rabobanks and the central organization. The cross-guarantee system is also an important aspect 
of governance. The faculties of the local banks, the central institution and certain subsidiaries are 
linked through this cross-guarantee system. This arrangement means that all other participants 
support any participant that is in trouble. As a result, the individual entities cannot go bankrupt. 
The affiliated banks have mandated the board of directors of this institution to control other 
components, such as leasing subsidiary De Lage Landen, and to manage international activities 
or interests in other parties (e.g. in the insurer Achmea). The Supervisory Board is responsible for 
the internal supervision of the central institute on behalf of its member banks.
The 136 member banks of Rabobank are all registered with their own banking license.36 
The influence of these member banks is evident (as witnessed during the period of this research) 
in the way that the Executive Officer responsible for international activities was made to resign 
in the aftermath of the Libor affair, even though he wished to stay on his post, and in spite 
of the confidence he had received from the Supervisory Board and the regulator DNB.37 There 
36 Situation during the field study (2013-2014).
37 The Libor scandal refers to a series of fraudulent activities relating to the Libor (London Interbank Offered 
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was “insufficient support” among local Rabobanks for this Executive officer to remain in his 
post.38 The departure of this Executive officer was instigated by the local Rabobanks and not by 
Rabobank Nederland. 
6.1.1.5 Education, training and information
By providing education and training, the cooperative ensures that members, elected representatives, 
employees and managers can contribute effectively to the cooperative’s development. They inform 
the public at large – particularly young people and opinion leaders – of the nature and benefits of 
cooperation. The education of the members, the public and the employees – in other words, the 
three main stakeholders in a cooperative  – is arguably crucial for ensuring the sustainability and 
long-term success of the individual cooperatives and Rabobank Nederland as a whole (see also 
McDonnell, Macknight & Donnely, 2012, p. 19). 
 
When they join a member bank of Rabobank Nederland, new employees receive a 
‘kennismakingsmap’ (‘introduction folder’) containing a short introduction to Rabobank, and 
its history. A film is also often shown. Those who are interested can also consult the content 
available on the organization’s website to find out more about the cooperative.
Members who have committed to serving as a member of the Members’ Council receive 
informational materials to learn more about the Rabobank cooperatives and their role in the 
Members’ Council. Further coaching and assistance are provided within the Members’ Council. 
For (local) board members, participation in Permanent Education is compulsory. Those who are 
interested can also consult the various websites of the organization to find more documentation 
about the cooperative.
6.1.1.6 Cooperation among cooperatives
Cooperatives serve their members most effectively when working together through local, regional, 
national, and international structures, and this also strengthens the cooperative movement. 
Two approaches to cooperation are:
• The formation of secondary cooperatives (‘co-ops of co-ops’) – Rabobank itself was a 
secondary or federal cooperative during this study.
• Individual cooperatives that share resources, expertise, and risk. The desire and sometimes the 
need for cooperation within the cooperative world has led to several partnerships in all five 
Rate) and the subsequent investigation and reaction. Libor is an average interest rate calculated through the 
submission of interest rates by major banks in London. It was discovered that some banks were giving the 
impression that they were more creditworthy than they actually were or were falsely inflating or deflating 
their rates in order to profit from trading. 
38 Source: https://www.rabobank.com/en/float/libor/faq.html.
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Rabobanks studied, as Table 13 shows. In the Netherlands, Rabobank supports initiatives for 
establishing new cooperatives by providing expertise, and in developing countries Rabobank 
provides technical assistance for financial and agricultural cooperatives.
 
Table 13: Cooperative partnerships in which Rabobank is involved
Association Founded Goal Members
ICA 1985 Advocacy and representation 
of cooperatives
Cooperatives of all sectors
ICBA 1922 Representation of mutual 
cooperation
Federations of cooperative banks, savings 
banks and credit unions
NCR 1934 Knowledge dissemination 
and support for advocacy
Cooperatives of all sectors
IRU 1968 Propagating the body of 
thought and knowledge 
sharing
A large number of Raiffeisen cooperatives in 
the world
EACB 1971 Lobbying in Brussels and 
at other international 
institutions
Nearly all European cooperative banks
Unico 1977 Commercial cooperation and 
knowledge sharing
Banco Cooperativo Español (Spain), Crédit 
Agricole S.A. (France), DZ BANK (Germany), 
ICCREA Holding (Italy), Pohjola Bank plc 
(Finland), Rabobank (The Netherlands), 
Raiffeisen Bank International (Austria), and 
Raiffeisen Schweiz (Switzerland).
Source: Mooij and Groeneveld (2015, p. 96).
Rabobank is active in 40 countries and services 8.8 million customers, has 440 places of business 
outside the Netherlands and 48,254 employees (FTE). RaboDirect is an internet savings bank 
operating in Belgium, Germany, Poland, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. The faculties of the 
local banks, the central institution and certain subsidiaries are linked through this cross-guarantee 
system. This arrangement means that all other participants support any participant who is in 
trouble. As a result, individual entities cannot go bankrupt.
6.1.1.7 Concern for the community
Cooperatives work for and are involved with the sustainable development of their communities 
in accordance with the policies approved by their members. This study focuses on internal social 
capital and the seven cooperative principles: concern for the community is externally oriented. 
For this reason, I will discuss this subject only briefly here. The cooperative Rabobank has a 
strategy which includes local sponsorship and volunteer work. These activities and contacts 
also ensure interaction between members/customers and staff. The Members’ Magazine places 
advertisements and organizes and contributes to meetings. Member banks sponsor various 
local and national events, for example, and provide training in schools about how to manage 
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money and debt. These examples also apply to our five member banks. Every year, the local 
banks reserve a portion of their net profit for the so-called cooperative dividend. The local banks 
invest these funds in helping to strengthen society. Several initiatives are supported to this end, 
including donating to a local ice rink, contributing to a cultural prize or sponsoring local non-
profit organizations or charities. Often, local banks provide support not only in the form of funds 
but also staff (expertise) and facilities. The members’ councils of the local banks play an important 
role in advising on decisions on how to spend the cooperative dividend. 
Rabobank primarily fulfills a public utility function, and in its role as a bank, it plays an important 
role in promoting and sustaining economic and social interaction in (local) society. Like many other 
organizations, Rabobank invests by donating, sponsoring, networking and sharing its knowledge 
within its community and areas of operation. It should be noted that it is difficult to differentiate 
investor-owned companies (IOCs) and cooperatives with respect to concern for the community, 
since many businesses invest part of their profits in the community (Rixon, 2013, p. 83).
6.2 The application of cooperative principles
As mentioned in Chapter 5, two focal points of organizational social capital were chosen, which 
are linked to the fundamentals of the cooperative structure: ‘Commitment of the staff and 
management to cooperative principles’ and ‘member-customer related activities’. Because the 
five investigated LCBs fell under the policy management of Rabobank Nederland, this is taken 
into account in the elaboration of the two focal points.
6.2.1 Commitment of staff and higher management levels to the cooperative principles
Cooperatives differentiate themselves primarily through their values and principles. Cooperatives 
are not unique business models because they have values that most companies share. It is the 
manner in which cooperatives put those values into practice that distinguishes them; they do 
this through their principles. The cooperative principles do not apply to all cooperatives or to 
every business situation, but they do serve as an important guide. Ideally, a cooperative would 
pay sufficient regard to all seven principles (see section 3.3), and it would therefore be easy to 
distinguish from other businesses. Within the five surveyed local banks as well as Rabobank 
Nederland, there was a structural lack of knowledge about these cooperative principles, and their 
application lacked depth. As we have seen, employees who participated in this study had only 
limited knowledge of the seven cooperative principles. Only three of the employees interviewed 
from the five LCBs and Rabobank Nederland were able to identify the seven cooperative ICA 
principles. The same applies to knowledge of the ICA and IRU organizations. Some of the 
employees of the five member banks who were interviewed, including executives and managers, 
had previously been employed by ABN AMRO or ING Bank and were therefore accustomed to non-
cooperative business. During the research period at Rabobank Nederland, only two documents 
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were available that explicitly referred to the seven cooperative principles. Furthermore, both 
documents clearly show that Rabobank does not fully embrace the seven cooperative principles.
[…As opposed to the ICA (2006), we think that…] […to ensure the continuity of their cooperative 
(Van Diepenbeek et al., 2000)…] 39 (43). And: ‘In some cases, these utopian and socialist ideas and 
the methods of the first cooperatives have resulted in guidelines that cooperatives are expected to 
follow, such as the principles of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), the global advocacy 
organization. This has often prevented a clear view of the cooperative as a business form. Those 
ideologies dating from the early years also explain the elements of charity, which still linger in the 
cooperative and the view of the cooperative as a responsible corporate entity which should be far 
removed from the free market.”40 (40).
This may explain the fact that the cooperative principles are not mapped within the organization, 
and the lack of any further guidance for staff and higher management or KPIs that may help to 
embed the principles within the organization.41 This clearly affects the impact of the cooperatives 
studied on organizational social capital. For a large cooperative bank such as Rabobank, the 
lack of (application of the) cooperative principles that was encountered raises further questions, 
because the Rabobank does maintain links with the ICA. 
The study also reveals that the banks surveyed struggle to find enough time to maintain relations 
with members and clients. Mistrust in wider society and within the organization, recent and 
future redundancies, budget cuts and increased regulatory pressure were named as reasons for 
this lack of time. Another reason mentioned in relation to guidance from within the organization 
was that management is primarily driven by economic efficiency and operational results rather 
than (achieving results through) the implementation of the cooperative principles (Valentinov, 
2004, p. 16). The principle of economic efficiency was wrongly viewed as a limitation on 
cooperative governance (Sacchetti & Tortia, 2012, p. 6). Employees at Rabobank are generally 
too busy working to meet the relevant regulatory requirements to be concerned with the 
cooperative principles. Staff are managed and evaluated more strictly during a period when their 
jobs are less certain than had been the case for a long time. This is likely to be a major reason 
for the reduced focus on members/customers and related policy. The disappearance of the clear
39 Source: https://www.rabobank.com/en/images/Cooperative-and-Rural-Financial-Development.pdf accessed 
14/8/2015.
40 Source: Internal document. Team Cooperative Banking. Translated from Dutch. Rabobank compared with 
other banks 14/11/2012. Used with permission from Rabobank. 
41 Performance indicators or key performance indicator (KPI). A performance indicator is a type of performance 
measurement. KPIs are typically used to monitor and measure an organization’s performance and progress 
towards achieving its strategic plan.
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distinction between services for customers and members, and the reasons why customers might opt 
for membership, also detracts from the spirit of the cooperative. Moreover, the interviews showed 
that an unambiguous strategy and shared vision for implementing the cooperative principles is 
lacking. My research uncovered no policy of Rabobank Nederland in this regard. However, the 
efforts that are being made, even if there is no policy, should be consistent with the organization’s 
aspiration to follow the cooperative model, and a budget should be allocated to this in order to 
emphasize the organization’s willingness to make this kind of investment. The case study shows 
that the cooperative principles within the five LCBs are not applied completely and uniformly in 
daily work, nor are they monitored or overseen by the LCBs or Rabobank Nederland. This seems 
to have affected the scores. The Board of Directors of the Rabobank Group views Rabobank as 
a special and sophisticated organization and cooperative principles cannot, therefore, be applied 
easily. ‘While the focus of the Board of Directors lies within the economic dimension, this Board 
views the cooperative principles as focusing mainly on the social dimension’ (40). Furthermore, 
the cooperative principles are not enforceable by Dutch law. The Civil Code, book II, fails to 
provide a complete definition of cooperative identity, or even to define the aspects that they 
do cover (Fici, 2012, p. 17). But although the seven cooperative principles have not been fully 
adopted and implemented with the aim of benchmarking them and judging their cooperative 
performance, this does not mean that the scope of the principles or portions thereof have not 
been brought into effect within these organizations. 
The social and economic focus of the senior management of the cooperative is of paramount 
importance, because this influences the ultimate performance of the cooperative structure and 
its day-to-day practice. 
The interviews show that the LCBs need supportive and experienced leadership within the 
organization, both centrally and locally, in order to fully maintain their vision of and belief in the 
cooperative idea, in combination with comprehensive knowledge of the cooperative principles 
and management that is consistent in its support for the cooperative ideals.
6.2.2 Interaction with the members/customers
During the research period, Rabobank was in the headlines on several occasions and received 
negative media coverage due to issues such as client integrity, Libor, mortgages and derivatives. 
These issues are indicators of a degree of friction in the relationship between the organization 
and its members/customers. The survey and the interviews show that there was not always 
annual contact with all members/customers and that a large proportion of employees have no or 
very little customer contact. The fact that a large proportion of the employees have no contact 
with the members/customers could indicate that social capital is decreasing. “I do not know if 
being a cooperative simply means being in touch with customers or being visible sometimes. 
You can also be visible without being in touch with each individual customer.” (14). However, 
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social capital is about more than just contact. It is about building and maintaining relationships. 
The interviews show that management policy choices ensure that only contact with selected 
(client) groups is maintained, such as through a dedicated account manager. Case A is currently 
in contact with only 10% of its members/customers each year. The question is, then, how they 
wish to maintain the social capital that they have accumulated at sufficient levels, including the 
apparently meaningful connection with members. The interviews show that the difference in the 
customer service provided for members and customers is not clear. For the staff of the bank, it 
is difficult to invite customers to become members because the difference between clients and 
members has become less meaningful in recent years: “The difference between members and 
customers has become blurred due to the lack of distinctions. There is no difference in service. 
Membership has always been touted as something important: you’re supposed to have influence 
and control. But there isn’t any of that.” (26). The same applies to the reasons for becoming a 
member. Many managers indicate that this is not clear to them or to the employees of the bank 
concerned. Despite these uncertainties among staff regarding the role of members, there are 
Members’ Councils in place at all the five member banks, which all work in a similar way. The fact 
that employees do not always know their council members again indicates the distance between 
the workers and these members. In this sense, about 2% of members are democratically active.42 
The only democratic right of members who are not elected council members is that they can elect 
the members of the Members’ Councils.
Four of the five LCBs have a policy whereby customers are approached to become a member if 
they use at least three services of the bank.43 The interviews revealed that the two largest LCBs, A 
and B, approached wealthier customers in particular (PB and ZR1) regarding membership.44 As a 
result, customers from lower social classes and with less economic clout are underrepresented in 
the membership,45 which in turn could undermine the representation of the population with the 
aim of broader empowerment in member councils. 
Four times a year, members receive the members’ magazine, which keeps them informed about 
all the news from the member bank. Members are also invited to participate in networking 
meetings and events. Within member bank E, members are also invited to participate in the 
various communities. The plan of the communities is described in detail by the relevant local bank 
42 During the Alliance’s General Assembly of ICA, Cape Town 2013, “worrying trends” that have affected the 
sustainability and member participation of cooperative banks like the Cooperative Bank in the UK, the coop 
credit institutions in Cyprus and Rabobank in the Netherlands were highlighted. Source: http://ica.coop/en/
media/news/radical-change-international-co-operative-alliance. Accessed 04/12/2013. 
43 From the start of 2016 there is a new member acceptance policy for all LCBs. Since then, membership has 
been open to customers who use one or more services of an LCB.
44 Private banking and large business.
45 This turned out to have been a possible unintended effect.
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in a magazine, which is distributed throughout the organization for information and inspiration. 
As far as interaction with members is concerned, this has been a very beneficial move. 
At the start of this study, one advantage that members, along with Rabobank employees, had 
over customers was that they had the exclusive right to buy members certificates. In early 2014, 
Rabobank Group decided to make this option available to everyone and thus to bring in external 
investment.46 This step represents a further reduction or dilution of the role of members in relation 
to that of customers. During the research period, there was no material difference between the 
advantages of being a member versus those of being a customer. To demonstrate and regain a 
cooperative difference it is essential to operationalize the cooperative principles. Furthermore, 
being a cooperative entails a significant role for members within that cooperative.
Rabobank and organizational social capital
Within the Rabobank Group, I examined whether information was available either on social 
capital or regarding the cooperative principles as formulated by the ICA. This information was not 
available, as confirmed during the interviews and by my contact at Rabobank who was involved 
in this research. It seems remarkable that when so many things are measured within a bank, no 
measurement or benchmark exists with regard to the cooperative principles or social capital, 
even though scientific publications are available on the role of social capital in cooperatives and 
the disappearance of cooperatives due to the loss of social capital (for instance Nilsson et al., 
2012). Were such a measurement or benchmark to be incorporated into the annual report, it 
could increase transparency and promote trust in the relevant institution, and also demonstrate 
the strengths and weaknesses of an organization at any given moment. This, in turn, could yield 
useful management information and information on market penetration, market information 
and awareness of the organization in a particular area or areas. The empirical data shows that 
in relation to size (in terms of staff employed, FTE), the two smaller banks D and E had a higher 
aggregate score on organizational social capital in relation to all three dimensions compared to 
the larger banks, A, B and C. Although this generally only involves small individual differences, 
it is noticeable that these small differences taken together and compared to the banks with a 
relatively greater number of employees, reveal a consistent pattern across all the individual scores. 
Based on the theory of Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen (2012) discussed in Chapter 4 and the 
empirical data, I identify at least five challenges in relation to the five LCBs and organizational 
social capital (see table 14). The CPR design principles are closely related to the nexus of members, 
control and responsibility. The three cooperative principles that relate to this are: (2) Democratic 
46 “If co-operatives are to maintain a distinct identity, therefore, their values must be stated more clearly than 
this. Two issues are particularly crucial for co-operatives. The first is that of autonomy (as expressed in ICA’s, 
2006, fourth principle): co-operatives are concerned to be economically independent of the public sector 
(e.g. by not relying on government grants) and also of the private sector (e.g. by not relying on external 
investment).” (Somerville, P. (2007, p. 7). Co-operative identity. Journal of co-operative studies, 40(1), 5-17. 
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member control, (3) Members’ economic participation, and (4) Autonomy and independence, and 
correspond with the CPR design principles (2) Congruence between appropriation and provision 
rules, (3) Collective choice arrangements and (4) Monitoring. Cooperative principle 5, Education, 
training and information, relates to the ability to activate the other cooperative principles and 
leads to improved functioning in relation to all of the various principles.
Table 14: Challenges of the Rabobank regarding social capital
1. The ‘free-rider’ challenge Rabobank has nearly two million members. Members are often anonymous 
and are unfamiliar with what membership can offer them. Furthermore, 
the vast majority of customers are regular customers and not members. 
Particularly when problems arise, customers may wait for someone else 
to take action. Free riding can be seen as individuals’ investment behavior.
2. The ‘monitoring’ challenge The large membership often makes members more anonymous, and 
Rabobank has proportionately more customers than members. With 
almost 2 million members, involvement is difficult to maintain. In 
addition, about 30% of the Rabobank Group does not actually have a 
cooperative legal form and members of the local Dutch Rabobanks have 
little influence over what exactly Rabobank Group does abroad. The 
value of being a member is therefore often unclear at the local level. If 
the difference between members and customers becomes smaller still, 
Rabobank will depart ever further from the original cooperative concept.
3. The ‘portfolio’ challenge In the past few years, Rabobank has received a fair amount of negative 
media coverage, which has caused a decline in its reputation. Members 
are kept ‘out of the loop’ when it comes to investments made outside the 
Netherlands. The decision to move more services to the internet, while 
closing down offices, may lead to alienation and dissatisfaction of the 
members and clients of Rabobank.
4. The ‘horizon’ challenge The relationship between members and Rabobank has changed 
significantly over the years due to a number of decisions. The dependency 
between the two is relatively low — compared to the past. Furthermore, 
the possibility for members or customers to leave and choose a different 
bank elsewhere is ever present. It should be added that the Rabobank 
was named as the safest bank in the Netherlands during the banking 
crisis that started in 2008.
5. The ‘knowledge’ challenge Ensuring and providing solid cooperative training and knowledge (see 
Goglio & Alexopoulos, 2014, p. 5).
Corporate governance will be a particularly significant challenge in the future, because research 
shows that many members are losing interest in their cooperative. (Nilsson & Svendsen, 2011). 
What can be done when a cooperative has almost two million members, as is the case with 
Rabobank? How does one keep a large number of members involved in the cooperative’s 
continued well-being? And who are these members exactly? What could their role in governance 
be? Although the number of cooperative members of Rabobank continues to grow (Groeneveld, 
2013, p. 1), and this seems like very good news for the bank, to draw this conclusion would be 
to overlook the fact that membership today is very different from membership 50 years ago, 
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when members were much more actively involved. Today, many members do not even realize 
that they are members, let alone play an active role. It could be argued that, paradoxically, 
more members means more difficulties in communicating with them all, and involving them in 
order to make well-informed decisions that the members whole-heartedly support. If there is a 
continuous decline in the participation of members, there is a risk of losing the commitment of 
those members. Small cooperatives often have a closer and more meaningful relationship with 
their members than larger cooperatives. The combined results suggest that the variation in scale 
(in terms of staff numbers) and the perceived declining interdependence between members and 
their cooperatives are correlated variables.
External factors
The various organizational dimensions of social capital are specifically relevant to the members. 
Adhering to the cooperative principles ensures that the essential role and position of the members 
remains protected. Dutch law on cooperatives is fairly loosely defined, which explains the broad 
definition of what constitutes a cooperative, and the cooperative structure and principles 
remain outside the explicit considerations of the law.47 The loose legal definitions mean that 
a vague interpretation of the cooperative structure is possible; it can be conceived as the idea 
of  an à la carte model. Based on the numerous possibilities for setting up a cooperative and 
the dependencies in terms of country and sector, there is no such thing as a completely pure 
cooperative model. Rabobank can be labeled as a hybrid organization because of the limited 
differences when it comes to influence, control, servicing and role of members, as compared 
to non-members. The Rabobank case shows that focusing on commitment of staff and higher 
management and interaction with members/customers may set the cooperative principles in 
motion, resulting in higher levels of organizational social capital. 
However, specific key performance indicators (KPIs) in this area were lacking. An important part of 
the explanation of the results of the organizational social capital survey lies in increased pressure 
in relation to certain issues, such as on-going staff reductions and increased pressure due to 
closer supervision in the financial sector as a whole. This has resulted directly in a decrease in the 
level of interaction between staff and members/customers. The prognosis is that this trend will 
continue. This is particularly concerning because the workplace is an important source of social 
capital, where the staff develop close ties with co-workers and members and customers while 
working cooperatively and in collaboration with co-workers. Long-term commitment between 
cooperatives and employees would encourage generalized reciprocity, and would reduce 
employee opportunism (Illingworth, 2012, p. 139). Staff cuts and the continued replacement of 
47 Fici (2012) for example states in his analyse of the Dutch (Civil Code, II book) that the Dutch cooperative law 
fails to provide a complete cooperative identity and even those aspects that they cover (including democracy). 
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permanent staff with temporary staff, on the other hand, will further undermine organizational 
social capital.
Impact of size of member bank (FTE Group size)
The results regarding the impact of size are in line with the assumption that small cooperatives 
score better than larger cooperatives. Looking at the results of the survey with only scores above 
5% significance: Dependent Variable: Q10. The manager of the cooperative (Rabobank), where 
I work encourages me, a One-way Analysis of Variance was used to determine whether levels 
of social capital within financial cooperatives differed among the respondents from the different 
cases. The analysis revealed significant differences among the groups (F(4,652)=34,691, p < 
.001). Respondents in case E showed the highest levels (M=4.12, S.D.=0.900), with cases A 
and B as the lowest scores A: (M=3.10, S.D. = 1.010) en B: (M=2.73, S.D. = 0.970). A post-hoc 
Scheffé test showed that case E differed significantly from each of the other four groups, but the 
difference between case A and case C was not statistically significant. The size of the effect is 
quite large: size predicts 17.5% (n2 = 17.548) of the variability in social capital scores. The same 
applies to the survey questions: Q11: 8%, Q37: 8%, Q38: 8%, Q39: 11%, Q40: 12%, Q44: 16% 
and Q49: 9%
A large proportion of employees – approximately half – seem to have no or hardly any contact with 
members and customers. This can partly be explained by their roles within the bank, but staff in 
all roles should be encouraged, and enabled, to interact with the public, members and customers. 
This lack of contact goes against the desired 80%-20% direct contact principle stated in the 
policy of Rabobank Nederland as stated in ‘Program Vision 2016’. This seems to have a negative 
impact on the structural dimension. It seems that the scale of the operation in relation to member/
customer interaction in this area is under threat, and this suggests that smaller cooperatives may 
perform better in this respect than larger ones. The interviews with LCBs A, B, and C indicate 
that this is, however, a conscious choice. By deploying staff as ambassadors to networks and/
or communities, the cooperative attempts to maintain its contact with its local area. However, 
the deployment of staff and ambassadors occurs largely in employees’ private time and on a 
voluntary basis; intrinsic motivation may therefore be undermined by factors such as workload, 
lay-offs, increased regulatory oversight, commercialization and the changing atmosphere within 
and outside the bank. The interviews revealed that employees often see working for a bank as 
“just a job”. The cooperative form and/or principles are something that are simply seen as a given 
because “we just happen to be registered as a cooperative.” Interviews and discussions with 
employees of Rabobank also demonstrate this. 
Increasing group size raises the challenge of proximity and levels of interaction with members 
and customers. Strong collaboration and the dependence of members is a distinctive feature 
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of the cooperative compared to other organizational forms. The empirical evidence shows that 
the overall cooperative score on organizational social capital levels increases when the size 
of the group (in staff numbers) decreases. This is found in relation to all three dimensions of 
organizational capital of Nahapiet & Ghosal (1998). At the same time, one can observe that, as 
commitment to cooperative principles among staff and higher management increases, the overall 
scores on social capital increase as well. This can partly be explained by controlling for interaction 
with customers/members. The same applies to knowledge of cooperative principles among staff 
and higher management and a positive attitude to cooperative behavior among staff.
6.2.3. Key findings from the case study data
This section will summarize the main findings from the case study data and divide these into focus 
points in the table below.
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Table 15: Case study key findings 
Focus Points Key findings
Cooperative principles: Commitment 
of staff and higher management.1 
Clear and comprehensive policy and monitoring is lacking:
- Internal focus of local banks could explain why cooperative 
principles are not well managed or monitored.
- The management is criticized for not setting an example of 
how to act during these times of turmoil.
- All five banks focus on efficiency, economic KPIs and 
regulations that are enforced by the regulators. 
- There are differences between the member banks’ 
membership policies.
- There are no clear differences between customer service for 
members and non-members. Both managers and directors 
were largely unable to explain the difference in the service for 
customers and members. 
- Unambiguous strategy and shared vision in the 
implementation of the cooperative principles is not available 
throughout the organization.
- Employees do not always know their council members, 
revealing a distance between employees and their 
representatives. 
Interaction with members/customers Interaction with members and customers is under pressure:
- Increasing workload, regulations and legislation resulting in 
less time for interaction between members and employees.
- Networking aspects and direct contact with members/
customers is decisive, but less face-to-face interaction and less 
direct contact means that this will become increasingly difficult 
and undermine ties with stakeholders. 
- Employees who live in the working area of the LCB pick up 
more signals than employees who do not live there.
- In times of austerity and cost reduction, employees may 
feel less motivated to commit to their work and/or to their 
employer.
- Employees are expected to attend events outside working 
hours; this requires motivation, close ties with stakeholders 
and the area, and the management leading by example.
Impact of size of member bank 
(FTE Group size); Rabobank and 
organizational social capital
The empirical evidence shows that a cooperative’s overall score 
on organizational social capital levels increases when the size 
of the group (measured in staff numbers) decreases. At least 
five challenges can be identified: The ‘free-rider’, ‘monitoring’, 
‘portfolio’, ‘horizon’ and ‘knowledge’ challenges.2
 
6.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have presented, analyzed and discussed the manner in which the cooperative 
principles are applied, based on the operationalization in table 12. The limited commitment of the 
staff and management to cooperative principles and member-customer related activities creates 
challenges with regard to maintaining and creating social capital. This also applies when the interview 
data shows that annual contact with (all) members/customers has not always taken place and that 
a large proportion of the staff have no or very little customer contact in their day-to-day work. 
Social capital is about building and maintaining relationships. The cooperative Rabobank faces 
five challenges in relation to its social capital, as shown in Table 14 ‘Challenges of the Rabobank 
regarding social capital’. The following chapter will discuss the results of the survey on organizational 
social capital.
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter will present and analyze the empirical results obtained regarding the production 
and reproduction of organizational social capital. In section 7.2, I will start with the results of 
the organizational social capital survey based on the operationalization in table 11 (see Chapter 
5), which was implemented at these banks in the period 2013-2014, focusing on the three 
dimensions of the theory of Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998). In order to construct the most 
comprehensive picture, the sections include data from the survey and interviews as well as from 
desk research. As indicated in Chapter 5, the analysis of this study has two focal points that are 
directly linked to the cooperative structure:
1. Commitment of staff and higher management to the cooperative principles.
2. Interaction with the members/customers.
The survey concerns day-to-day behavior and is largely based on the perceptions of the staff 
who responded. The combined empirical data will shed more light on the manner in which 
the five LCBs apply the seven cooperative principles in their day-to-day work, as discussed in 
section 3.3, Rabobank and the cooperative principles. This chapter concludes with section 7.3, 
the Conclusion.
7.2 The five Local Cooperative Banks and the assessment of organizational 
social capital
In this section, I will start by describing the five banks, from the largest to the smallest in terms 
of staff numbers, and by describing how the five member banks can be scored on the three 
organizational social capital dimensions of Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) at the time I studied 
them (2013-2014). The results of the survey are combined with findings from the interviews. The 
scores for most of the survey questions were given on the five-point Likert scale and are shown in 
the tables using a percentage scale. This allows for easier comparison and understanding of the 
results reported (Calabrese, 2009, p. 22). 
LCB A: A major player  
LCB A is a large cooperative bank among the Rabobank Local Cooperative Banks. It has its 
own banking license, around 400 staff (FTE) and eight offices, and it services around 142,000 
customers. Approximately 12,500 of these are business customers. This means the bank has a 
very diverse clientele. Due to its size and the large number of clients, the bank faces a challenge 
maintaining a close connection with its target group and operating environment. At the same 
time, this large pool of stakeholders provides an ideal basis for learning about the specific issues 
that are relevant to these stakeholders. The bank has more than 24,000 members. LCB A has 
around 35 council members who are actively involved in the operating area of the bank, such as 
local businesspeople, members of local associations and other active members of the community. 
Together they form the Members’ Council. The members of the council often play an important 
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role in the business community or in local associations. Day-to-day management is in the hands 
of the board and the four board members determine the policy of the bank and ensure that the 
bank is on course to meet its goals and policies. The Board of Directors reports on its policies 
annually, at one of the members council meetings. The working area of LCB A includes a city that 
is among the five most populous cities in the Netherlands.
LCB B: A big city bank
LCB B is a large bank in a large city in Noord-Brabant that constitutes one of the largest municipalities 
in the Netherlands in terms of population. LCB B is a large cooperative bank among the Rabobank 
member banks, and has its own banking license, almost 350 staff (FTE) and seven offices. It services 
around 113,000 customers, of which approximately 9,000 are business customers. The bank has 
more than 31,500 members. LCB B has around 35 Council members who are actively involved 
in the operating area of the bank, such as local businesspeople, members of local associations 
and other active members of the community. Together they form the Members’ Council. Day-to-
day management is in the hands of the board. The four board members determine the policy of 
the bank and ensure that the bank is performing well in financial terms. The Board of Directors 
reports on its policies annually, at one of the Members’ Council meetings.  
LCB C: A strong network player
LCB C is a large cooperative bank among the Rabobank Local Cooperative Banks. It has its own 
banking license, almost 300 staff (FTE) and five offices, and it services around 83,500 customers, 
of which approximately 9,000 are business customers. The bank has more than 20,500 members. 
LCB C has around 35 Council members who are actively involved in the operating area of the 
bank, such as local businesspeople, members of local associations and other active members 
of the community. Together they form the Members’ Council. Day-to-day management is in 
the hands of the board. The four board members determine the policy of the bank and ensure 
that the bank is performing well in financial terms. The Board of Directors reports on its policies 
annually, at one of the members council meetings. This bank is known for its strong networking 
capabilities. This is due to the investment that this bank makes in encouraging its staff to actively 
participate in networks, business clubs and giving their employees the right support to achieve 
this. 
LCB D: The survivalist
LCB D is a small cooperative bank among the Rabobank Local Cooperative Banks. It has its own 
banking license, almost 200 staff (FTE) and three offices, and it services about 46,500 customers 
of which approximately 4,500 are business customers. The bank has more than 13,000 members. 
LCB D has around 40 Council members who are actively involved in the operating area of the 
bank, such as local businesspeople, members of local associations and other active members 
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of the community. Together they form the Members’ Council. Day-to-day management is in 
the hands of the board. The four board members determine the policy of the bank and ensure 
that the bank is performing well in financial terms. The Board of Directors reports on its policies 
annually, at one of the members council meetings. Smaller banks generally have smaller customer 
groups and higher levels of qualitative contact with their members and customers. One reason for 
this is the formal and informal involvement of their staff through local networks. Smaller banks, 
such as LCB D, are generally keen to retain their independence as LCBs due to this high degree 
of local embeddedness.  
LCB E: The small and active community bank
LCB E is a small cooperative bank among the Rabobank Local Cooperative Banks. It has its own 
banking license, almost 125 staff (FTE) and two offices, and it services about 87,000 customers, 
of which approximately 4,000 are business customers. The bank has more than 10,000 members, 
of which over 8,000 are private customers. Of the latter, approximately 750 are aged 18-35. LCB 
E has around 35 council members who are actively involved in the operating area of the bank, 
such as local businesspeople, members of local associations and other active members of the 
community. Together they form the Members’ Council. Day-to-day management is in the hands 
of the board. The four board members determine the policy of the bank and ensure that the bank 
is performing well in financial terms. The Board of Directors reports on its policies annually, at one 
of the Members’ Council meetings. Within the Rabobank Group, LCB E is known as a leading 
player. This local bank comes up with its own initiatives in relation to new ways of connecting 
with members and customers, empowering networks and creating added value for their working 
area. Smaller towns and cities often provide a more intimate setting, facilitating the formation 
of informal relationships and providing a more informal atmosphere. This can be a significant 
advantage as it can help to establish a clearer picture not only of the needs of the local population 
and clientele but also of where the opportunities are. This takes longer when ties are more 
formal. In addition, smaller municipalities often include richer associations and stronger links with 
sports clubs. All this can mean that local banks are much more broadly and deeply integrated into 
the lives of the customer population. 
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Descriptive Statistics
The following descriptive statistics describe the units of analysis or samples used in the study.48
Q 1 Gender.
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48 The survey questions regarding descriptive statistics are questions 1 through 5 (see graphs below).
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Q 4 What is your role within the organization?
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The descriptive statistics show that more than half of the employees of these banks are women. 
Most employees are older than 25 years but younger than 55 years, and have over 3 years of 
work experience. More than 60% have worked at the relevant local bank in various capacities.
7.2.1 Structural dimension
The ‘structural dimension’ describes the impersonal configuration of links between people or 
units and concerns the overall configuration of the social system and of the network of relations 
as a whole (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1988, p. 244). Important aspects of this dimension include 
the presence or absence of relationships between actors and the configuration or morphology 
of the network, describing the standards of connections through such variables as density, 
connectivity network configuration, stability and ties (Coleman, 1990).49 Network ties that are 
49 Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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actively maintained through frequent and repeated social interaction are central to an efficient 
and competitive organization. Furthermore, this dimension represents the relational anticipation 
of value attainable by individual actors through social networks. 50 The corresponding survey 
questions focus on the extent and manner of interaction by the employees, whether they live in 
the catchment area of the cooperative bank, whether they participate in local networks/social 
groups or and use online social networks, whether they feel encouraged and facilitated by their 
manager to participate in local networks, whether they feel they have sufficient time to devote 
to their relationships with customers and members, the manner and frequency of contact with 
members and customers and what this interaction means for employees.
Q 6 Do you live in the catchment area of the cooperative (Rabobank) that you work for?
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50 The survey questions regarding structural dimension are questions 6 through 23 (see graphs below). Some 
survey questions include control variables, in order to increase the validity and comparability of future research.
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Q 15 How many former colleagues (including previous employers) are you still in touch with 
today? 
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Q 18 I generally see all my clients or members face-to-face once a year.
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Q 21 Every year we organize meetings for our members and customers. 
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Q 19 We organiz annual meetings for all our m mbers and custom rs. 
 
 
Q 20 I have a ‘face-to-face’ conversation, telephone contact and/or e-mail 
contact with all the customers or members assigned to me at least once a year. 
 
 
Q 21 Every year we organize meetings for our members and customers. 
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Q 22 Contact with customers or members is important to me.
Q 22 Contact with customers or members is important to me. 
 
 
Q 23 The needs and desires of the customers/members of the cooperative are 
important to me. 
 
 
Q 24 Generally speaking, I trust most people. 
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LCB A
The survey reveals that at LCB A, 72% of the respondents have been working at that member 
bank for over three years. Employees seem to remain connected to this bank for a long time: 
“Rabobank people are very traditional and conservative. You also see this in staff promotions 
within the organization: people stay put for a long time and play it safe.” (4). 
Among the respondents, 41% live in the catchment area of LCB A. Arguably, those who live in 
the local area are more likely to pick up local signals. The chair of LCB A indicated that “Finding 
staff was difficult in the past. Where possible, we do prefer people from the local area. This 
benefits the area, but moreover when people are from outside the working area we know that 
this may be a reason for them to leave again.” (5). The cooperative advisor (2) notes that although 
59% of the respondents indicated that they do not live in the bank’s catchment area, the bank 
does not encourage this (6). “It may be a risk factor” … “People may underestimate what that 
could mean” (2). “When it comes to networking, it helps that our people live in the area” … 
“It is definitely to your advantage if your people live in the area” (2). Respon ents from LCB A 
indicate that there is a preference for employees from the bank’s own catchment area, but that 
experience shows that these people are hard to find. The reason for this preference is “because 
they can move around more easily in the networks and will also pick up on what’s going on 
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in the communities they live in more easily. That’s not as easy if you don’t live in the area.” (4) 
The interviews held at LCB A revealed firstly that the percentage of staff that actually live in 
the area is not managed or monitored, even though the interviewees pointed out that living 
outside the area means that employees may find another job closer to home, and furthermore 
that living in the area can provide the bank with more local signals. “Ultimately, the people you 
want are commercial people. In your workforce you have ... people who are socially active, like 
ambassadors, you have some that are in a few associations, but they were never consciously 
selected for that, they just happened to already be on board at the time and they just really enjoy 
it. And the percentage of those kinds of people is just going down.” (5)
Based on the previous paragraph, it can be concluded that as well as place of residence, employees 
must also be intrinsically motivated and have an affinity with the local area in order to pick up on 
local signals for the bank and be active in networks. 
LCB A indicates that quality is most important and that staff may therefore come from anywhere, 
adding that certain staff are hard to find. Furthermore, the staff interviewed at LCB A state that 
intrinsic motivation is crucial to working for a cooperative, and that employees living in the area 
may perform less well at work than employees outside the work area. 
Regarding question Q 18: I generally see all my clients or members face-to-face once a year, the 
chair of LCB A stated that “it is a myth that small local banks perform better in client contact.” 
Furthermore, he explained that there is supposed to be a designated account manager for every 
client but that in practice this is only guaranteed for larger clients. In the corporate division, these 
are called the ZR1 and ZR2 markets. More specifically for bank A, the interviews revealed that for 
around 90% of customers/members, there is no or very little contact with their bank every year.
According to the chair of LCB A, there is barely any contact with about 90% of clients and 
members. It appears to be difficult to arrange customer contact within a big bank (350-400 FTE). 
The chair commented that “it involves a lot of managing, organizing and intrinsic motivation 
… that determines the effectiveness of what you’re doing” … and “sixty employees have a real 
market assignment and the rest are in other functions” (5). For LCB A, participating in networking 
is part of a bank’s responsibility to contribute to the local economy and society. This is apparent 
from the documentation and interviews. Employees are happy to contribute by doing volunteer 
work, as demonstrated by the percentage of respondents who do it (see Q36). However, “being 
close (to the local community) and involved has other aspects too. For example, service employees 
would rather not participate in the ‘NL doet’ volunteer work event at the food bank, because 
they don’t want to embarrass people who live in the same street.” This is not just a questions of 
avoiding embarrassing situations, however; sometimes the motivation for doing volunteer work 
is limited: “People really do want to help, but I also hear people say: it’s just something we do, 
it’s not our entire lives” (5).
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Encouragement for staff and managers within LBC A to participate in local networks has decreased 
recently, as evidenced by various interviews. In individual meetings between managers and their 
team leaders and individual team members, “last year there was less emphasis on that, because 
we had a lot more internal problems, (including) Case Customer Integrity51” (4). In addition, it 
seems to be difficult for managers to clarify what participation means: “What I do with my team 
leaders, and what they do with their people, is engaging in conversation: what will you be doing 
this year? And that’s quite general, like a kind of annual plan, which includes your evaluation 
but also what you’re going to do in the local area to make a difference and I think that’s quite a 
challenging task, especially for people that I manage” (1). 
Participation in local networks takes place both during and outside working hours. In the 
mortgage market, for example, it is important for a bank to be visible, which means being visible 
in the relevant networks. “It’s true that the average consultant or team leader has really had no 
room for that recently. It was all hands on deck just to be in control (supervision cases)” (7). Based 
on the previous paragraph, it can be concluded there is a structural issue in relation to capacity. 
The government has recently put more stringent laws and regulations in place, which serve to 
shift the focus onto the client’s interests and protect customers. In addition, this legislation is 
intended to stabilize banks and thus improve the supervision of the financial sector. During the 
timeframe of this study, Rabobank Group became subject to stricter legislation and supervision 
from the ARG (Audit Rabobank Groep, the internal audit department of Rabobank) and the AFM 
(Autoriteit Financiële Markten). This stricter legislation was introduced in all segments of the bank 
and has had an impact right across the member banks. 
The interviews clearly show that the increased workload caused by closer supervision has resulted 
in less time for and focus on participating in the various local networks. However, employees 
were well aware of this. One respondent noted: “We are assessing our networks again. What 
networks do we have in common with the housing associations? They’re there, but we will have 
to reactivate them.” And: “We’ve had little time for this and that can be explained” (7). During 
the research period, LCB A focused mainly on the control and order of (supervision) cases and this 
affected its participation in local networks. According to a respondent: “I think this has to do with 
the fact that our focus has been internal for a long time. You also see it with golf clubs,,and we 
are still active in a number of clubs. You see that we make virtually no use of those opportunities, 
to play golf with clients here” (2). 
This internal focus has also had an effect on the time that employees have available for members 
of LCB A: “I do notice that they (employees) are spending a lot of time on regulations … I 
recognize that situation too, you get more and more work on your plate … There is less time to 
organize things for members …” (2). In order to maintain the connection to the members and 
51 KI: Klantintegriteit: Case Customer Integrity. 
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customers, a decision was made: “We are moving more and more towards arena settings for 
a particular customer group. This is organized by (the sections) Private Banking and Business. 
They’re intended for a certain group of customers. We are now looking to involve the Member 
Council more and more. They (the Member Council) also indicate that they quite often lack 
information” (2). Lack of time means that employees have the impression that they have too little 
time for members and customers: “That is the problem that we’ve been having this time too, and 
that we’re still having: we have no time, not enough time to deliver quality, and that quality is 
not so much about how well we sort out the AFM case or the Client Integrity case, but it’s about 
the quality of service for our customers.52 We do not have enough time to really connect with the 
customer.” And: “I feel that in recent years we’ve grown apart from our followers, more distance 
between the members and the customers” (6).
 
The chair of LCB A offers the following explanation for the limited time available for members 
and customers: “If you look at which path we are taking, which customers we even have contact 
with in the first place… We’re just a mass market organization. In the corporate business you 
have ZR 1 and ZR 2 and then maybe you have one account manager, and below that you don’t 
even have an account manager anymore. That’s when those other channels are much more 
important. Because with 90% (of the customers) we hardly have any contact.” (5). According to 
the chair, intrinsic motivation, managing and organizing are important for the LCB now, and he 
also comments: “Privacy should also be taken into consideration, and you can also see a tendency 
towards commercialization which has emerged in recent years. It’s just work, they say. It’s not our 
life, it’s just one part of it, it’s our job. It’s also a matter of a new generation. The bank has also 
become more businesslike, more narrowly focused on content. With issues like client integrity 
and mortgages, management has become harsher. More people than before need to leave for 
quality reasons. Within the organization we’re well aware of that as well. One person says we’ve 
become just a regular company, another says we’re not what we used to be” (5).
The amount of contact may increase due to the increasing opportunities for virtual contact, 
but it seems that a lack of policy, commitment and focus is causing a decline in the quality of 
customer relations. This is because declining levels of interaction and the ongoing transition from 
human-to-digital contact may lead customers and members to feel less heard and connected. 
Direct and active control by staff and management is also lacking. The number of instances 
of contact is less important than the quality of the contact that does take place, as well as 
the intention of building and maintaining relationships. This is because the role of members is 
connected to social capital via the cooperative principles based on the roles for which qualitative 
52 The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) is responsible for supervising the operation 
of the financial markets. The AFM supervises the conduct of the entire financial market sector: savings, 
investment, insurance and loans.
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interaction is required. Frequent contact does not necessarily mean that there is any intention to 
build and maintain relationships — and that is what social capital is all about, since reciprocity, 
investment in relationships and ties with the community are meant to strengthen and improve 
business. Within LCB A, the interviewees reported that the networking aspect and direct contact 
with customers remain important, but that at the same time, less frequent face-to-face contact 
and less direct contact will become increasingly common in the future. This was also apparent 
from the interviews: “When it comes to the cooperative, no bank has more information about 
its customers. The networking aspect is becoming more and more important … I really think 
the relationship is what it comes down to. I have a very large network myself. A lot of people I 
know through work and I see them regularly, which also creates a different kind of connection, 
and those clients tell me a lot too. Information that can also be very useful to us as a bank. 
Which includes what they think of their bank as well as other things I know about them” (2). 
And: “There’s no choice but to become even bigger, because that allows you to work more 
professionally, or else you would have chosen long ago to just continue as a thousand little banks. 
If you look at the trends, globalization, virtualization and regulatory requirements, then what 
you get is a scale debate” (5). “I think people still really have to get used to the fact that face-to-
face contact and visiting customers in person is becoming a thing of the past and that that’s not 
necessarily a bad thing in itself. There’s still a certain tension, but I think the reason why people 
are being negative … is that they’re still adjusting to the new world” (4). 
LCB A indicates that workload and regulations as well as legislation leave too little time to work 
actively with members. Certain cases and projects demand a great deal of time, such as client 
integrity and the need for detailed documentation. These require so much time that there is just 
too little time left to work on networking with members. Furthermore, the increasing demands 
of regulatory agencies and budget cuts are placing a strain on both the organization and its 
staff. The interviews with the LCB A show that as a result of this pressure, there is less time for 
interaction with members and customers. 
The interviews held with staff from LCB A indicate that the decision to scale up within Rabobank, 
by merging some smaller banks to form larger ones, has the assumed advantage of faster 
professionalization in areas such as globalization, virtualization and increasingly strict regulatory 
requirements. According to the management of LCB A, the choice has been made to adopt a 
more mass-market approach and it has been decided to limit active contact and close customer 
relationships to specific customer groups. This means that active contact is limited to 10% of the 
bank’s customers. Furthermore, no staff members are available to intensify contact due to the 
cost-benefit ratio. The interviews revealed that the tendency to justify changes with growth and 
increased efficiency, as indicated by LCB A, and the redundancies that have affected Rabobank 
mean that a growing number of employees seem to adopt an “it’s just a job” approach to their 
136  •  Chapter 7
work, rather than a more dedicated attitude. Reorientation, downsizing and stricter governance 
following the mortgage and client integrity cases have led to increased insecurity at Rabobank, 
including fears of further redundancies. During the research period, many employees told their 
manager that Rabobank had become a ‘normal’ company for them, an organization just like any 
other financial institution, and that they no longer recognized the cooperative approach. The 
interviews indicate that uncertainty among employees also means that employees do not focus 
on the ultimate goal of their work, which is providing the best service and quality to members/
customers.
LCB B
The chair (15) of LCB B indicated that the fact that 49% of staff do not live in the bank’s catchment 
area has been “a natural development”. He had previously asked (within his organization) about 
the number of staff who live in the local area: “and there was no answer. Nobody knew. So we 
definitely needed to figure that out and I can confirm that it was not treated as a priority.” He 
also argued that: “You manage your staff roster according to the qualities you hire the staff for 
and whether they fit into your business culture. And being (LCB B), you want the best people. 
Commuting time is less relevant, but you do check whether it’s within reasonable commuting 
time, because you know that if people really do live very far away, they’ll be more inclined to leave 
you and they’ll be more likely to choose a different place.” When it comes to staff living outside 
the local area, the management of LCB B wants its staff to work on actively engaging within 
the local area. “It’s okay to live and work in different places, but then you do have to organize 
your own involvement and that doesn’t happen all by itself.” The chair of LCB B does not live in 
the area, but indicates that he has extensive knowledge of it. It is, however, unclear how ‘active 
engagement with the local area’ is encouraged, supported, facilitated or measured within LCB 
B. What is clear is that living within the catchment area is a point for consideration when hiring 
new staff: “We will make that a factor now, so if you have to compare CVs side by side, and one 
of them is from (catchment area), in the case of equal qualifications we’d prefer someone from 
(catchment area)” … “It also helps for staff commitment” … “Imagine a manager who lives in 
Venlo, that’s pretty far away obviously. Driving to work for an hour every day. You’d need quite a 
lot of motivation to work here. You’d pass a lot of other banks on the way.”
The nature of the town in which LCB B is located, a university town, was also mentioned as a 
reason for the large proportion of staff who live outside the catchment area. This also explains 
why 42% of them are not part of a local network. 
Staff participation in business networks is encouraged and opportunities are created for staff from 
the business division to participate in various business networks. Participation leads to business 
opportunities and local market information. “Within my team (at the Business Division), I manage 
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the business consultancy department, which includes the real ‘commercializers’. I manage them 
directly and I particularly encourage them to participate in networks of their own choice, the 
reason being that the only unique selling point Rabobank has compared to other large banks is 
that we are aware of small local businesses and we know the people who run them.” (11). 
Social capital relates specifically to interaction between staff and the members/customers, so it is 
important that this interaction actually occurs. In order to be able to discover what is relevant to 
your members/customers, you first need to interact with them. Despite the different sizes of the 
various offices of the bank, the interviews show that people talk about the customers within the 
bank. “The smaller the group, the more social capital, of course. It is a city bank, but when you 
talk to the staff they really are talking about the customers.” (11). 
The interviews conducted at LCB B revealed, firstly, that the percentage of staff members who 
actually live in the local area is not managed or monitored, but that this will be taken into 
consideration in future job applications. Secondly, there appears to be a perception that there is 
a difference between different kinds of staff members when it comes to participation (in general 
terms): “You see more regular participation among traditional Rabobank employees, the younger 
ones who are joining us now or who have been around for a while don’t have that. They’re 
couples who both have jobs.” Moreover, the survey reveals that 36% of the respondents at 
LCB B agreed with the statement in question 10 (see Q10), ‘The manager of the cooperative 
(Rabobank) where I work encourages me to participate in local networks (i.e. offline networks)’. 
This finding indicates that most employees are unlikely to feel motivated to participate in this way. 
The chair admits that this is a point of concern and continues by pointing out: “There’s a barrier 
somewhere. We’re from a time when work and private life were separate and they’re becoming 
more and more intertwined. And it’s becoming important to participate and to value being part 
of Rabobank. That realization still has a lot of growing to do. This is really a challenge to achieve.”
In a period of austerity with frequent layoffs, employees can be expected to feel less intrinsically 
motivated and commitment may suffer. They may also feel less encouraged to display such 
commitment. This creates a certain tension. “I think there are definitely people who want to 
do things, but who don’t want to do it in their spare time. Then what kind of company are you 
working for, and what makes you think it all has to come from the bank?” (15). Further tension 
is evident in the following comment: “If you say ‘I’m not being facilitated’, that make me feel 
mildly annoyed too, because you shouldn’t have to be facilitated to like something. It should be 
intrinsic.” (11). 
Last year, all employees attended a social media network workshop. By offering this workshop, 
the management tried to demonstrate to the staff the many possibilities of online social networks. 
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“Everyone got to learn about Facebook. We explained to everyone what Twitter was. We gave 
everyone an opportunity to at least know about it and to participate and we encouraged that.” (15).
The survey revealed that approximately 30% of staff find that there is insufficient time to devote 
to relations with customers or members (see Q12). This result was confirmed in the interviews, 
which clearly showed that the internal focus has led to a deterioration in the contact with the 
members/customers: “It’s no good, we don’t talk to our customers nearly enough and we’re 
very much internally focused (due to Customer Integrity among other things), very emphatically 
so, but it’s also because of increasing financial demands and time-consuming systems.” (10) The 
chair also commented: “I’m not shocked at all, that’s our dilemma, the big dilemma we need 
to solve. We have way too much to do. We have the CER triangle53, commerce, customers, 
members. We’re constantly being — I always say, up there are the customers and the triangle 
is constantly being pressed downwards. There’s risk that needs your attention, and customer 
integrity, etc. It all has to be recorded in files and it all takes lots and lots of time and the systems 
do facilitate it but not enough.” (15).
This internal focus has resulted in a weakening of the notion that a cooperative should maintain 
close contact with its members and customers, and is a cause of concern among the management 
of the bank: “… This is one of the main worries and challenges the management has, making 
sure it’s the customers that it’s all about. We’re a service company.” (15).
The image that arises from the interviews is that the amount of traditional, face-to-face contact 
between the staff of LCB B and their members/customers is likely to continue to decrease, and 
secondly that alternative forms of contact are being considered.
The form of contact with members and customers will change, but the bank will remain close to 
its members and customers: “But not in the traditional way anymore. You have to understand 
that as a staff member, and that includes management, you have to understand how you can 
get to meet those people. That can be done, meeting them can be done on social media, or with 
a phone call, a text, or meetings where people see each other, or events.” (15). LCB B aims to 
increase its current visibility by appointing ambassadors for LCB B’s local area. These ambassadors 
will receive resources for organizing things as a form of participation.
The survey shows that 26% of respondents replied positively to the question: I know many 
customers or members (of my cooperative) personally (see Q17). The interviews show that among 
staff there is a difference between staff working at the headquarters and those working at the 
smaller offices of LCB B: “I recognize that in a general sense but my offices are in small towns, 
53 This is a term specific to the Rabobank, referring to a trade-off situation between risks, commerce and 
service for the customers/members. 
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basically villages with a number of employees from the area, so everyone knows each other 
and they go to work by bike. They know a lot of people in the area so they do have a strong 
connection. I have a few staff members who have been working at the office for a very long 
time. They’ve really become the face of the office. I see the difference when I come here (at the 
headquarters of LCB B). Here people like their anonymity. Here a customer wouldn’t ask for the 
same employee who they saw before, as they would at my office, they’d rather… discussing 
personal matters with someone they know is something they’d rather not do. At my office, when 
I get different staff sometimes, I’ll often get people saying: gee, we talk to a different person 
every time, we don’t like that.” (12). 
 
It is also becomes clear that not all employees are connected with the Local Member Board: “The 
Members’ Council is actually a strange organ at the local bank, because for me the Members’ 
Council seems like a party mainly for the management and the higher-ups. You can tell there is 
no focus or hardly any focus on the question of how to get the staff into the Members’ Council. 
Or they could make sure the Members’ Council is informed of what they do, or that there are 
some staff members present.” (11) 
LCB C
At LCB C, it was not known how many employees live in the local area: “This isn’t seen as a goal. 
I’m surprised though that they make up more than 50% (of the respondents). There hasn’t been 
any policy about this. This is a city bank and city banks have a certain pulling power. It has appeal for 
staff, but people wouldn’t relocate for it. Where you live and where you work aren’t connected.” 
(16). Living in the local area is important for picking up signals and improving the visibility of the 
organization. A few years ago it was therefore compulsory for certain colleagues to live in the area: 
“It used to be that the directors had to live in the area, just like a mayor did. But that’s been relaxed. 
So it’s not really about where you live.” (16). The local residency requirement has been abolished 
and the decline in the number of banks and further mergers and upscaling (resulting in expanded 
catchment areas) may explain why fewer and fewer people live in the local area: “The staff of a 
smaller bank tends to live closer in the working area and are more likely to be held accountable in 
the working area for the bank’s performance, and so they’re more engaged because their work 
and private lives are more intertwined. You can’t blame anyone else either because you work at 
that bank yourself, if the bank scales up and not all of the staff are from the local area.” (24). 
Furthermore, the internal focus of local banks explains why this is not managed or monitored: 
“Another reason is the fact that a number of banks were also under their management (of the 
Audit Rabobank Group (ARG)) and so they were mostly focused on sorting out internal cases.” (24). 
The chair also puts the advantage of living in the working area into perspective: “There are people 
from outside the working area who still do a lot within it, but also the other way around: employees 
who live here but don’t really give a hoot about what happens here.” (16). 
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LCB C is looking for a way to highlight the contribution of the bank to society, and to communicate 
this to employees, members and outsiders: “What’s less well known is the social contribution to 
the working area, like for example: how many new entrepreneurs are we helping right now? How 
many mortgage customers have we helped? And also, what are we sponsoring in the working 
area, and what are we donating to in the local area from the cooperation fund? That should give 
you more of a feel for the social, societal and economic impact that the cooperative bank has on 
its area. People don’t realize that at all. I talk about this to the mayors and municipalities where 
we’re located. We have a public utility function and the bank also has a cooperative aspect on 
top of that, which the members have some influence on.” (24).
The role of the members and the Members’ Councils is still developing, and this is also leading 
to internal questions: “What is the influence of the members, in effect? How does this work 
locally and what influence is there? Because we are the implementing body of a centralized 
organization.” (16). According to the management of LCB C, accountability to members/
customers and therefore to the Members’ Council is a central consideration: “The Members’ 
Council is frequently searches for what influence it has. But they already have influence just by 
being there. It’s still important to be accountable to our customers.” (16).
During the field study period, LCB C chose to approach Rabobank staff members that work for 
Rabobank Nederland or other LCBs to act as an ambassador for their bank. The management 
wished to make use the networks of these indirect colleagues in order to strengthen their ties 
within the Rabobank Group, within its catchment area and with society in general. The bank is 
considered ubiquitous in the city and participates in many formal and informal networks.
LCB D
Within LCB D, too, the number of employees that live in the catchment area was unknown, and 
again this is not an aspect that was managed or monitored. However, people worked actively to 
find local interns and to help local students by providing internships: “This is what we’re trying to 
focus on, but quality comes first. With interns and trainees, we try to connect local talent.” (26).54 
Some 8% of respondents gave neutral replies to question 23, ‘The needs and desires of the 
customers/members of the cooperative are important to me’ (Q 23). According to the chair, this 
was due to uncertainty at Rabobank: “There are still people who don’t think about the ultimate 
goal of their job. They don’t see their position as part of a bigger whole. Big, major developments 
can make people feel insecure. But that insecurity was built up by conversations that took place. 
You’re asking something of me, but I have to leave. That definitely plays a part.” (26). 
54 The limited sample size of LCB D may be the cause of the large number of respondents (76%) who live in 
the working area.
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Respondents were scarcely able to explain the difference in service for members and customers, 
or stated that there was no difference in service: “For customer service, there’s no distinction 
between members and customers. So we do the exact same things.” (26). 
There were also doubts about the various arguments that were used to convince customers to 
join: “At this bank it’s been said that Rabobank will support its members for longer, but who 
wants to hear that as a reason to become a member? Content-wise, it’s nothing. We’ve been 
working on this since 2000. We have the magazine Dichterbij now, but they can get that from an 
Albert Heijn (a Dutch supermarket) too.” (26).
The chair mentioned a lack of vison as a reason for the existing lack of clarity  regarding 
membership: “There has been a lack of real vision and passion to represent the cooperation. 
Since 2008, there has been stress on the cooperation because we haven’t been able to explain 
to the supervisors that it makes us something just a bit different. Because of Libor, the supervisor 
has ended up looking at us the same way they look at other banks. This has seeped into society 
too: you’re just the same as the others after all.” (26).
LCB E
Of the respondents from LCB E, 47% lived in the catchment area of the bank. People were 
aware of the number of staff who resided locally, according to the interviews. Commitment to 
the local area was stated as important for the management of the bank and as playing a role in 
recruitment and selection: “When we hire new staff, local involvement and the fact that people 
want to act as an ambassador are taken into account.” (39). Managers also consider existing or 
future local networks and the expertise of candidates: “At the moment I’m looking specifically for 
people from the local area. They’ll soon have children going to school in the working area, they’ll 
pick up on information. When it comes to specialists, things get difficult. It’s also about added 
value for the communities now.” (38).
Among the respondents, 79% agreed that: The manager of the cooperative (Rabobank) where 
I work promotes/encourages me to participate in local networks (i.e. offline networks) (Q 10). 
Nonetheless, according to the chair, organizational changes and external pressure play a role 
in whether people participate in networking: “Not everyone will be interested. We’re going 
through a time of crisis and the entire Rabobank is focused on a new orientation. There’s pressure 
from the supervisors. People are managed based on this (KPI), particularly people who are on 
quality assurance or HR and some on internal credit management. Those are mostly people 
who are managed based on quality. They’ll feel less interested and encouraged to do that. The 
management doesn’t put a brake on this. But practically speaking, I can imagine.” (34). So 
the chair is unsurprised that his employees are not interested in participating in networking. 
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The management is also criticized when it comes to its supposed exemplary role: “I feel the 
management and higher-ups should take more of a pioneering role. As an exemplary function. 
Only five members of the management are members of a community. We regularly receive 
invitations for networking meetings, and they’re forwarded. Colleagues sign up for them based 
on the appeal of the event. That’s a matter of personal preference. That’s something you should 
do in your spare time. Within the bank (LCB E), that is part of your competences. This suits the 
culture of the bank so this is what you do. For that, the exemplary function is necessary, though. 
This isn’t being encouraged well yet.” (35). 
Employees are expected to attend events in their spare time. “What it comes down to is that 
it’s your own time that you are investing in it. As an ambassador, you can get an extra bonus at 
the end of the year, but it’s not proportionate to the number of hours you give up. If you don’t 
have the intrinsic motivation to give up those hours… So it’s possible that people don’t feel 
facilitated by the bank. You don’t get paid for those hours.” (39). This may affect participation in 
the networks because employees are unwilling to sacrifice their private time, are not intrinsically 
motivated and do not feel facilitated: “Is the willingness intrinsic? How does that work? Partly 
it’s in the people. Only 25 employees at [bank E] are involved in a community, of which 14 
passively. So there are only 11 active community members within the entire bank. This is where 
we really need a good example to be set. The chair of the board is usually at too high a level. 
The staff sometimes can’t understand the relevance of the chair’s ideas.” (35) Still, 57% of the 
respondents feel that their manager facilitates their participation in local networks (see Q11). 
Intrinsic motivation is important in order to perform well within LCB E: “This also relates to the 
competences of the colleagues in question. You do need to be intrinsically motivated to want to 
be part of this group. That definitely is encouraged; during the staff meeting, they explained the 
communities and how important they are.” (37). The interviews revealed that there was less time 
for contact with members/customers, and less focus on cooperative action within LCB E. This was 
due to the workload on staff, but also due to management by Rabobank Nederland: “Considering 
the high workload, we can’t deal with this now. People need space and not everybody feels this 
at the moment. I don’t see much encouragement from the Executive Board.” … “The focus 
is mainly on the efficiency aspect, but not on the C’s of CER55, Commerce, Cooperation and 
Community. I don’t see that being expressed, not in the encouragement, not in the management, 
and that’s something you also see with local banks so it’s also true for us in part.” (34) 
The interviews show that staff members need (or would like) guidance from Rabobank Nederland 
when it comes to cooperative activities in their day-to-day work and what this means in practice. 
At the management level at LCB E, there is a lack of clarity as to how this can or should be 
55 This is short for Commerce, Efficiency and Risk Management. This is a term specific to the Rabobank, 
referring to a trade-off situation between risks, commerce and service for the members/customers.
The five Local Cooperative Banks and organizational social capital: results   •  143
7
implemented. The manager commented: “Below that, there is a management team. Half of them 
know what (our chair of the board) is talking about, and that’s an optimistic guess. If you go 
through our DT/MT, there are two people who just don’t understand at all. There are two people 
who are working from a commercial point of view, so basically they don’t understand at all either. 
Then there are two who do understand what (the chair) means, but they have difficulty doing it, 
and they also think a Local Compliance Officer (LCO) and a Business Management (BM) person 
shouldn’t participate in those networks, because they feel they should remain independent. So 
they can’t play a role either. I think that between the nine of us, we have three people who 
actually get it, and who are sincerely actively involved with those communities – and that’s what 
it’s all about. They’re involved in the way the chair meant. The Large Business (GZ) manager 
doesn’t understand at all and the SMB manager does, on the other hand.” (38). If the vision and 
aims of cooperative action are not clear to managers and team leaders, they will not be able to 
convey the right message to staff or provide them with the appropriate support. 
Of the respondents from LCB E, 20% reported annual contact with their members/customers. 
The chair elaborated on this as follows: “Staff members need to really take the cooperative 
ideas and philosophy to heart. And they need to become sophisticated in that regard. My vision 
for 2016 is 80-20%. I’ll be content if 80% are in touch with the community in some way, be 
it through volunteer work or something else, and preferably in a businesslike way.” (34). The 
private sector manager confirmed that the proportion of staff that are generally in contact with 
members/customers every year needs to increase: “In our case it should be 75-25% because 
75% of our people are in the commercial sections and we have 25% working behind the scenes. 
Someone from BM should also show their face if they live in the working area, and work on 
developing activities.” (38). 
There is an attendance requirement for staff in relation to members’ meetings: “Commercial 
account managers and private bankers and financial consultants are invited on a mandatory 
basis. The others are invited on a voluntary basis. They can attend if they want. If they do, they 
show up in a suit and wearing the Rabobank badge. They’ll attend in the capacity of a host from 
the bank. And that means you have to reach out to people. In our case there would be some 
300-400 people attending so you’d need some 60-70 staff members.” (38). So all employees 
have the option of attending, but there also appears to be some reluctance to participate: “Staff 
members will sometimes be reserved; it has to be handed to them. They’re too passive. They’ll 
act if they need to. But I can’t blame them, they’re not aware of how it could benefit them. At 
the meetings that we organize, you’ll see staff members clustering together, while there’s also a 
manager going around and talking to everyone.” (35). 
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However, employees are not invited to the Members’ Council and this can lead to an informational 
disadvantage: “I myself was a secretary of the Members’ Council for years. Very externally 
oriented, that is to say, on the members of the Council. Internally, it was only on the agenda of 
the Local Web. The people who did attend were the directors and the management. No invitation 
was ever sent to the other staff. The minutes are never published either. When I was a secretary 
of the Members’ Council, I knew what was going on; now that I no longer am, I don’t know 
what’s going on there anymore, or what they’re doing. I regret that. This shows that this really 
is an issue; we now have a situation where staff members don’t know who’s on the Members’ 
Council. In that situation, that ‘everyone knows everyone’ arrangement isn’t there. And that’s 
very important.” (35). It also seems to be unclear whether the management team will continue 
to attend in the future: “No, our staff aren’t invited to the Members’ Council. Except for the 
management and the directors’ team. Although we’re reconsidering whether the management 
team should still be there. I don’t try to, but I do nearly always attend myself. I never thought 
about whether my colleagues would like to be there and if they would be interested in that.” 
(38).
And yet, other interviewees told a different story, indicating that staff members do attend and 
that there is contact between the staff and the members/customers. “Sometimes staff members 
do join. But staff members are already very much in touch with the communities. There are a 
number of communities within the bank. They’ve been initiated by the bank. Hence the hope 
that some of the people within those communities will take the initiative. The staff members are 
supposed to continue participating in those communities. I want to join the members’ meetings 
too and that was no problem. The business controller for company management has become a 
neighborhood ambassador, for example. They initiate all sorts of activities again, together with 
the people from their area; it’s very well integrated and it works really well. During my own 
job interview it was clearly indicated that members’ and customers’ meeting are part of the 
job and the competences. They’re not paid for this at the moment. So it’s members’ meetings 
and communities.” (37). It also seems that at some Members’ Councils, staff members do exert 
control; this presumably relates to the staff members who attend on a mandatory basis, and 
there is a possibility for staff members to attend if they want to: “There are Members’ Councils 
in the sense of winter lectures. Staff members are actively involved with those and there’s some 
degree of focus on them too. It’s clear that staff members need to be present for these. Or at 
least they should take turns. During the performance review meetings, we focus on whether 
staff members have been visibly present during those evenings. Invitations are sent out for those 
lectures and everyone just accepts those. Then there’s some discussion on who exactly is going to 
go. In Private Banking it’s very normal that at least the account managers are there, along with a 
number of assistants. It does depend on the role, the staff members who are the most in touch 
with the customers are there too. If you want to go, you can.” (39).
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Comparative summary for the structural dimension
The interviews show that of the five LCBs, only staff at LCB E know exactly which proportion 
of staff members actually live in the local area, and that there is currently no policy regarding 
this. At all five LCBs, staff indicated that they would prefer employees from the surrounding 
area, because this is beneficial to the LCB’s knowledge of the local area. Staff at all five banks 
also stated that intrinsic motivation was a decisive factor in working for a cooperative, and that 
employees who live in the local area will not necessarily be more actively involved in the local 
area. At LCB B, staff members indicated that participation among older employees was higher, 
and that this generational difference was clearly visible within LCB B.
Staff members at LCB E indicated that the recent period of economic difficulty, including the 
reorientation of the Rabobank Group, had caused employees to feel less compelled to account 
for their responsibilities in developing and maintaining local network(s). Increased pressure from 
regulators had resulted in staff focusing on quality control. Increased leadership from senior staff 
is required and needs to be encouraged. Network events are often held after work and employees 
do not always have sufficient intrinsic motivation to participate, according to respondents at LCBs 
A, B and C.
When managers and directors do not understand the strategy and vision of the chair, and are not 
able to translate and convey the relevant message, this causes a knowledge discrepancy between 
management and bank staff members, which can cause problems in the implementation of 
strategy and policies that relate to involvement with the local area. The interviews showed that 
intrinsic motivation among employees is key in all aspects. Currently, there is no clear direction. Staff 
at LCB A indicated that workload, regulations and legislation leave too little time to actively work 
with members. Staff at LCB C described a similar situation. Case files and projects take up a large 
amount of time, such as those relating to client integrity and the need for detailed documentation.
Interviews held with staff from LCB A revealed that the decision to scale up had been made on 
the assumption that this would lead to more rapid professionalization, and due to considerations 
such as globalization, virtualization and increasingly onerous regulatory requirements. According 
to the management of LCB A, therefore, active contact and intensive customer relations should 
be focused only on specific customer groups. 
The Chair of LCB B reported that interaction between the organization and its members/customers 
was essential, but that the way in which this is done is up for discussion. The LCBs’ policy can be 
explained through (online) presentations, seminars and ambassadors in close contact with the 
general Members’ Council. At LCB E, employees are explicitly required to have contact with the 
various communities.
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The Members’ Council has an external focus and needs to communicate with the Board and the 
management. At LCB E, the question of whether the management team will have to attend the 
council in future was raised. Employees are not invited, except at LCB D, although they can review 
the agenda through Local Web. At LCB C, ambassadors are invited; people who live in the local 
area. Reports on the council meetings are published at LCB C but not at LCB E. The impression 
from the local banks is that the Members’ Councils are still finding their role and which influence 
they can have on policy, governance and operation. Although presence of the Members Councils 
is effective, as has been demonstrated, (Libor), they remain to some extent unclear clear about 
their role. The task of the local banks is, as stated previously, accountability to its customers/
members.
During the research period, many employees expressed the view that Rabobank had become 
a business just like any other for them, and that they no longer recognized the cooperative 
approach. Reorientation, staff cuts, stricter governance with regard to mortgages and client 
integrity were all leading to higher levels of (job) insecurity at Rabobank. The interviews revealed 
that uncertainty among employees was causing them to lose the focus on the ultimate goal 
of their work: providing the best service and quality to their members/customers. Managers 
from LCB E indicated that there was no difference in customer service between members and 
customers other than the opportunity to participate in networks and possible election to the 
Members’ Council. The distinction between members and customers seems to have become 
blurred. Membership influence and control no longer appear to be emphasized. 
LCB E had begun to establish various communities in the local area to share their ideas and take 
advantage of opportunities to network, such as communities for young entrepreneurs, medical 
communities and IT communities.  
The interviews revealed that commercial account managers, private bankers and financial advisors 
are obliged to attend member and council meetings, but criticism of this focused on the fact 
that attending staff members are not always actively involved and tend to ‘crowd together’ at 
meetings rather than reaching out and seeking contact. They also lack a sense of purpose as to 
what is expected in terms of networking and customer interaction. 
It seems that the lack of policy, direction, commitment and attention is causing a decline in the 
quality of customer relations. The number of instances of contact is less important than the 
quality of that contact and the intention of building and maintaining long-term relationships. 
This is what social capital is all about. Reciprocity, investment in relationships and ties with the 
community should strengthen and improve business.
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7.2.2 Relational dimension
The relational dimension comprises the norms, expectations and levels of trust or respect that are 
developed through a history of interactions within the network (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
It relates to the nature of personal relationships and focuses on aspects that influence behavior, 
because actions also are likely to differ in significant ways (from other network members) and 
to involve personal and emotional attachments. Among the key elements in this dimension are: 
trust, the norm of reciprocity and identification.56
7.2.2.1 Trust
 
Q 24 Generally speaking, I trust most people.
Q 22 Contact with customers or members is important to me. 
 
 
Q 23 The needs and desires of the customers/members of the cooperative are 
important to me. 
 
 
Q 24 Generally speaking, I trust most people. 
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Q 25 Most people in the local area of the cooperative can be trusted.Q 25 Most people in the local area of the cooperative can be trusted. 
 
 
Q 26 Most customers or members can be trusted. 
 
 
Q 27 Most of my colleagues within the cooperative (Rabobank) can be trusted. 
 
 
Q 28 I am always confident that my friends and family act in my best interests. 
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56 The survey questions regarding relational dimension are questions 24 through 40 (see graphs below).
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Q 29 I am always confident that my colleagues act in my best interests.
 
Q 29 I am always confident that my colleagues act in my best interests. 
 
 
Q 30 I am always happy to help my relatives with any question or problem. 
 
 
Q 31 I am always happy to help my friends with any question or problem. 
 
 
Q 32 I am always happy to help my colleagues with any question or problem. 
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7.2.2.2 Norm of reciprocity 
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Q 32 I am always happy to help my colleagues with any question or problem.
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Q 33 I am always happy to help customers or members of the cooperative with any question 
or problem.
Q 33 I am always happy to help customers or members of the cooperative with 
any question or problem. 
 
 
Q 34 I follow the local news of the working area of the cooperative (Rabobank), 
for example by reading local news reports. 
 
 
 
Q 35 People are generally willing to help each other with a question or problem. 
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Q 35 People are generally willing to help each other with a question or problem.
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Q 36 Do you do volunteer work at this moment, such as helping at a food bank, assisting with 
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Q 38 I feel that I am committed to the local cooperative Rabobank.
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LCB A
According to the respondents, staff members’ trust in each other and their willingness to help 
each other is related to the size of the bank and the staff workload. The size of local banks has 
an effect on procedures as well as workload and the willingness to help each other: “At a large 
bank, the structuring of the procedure is still clear. Because of the pressure of the workload, 
people thought and still think: let me get my own desk cleared first. Because of the pressure, and 
because they can’t handle it.” (5). In order for mutual trust to become established, it is important 
to focus on this every day, and there is a role for everyone in this: “Having faith that you can 
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converse with each other, like when you think ‘what the heck are you doing?’, you feel you are 
able to tell me that and we could do something about it… It’s repeated every day, repeating to 
do as I say, and I always ask team leaders whenever I talk to them if they have any tips for me, is 
there anything I could do better or differently, and it takes a while before they give me more of 
that… The same goes for the departments. When I’m in the start-of-the-day routine, if I expose 
my vulnerable side, things I might not have done right, then maybe they will too. 
Then maybe they’d feel they have the freedom to do the same… Being close to the workplace, 
knowing what’s going on… (The team consists of) 60 staff members, I’m lucky that it’s all 
together in one place.” (1). 
During the research period, several LBCs used a so-called card system, similar to the way in which 
soccer referees sanction offenses. When staff members make certain mistakes regarding client 
integrity policy, they may be given a ‘yellow card’, which is considered as a warning, but in the case 
of repeated offenses they are given a ‘red card’, and in that case, they are dismissed from their post. 
As a result, the pressure to perform and avoid mistakes and oversights has increased and mutual 
trust between colleagues has suffered, adversely affecting the internal culture: “‘Whoops, too bad, 
good bye-letters and things like that. No wonder, that’s just asking for it.” (4). This results in a 
culture where employees are afraid to make mistakes and also reluctant to help each other.
 
It also appears that not all staff members value the needs and desires of the members/customers 
equally (see Q 23): “I find this shocking. And difficult. When we notice this in the department, 
we’ll have a conversation about it. During the last year there have been a few people who quit; 
it turned out in the end that this just wasn’t their cup of tea anymore. You have to be honest 
to each other like that.” (1). And: “It’s striking that there are so many of them.” (4). Still, there 
are different views on this too: “I think there are more people working within this Rabobank – I 
don’t actually know any local Rabobanks besides the ones I’ve had courses at, and by the way – 
there are staff members who actually give a hoot whether they work at Rabobank, ABN AMRO, 
ING57 or some insurance company. They come for the money, and for what definitely used to be 
a reasonably stable and relatively well paid working environment.” (8). Regarding people who 
are not interested in the needs of the members/customers, the respondents commented: “Don’t 
get a job at the front office of a local bank if you’re like that.” (7). And regarding the connection 
with the members/customers: “I get the impression that over the past few years we’ve grown 
more distant from our supporters, I mean the members and the customers. Sometimes I say 
jokingly: some people join us here thinking they’re just paid a salary every month but they have 
no idea how that money is made. The people who have joined us here over the past few years, 
they see (Customer Integrity) appear on the scene, and they just think that’s all normal. I’m from 
a different generation… From my perception that distance has definitely become greater.” (6). 
57 ABN AMRO and ING are the names of two other prominent banks in the Netherlands.
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LCB B
According to the chair of the bank, creating trust depends on the size of the organization: “The 
bigger it grows, the more difficult it becomes.” (15). The chair conceives of trust as something that 
should be visible in the staff’s daily behavior: “Trust is not the sort of thing that you get together 
and work on, trust is something you need to translate into what you do and what behavior you 
display.” (15). Another important aspect is the degree to which managers are involved with their 
staff: “As a manager, do you know well enough whether your employees understand the systems 
properly and follow the agreements we’ve made together? Are you sure of that? Because that’s 
your responsibility. If you know that, it helps a whole lot, because then I don’t have to give you 
a yellow card, because then if I see things aren’t quite the way we agreed upon, we can talk 
about why that is. But that doesn’t happen enough.” (15). There also seems to be a relationship 
between the size of the bank and the degree of confidence ‘that my colleagues act in my best 
interests’ (see Q 29).
“I’m a customer here too. Suppose I wanted a mortgage. Would my co-workers put the same or 
more effort into that than they would for a customer? When an organization grows larger, and 
(LCB B) is a pretty large group, that decreases. And that’s very strange. I’ve worked at a small 
bank too and there we would be glad that we get to advise and help our own co-workers, but 
now they’d be someone from a different department and then it’s like it’s actually reversed, it 
seems. That’s very strange.” (15). 
Another reason given for the results for Q 29 were the continuous changes within Rabobank: “It’s 
because there are developments that undermine that confidence, that make you think: what’s in 
it for me? That 41%, that’s about how as a staff member you need to be careful to make sure 
you stay on board. And you have to pay close attention to your co-workers to make sure they 
don’t board a passing train and leave you behind. There’s nothing more human than that in an 
environment that’s being squeezed.” (11). 
Keeping an eye on the local news enables the staff to pick up on signals from the local area. 
However, not everyone within the bank actually does this. Some 21% of respondents indicated 
they do not follow the local news (Q 34). “I recognize that attitude and I understand where it’s 
coming from, it’s directly related to not living here and thinking [City B] is just where I work and 
other than that it doesn’t really matter what goes on there. We’re focusing on this, and this also 
relates to Customer Integrity, if you really want to get signals, you have to know what’s going 
on in your working area. Customer Integrity is the catalyst.” (11). And: “I don’t discuss that with 
my team and here, at a city bank, that is indeed a point of concern. Some people do live in the 
working area and they do bring some news along but the rest of us could go and get more of it 
ourselves too.” (9). 
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When it comes to trust in general, the Customer Integrity Policy has had an impact on internal 
levels of trust between colleagues as well as external trust vis-à-vis members/customers and 
society in general: “I think this is partly because of Customer Integrity, I think that’s made us 
more suspicious and sometimes we’ve taken that a little too far.” (9) In order to maintain internal 
trust, there are certain rules of conduct within the bank, such as the following: “We’re working 
on trust, for example through mutual double checking, and not arranging things for people we 
know.” (9).
LCB C
Despite the many gatherings that are held for members/clients, there is the feeling amongst 
staff that something needs to be done to preserve the distinctive social character of their bank: 
“Its social character is precisely what distinguishes Rabobank from other banks. If you no longer 
maintain this reputation and the perception of half of the staff start to change, this means there 
is some serious work to do.” (20).
The ongoing organizational changes have led to tensions and uncertainty among colleagues: 
“If someone from a group needs to be fired, based on the quality policy, it can lead to a lot of 
tension. These things happen, and we try to talk about it.” (20).
Employees also reflect on regaining the confidence of wider society:
“I think members should have influence, I don’t know whether that should be through the 
Member Council. I think it is time that we switched to new ways and gave people insight and 
influence at the bank. Because banks need to rebuild their reputation.” (20).
LCB D
The perception of the respondents was that they expect higher levels of trust among the smaller 
LCBs: “Self-interest and internal competition can be found at large LCBs, we always look at the 
whole team. Everyone helps each other if there is an issue. This is done on their own initiative. 
While staff at large LCBs generally have to resolve their issues by themselves. It does not mean the 
atmosphere is different, but the emphasis is on self-interest.” (28). Within LCB D, people were 
concerned about a forthcoming merger, and this affected the levels of confidence in each other 
and in the organization: “Uncertainty plays a role, we may be facing a merger, Visie 2016, the 
newspapers are full of impending layoffs at Rabobank.” (30). 
LCB E
The interviews showed how external trust (see Q 26) has decreased and that the same applies 
to the trust that staff members place in each other: “Society’s distrust towards the bank and 
vice versa is getting worse, I can say. Trust in each other, because of a few excesses, and as a 
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result of shrinking, the economy… Staff members are looking more critically at customers too, 
and Customer Integrity is part of that. It’s possible that within the Rabobank organization we’re 
seeing things in tunnel vision, that is in segments like Private Banking, and Businesses isn’t doing 
anything for me. Perhaps we have a very narrow view instead of a more collective vision towards 
the customers.” (34). 
One reason for the declining levels of trust among staff towards each other as well as towards 
members and customers could be the increased pressure from new laws and regulations: “You 
can’t trust anyone, you have to protect yourself in what you do. For example, with telephone 
identification, staff members want to cover themselves better and have become more suspicious. 
Even if they know it’s the customer.” (35). Other people clarify this: “As a result of issues like 
Customer Integrity, it’s now no longer socially desirable to trust people until proven otherwise. 
It doesn’t specifically mention trust. There’s trust among the staff. But we do want to record 
everything. We’ll say: email it to me, I’ll send a reply. The issue of control has repercussions here 
too. The need to record things is being taken too far now, now they want to tape everything.” 
(39). The local environment has an effect here too: “That’s really a matter of our operating area. 
We’re in a city here. There are a few areas that are a really bad social environment. We get people 
yelling abuse and threats down the phone and in the lobby. A healthy dose of vigilance is called 
for here.” (37). There appears to be a distinction between members and customers when it comes 
to this, however: “We’re all cautious here. We’ve taught our staff to be very critical. Though we 
are less suspicious of our members than our customers. We do make a distinction there.” (38). 
Mutual trust among staff (see Q 27) also depends on mutual competition: “At this local bank, 
I notice this happening in two departments: Private Banking and Businesses. That’s a matter of 
wanting to score and wanting to keep the customers within their own department. It’s not just 
about KPIs but also about being confident that the customer will be helped properly.” (35). In 
order to work on improving trust, “we’re trying to create a very open culture.” (37). 
Comparative summary for the relational dimension
The interviews revealed that, for all the employees interviewed, both society’s trust in LCBs, and 
banks’ trust in society have deteriorated. Due to various excesses in the past, employees are more 
critical regarding customers. Because of various checks and customer file integrity issues, many 
employees feel the need to ‘cover their backs’ against errors by recording and logging everything. 
Many employees have even become more suspicious toward each other.
Staff members at LCB A indicated that higher workloads have caused people to focus mainly 
on their own work and responsibilities and have less regard for the bigger picture within their 
department.
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LCB E was the only bank that indicated that there is one district of the operating area that arouses 
particular suspicion because of the demography of that area, which can give rise to difficulties for 
staff, who have in the past become the target of threats and verbal abuse. Within LCB E, special 
attention is being paid to this problem, but it also implies that employees are less suspicious about 
members than they are for non-member clients.
7.2.3 Cognitive dimension
The third dimension of Social Capital, the cognitive dimension, relates to the resources that 
promote a shared vision, shared language, common interpretations and systems of meaning, 
generally codes and shared narratives, values and other cultural elements. (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998).58 
7.2.3.1 Shared vision 
Q 41 I am aware of the cooperative goals of our organization.
Q 40 I am proud to be an employee of the local cooperative Rabobank. 
 
 
Q 41 I am aware of the cooperative goals of our organization. 
 
 
 
 
Q 42 My manager spends enough time on cooperative activities in our daily 
work. 
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58 The survey questions regarding the cognitive dimension are questions 41 through 50 (see graphs below).
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Q 43 My colleagues generally know what the cooperative philosophy stands for.
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Q 44 The local management of the cooperative (Rabobank) publicizes the fact 
that it is a cooperative sufficiently. 
 
 
 
 
Q 45 Working for a cooperative (Rabobank) is a conscious choice for me. 
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Q 45 Working for a cooperative (Rabobank) is a conscious choice for me.
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7.2.3.2 Shared language (SL)
Q 46 The employees of the cooperative (Rabobank) communicate with customers or members 
clearly in writing.
Q 46 The employees of the cooperative (Rabobank) communicate with 
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Q 48 All customers must also be members of the (local) cooperatives. 
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Q 47 Colleagues at the cooperative (Rabobank) communicate clearly during conversations with 
customers or members.
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7.2.3.3 Membership
Q 48 All customers must also be members of the (local) cooperatives.
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Q 49 The influence of the members of my cooperative (Rabobank) is clearly noticeable in the 
area where I work.
Q 49 The influence of the members of my cooperative (Rabobank) is clearly 
noticeable in the area where I work. 
 
 
 
Q 50 Members are very important to the survival of a cooperative. 
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LCB A
Within LCB A, the respondents do not seem to have a clearly defined idea of what cooperative 
banking means exactly, which affects its internal vision as well as the relationship between the 
bank and its members: “In my opinion, that’s ingrained into a lot of things, but the question is 
whether we recognize that in each other… Like, is what I’m doing for my co-workers recognizable 
enough as being cooperative, do we have the same ideas about that? I’m not so sure of that.” 
(1). And: “I’d expect that people think they don’t get enough time to network, to express… In 
my opinion, there aren’t many examples at Rabobank Nederland… Within (LCB A) not everyone 
knows what cooperative banking means.” (2). LCB A’s ideas about membership, the admittance 
of members and the opportunities of being a member, appear to be diverse: “We’ve indicated 
that we want to actively include certain target demographics in the membership. And that we 
want to actively call attention to that, to the membership. (Why doesn’t everyone get to be a 
member?) We don’t exclude people. That’s from Rabobank Nederland, from the discussion that’s 
going on there. But what’s more important: so then everyone is a member, great, but then what 
are you going to do with that? At our bank too – they get the members’ magazine Dichterbij, 
but I think membership still means very little. So being a member doesn’t make much of a 
difference.” (2).
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LCB B
Within LCB B, people are unhappy about the lack of clarity regarding the concept of being a 
cooperative as well as the way in which the membership is treated: “The term ‘cooperative’ is 
thrown around a lot but it’s still an unclear concept. It’s the sum of the individuals, but then what 
does that mean? And how do you strive for that? It’s very difficult to make that into something 
tangible. If you were to say, you know, we should set a concrete objective and strive to achieve 
that, and then call that our cooperative mission, that would be possible.” (11). Staff members 
report increasing difficulties in explaining the benefits of being a member to the customers and 
to themselves: “This is the essence of the problem: you’re telling people just to make customers 
members straight away, and the customer asks: what’s in it for me? Why should I become a 
member? Well, um, you get to help us make decisions. About what? Well, bank stuff and 
everything. But I’ve got a business to run. I’m convinced that there is no reason to become a 
Rabobank member, unless you really… You could ask yourself what it is that you keep going.” 
(11). And yet, making people members appears to be something fundamental: “What do we 
do if we just forget about those new members? Good luck selling that to the world outside. 
You’re maintaining something that isn’t there.” (11). Some respondents even wondered out loud 
what members actually are: “What is a member? Are some people members just so they’ll get 
a discount every once in a while, is that all it is?” (14). They wondered what the actual added 
value of membership is: “I’m glad we’re recruiting new members but you do have to do that 
where you think membership is actually going to add something worthwhile.” (13). Employees 
also questioned whether both members and clients can become sufficiently involved when there 
are only 30-40 seats available in the Members’ Council of the relevant local bank. Furthermore, 
differences among staff members were apparent in relation to the influence of the members in 
the local area: “I can see the impact of the members at the head office in the city and that of 
those in the smaller towns. The small towns have more impact, they still have the social capital of 
a small community so people know the members of the Members’ Council and they know where 
to find each other, and if something goes wrong they’ll know where to find each other, so there’s 
more interaction. Cooperation has more consequences there. This was clear, for example, during 
that discussion about opening hours. The directors were a lot more nervous about breaking the 
news in the smaller towns because they expected it to have more of an impact there too. My 
entire team notices this. Being small has the benefit of making it easier to find and recognize each 
other, and the disadvantage of it for the customers is that it’s a costly structure. And I’m not sure 
how much longer it will be viable across the entire organization.” (12).
The chair has no clear answer to the question of whether all customers should also be members of 
their (local) cooperative (Q 48), ‘All customers should also be members of the (local) cooperatives’: 
“That’s the dilemma of our organization. We need to find a solution to that. The responsible 
member of the Executive Board attempted to do that with his proposal on cooperative customer 
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service. His first proposal still said all customers had to become members. I believe customers 
should really be motivated in order to become members. To those, it would have a different 
meaning too. But still, for 25 years now I’ve been explaining that there are benefits to being a 
member of a customers’ cooperative, and I don’t have any more success at that than others do.”
Within the Executive Board of Rabobank Nederland, there continues to be a discussion regarding 
whether or not every customer should be made a member: “We haven’t really made a decision 
on that, it’s not clear at all. We should either make everyone a member or else show that we 
make a difference by being a cooperative and really ensuring that customers – that is, members – 
experience that things are really different here. That they’d have influence, that they’d participate, 
and that the people who work here really are different. I’m a customer here as well as a member. 
They have a different role in society. They take responsibility in society. That’s one option. You 
could also say: we choose to only have proper members. But then those members do need to 
really take a risk and then they should also really benefit accordingly. If we want to ensure real 
benefits for 2 million members, that would immediately have its effects on the budget. (15). 
Based on the views expressed here, it can be concluded that there are questions and ambiguities 
regarding cooperative customer services across the organization as a whole.
LCB C
The interviews at LCB C also indicated a lack of clarity regarding membership, and a loss of value 
of the benefits and opportunities associated with being a member: “They get too little energy 
back about the benefits of using their membership to get involved with the management of 
the bank. The relationship has become hollowed out. And young adults don’t have strong ties 
either.” (24).
LCB D
The director of Businesses points out that they too are responsible for the current lack of clarity 
regarding membership: “Where we have hitherto not been successful enough is explaining 
properly to our people what the difference is between a customer and a member, and what 
it means to a customer or member to be a customer or member of this bank. I can see that 
when I ask our own staff about that. You could ask the question 170 times, asking: ‘what is a 
cooperative to you’… We haven’t conveyed that properly, we haven’t invested enough in it to 
enable them to promote it, and we haven’t facilitated our people enough to all do that in the 
same way. I think you’d get very different answers.” (31). 
LCB E
At the smallest bank in this study’s sample, staff indicated they want to focus more on cooperative 
banking and the meaning of membership. However, other factors are also demanding their 
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attention: “Compared to me (the chair), the management is much more focused on the E and the 
R (in CER). Because the supervisor requires it, so that’s more urgent. Encouraging and drawing 
attention to cooperativity has come under pressure because of this. I recognize that perfectly. 
The preconditions should never have to be completely optimal. We need to focus on this.” (34). 
The bank has spent a great deal of time on new ideas and has published a special magazine about 
community banking, but staff members still want more from the management, for instance 
regarding setting the right example: “The staff need for more leadership. People (within LCB E) 
are proud to work for Rabobank, there is a basis and there are good working conditions, but 
there is also fear (of being fired, due to recent layoffs). The directors indicate they have little time. 
There’s no chance to demonstrate your competences… The chair of the board is on an express 
train that doesn’t stop. People don’t get a chance to board. I think the higher-ups should take on 
more of a pioneering role. The directors and the management aren’t active digitally. They should 
be much more involved, physically and digitally, in order to get the staff on board. Ask them to 
come with you some time. The chair of the board doesn’t have a blog and never takes anyone 
along. The directors should show more involvement, internally and externally. Publications have 
made this bank become generally known for being innovative.” (35). With all the effort currently 
going into supervisory issues and the focus on Rabobank’s budget cuts, there may be less time to 
focus on the idea of being a cooperative: “Perhaps less attention and focus is being shown due 
to budget cuts.” (37). The director of Businesses, by contrast, thought that things were going well 
and that not all of staff members realized how well they were doing: “Community banking is a 
textbook example of cooperative action. Our own colleagues at the local bank are insufficiently 
aware that we are playing a pioneering role in this field and that this path is cooperative action 
in optima forma. Other local banks are looking on open-mouthed.” (36). 59 
Comparative summary for the cognitive dimension
From the interviews it is clear that all five banks focus on efficiency and economic KPIs and, 
particularly, on the mandatory regulations that are enforced by regulators. These points of focus 
were demanding a considerable amount of time and effort from the five organizations at the 
time of my research.
Respondents at LCBs B, C, D and E also noted that the active encouragement of the cooperative 
principles was suffering because of these regulatory requirements, even in a shrinking organization. 
The need for active policies and clear communication remains, even when the circumstances are 
59 Curiously, in the community banking magazine of this LCB (LCB E), which has been distributed across the 
entire Rabobank organization, Rabobank Nederland states: “When banks really do their best, they are utility 
companies that fulfil an important facilitating role. Rabobank has always tried to fulfil that role in society. 
One of the latest ways to do well in this area is called community banking.” While on the next page, it says: 
“Community banking, Rabobank has been strong on that for 100 years now.” 
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not optimal. Respondents at LCB A indicated that the increased workload was essentially making 
it impossible for team leaders and managers to make time for, for example, the daily kick-off 
meetings.
In all five banks, those interviewed reported that leadership was lacking in the areas of 
communication and policy.  
From the interviews, it appears that all five CEOs found it difficult to explain the difference in 
services between clients and members, and what the benefits for members are or should be. They 
also indicated that they expected more support, guidance and a clearer vision from Rabobank 
Nederland, and more specifically from the Board of Directors. Other interviewees were not able to 
clarify the difference between a client and member, nor what it means for a customer or member 
to be a part of Rabobank.
At the same time, the interviews and desk research also revealed that there were differences in 
membership policy between the local banks. In order to be able to become a member of LCBs 
A, B, C, D, one or more services need to be purchased. This situation is different at LBC E, where 
at least three services need to be purchased in order to become a member. From desk research 
into the LCBs’ documents relating to membership policy, it appears that in the case of LCB A, it 
is true in principle that any client can become a member by purchasing one service. However, the 
same member policy document states that the focus of LCB A’s membership policy is primarily 
on private banking clients, Business Relations and private banker clients. In effect, then, LCB 
A focuses on these types of customers as its most significant customers.  This has also been 
noted in practice at LCB B, according to the interview with the chair of LCB B. Greater clarity on 
membership policy is an important aspect of the first cooperative principle: voluntary and open 
membership. Within the five LCBs, a single clear vision of what profile members should have 
seems to be lacking. It is not clear why, for example, customers who purchase one product or 
service should not be regarded as meaningful customers. An individual who is involved in the 
local area – perhaps a volunteer involved with meaningful activities – but who receives welfare 
support and has only a savings account could still be a significant contributor to policy, social 
awareness and governance.
Regarding banking services, there are no clear differences between customer service for members 
and non-members. The interviews showed that both managers and directors were unable to 
indicate the difference in the service for customers and members. At the same time, they also 
expressed their LCB’s desire for more guidance concerning this issue from Rabobank Nederland.
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7.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have presented, analyzed and discussed my findings from the survey, desk research 
and interviews conducted among staff at both the five LCBs and Rabobank Nederland. The limited 
role and involvement of members creates challenges with regard to maintaining and creating social 
capital. This also applies to the finding that annual contact with (all) members/customers does not 
always take place and that a large proportion of staff members have no or very little customer 
contact in their everyday work. 
 
Social capital relates specifically to the interaction between staff and members/customers, so 
it is important that this interaction actually takes place. In order to be able to understand your 
designated members/customers, you first need to interact with them. It seems that the lack 
of policy, direction, commitment and attention is causing a decline in the quality of customer 
relations. How many instances of contact occur is less important than the quality of the contact 
that actually takes place, as well as the intention of building and sustaining long-term relationships. 
This is what social capital is all about. In times of austerity and ongoing staff reductions, it is 
to be expected that employees feel less intrinsically motivated to commit themselves for their 
employer. At the same time the interviews have shown that society’s trust in the LCBs, and the 
LCBs’ trust in society, have deteriorated. Due to various excesses, employees are more critical with 
regard to customers. Because of the various checks introduced and customer file integrity issues, 
many employees feel the need to ‘cover their backs’ by recording and logging everything. Most 
employees have become more suspicious, even toward each other. 
 
The decision to scale up was based on the assumption that this would lead to advantages in 
terms of more rapid professionalization and in areas such as globalization, virtualization and 
stricter regulatory requirements. The interviews show that active contact and close customer 
relations should focus only on specific customer groups. Based on the theory discussed in chapters 
3 and 4 and the empirical findings of this study, it is now possible to answer the various research 
questions and the primary research question of this study, and to formulate conclusions in Chapter 
8: Conclusions.

Chapter 8 
Conclusions
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8.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 led to a fall in the confidence of citizens and consumers 
in banks. In recent years, various (financial) crises and scandals have occurred within the financial 
world (e.g. ‘toxic’ credit default swaps, excessive bonuses, fraud and money laundering). This 
demonstrates the direct relationship between the banking system and wider society, because 
when banks face these kinds of problems, the economy is invariably affected and therefore 
society as a whole.
Within the banking sector, it is possible that cooperative banks may provide an alternative to the 
more widespead model of shareholder banks. Traditionally, cooperative organizations have prided 
themselves on their close-knit member-client networks and their cooperative approach which is 
based on reputation, reciprocity and trust. At the same time, these are also the determinants of 
‘social capital’. This was also emphasized during the UN’s Year of Cooperatives (2012). During 
and directly after the financial crisis, cooperative banks were perceived as different to other types 
of banks, such as shareholder banks, because of their greater degree of local connectedness and 
engagement, and they therefore seemed to be less affected by the unhealthy incentives and 
practices that plagued much of the rest of the banking sector. Earlier studies have shown that 
European cooperative banking groups performed fairly well throughout the financial crisis of 
2007-2008, and did not require the large-scale government support that many non-cooperative 
banks received (Ayadi et al., 2010; Groeneveld, 2011; Birchall, 2013; Chiaramonte et al., 2013; 
Butzbach & von Mettenheim, 2014). 
One possible explanation for this lies in cooperative’s different approach to doing business. The 
approach taken in this dissertation views financial cooperatives as facilitators of social capital, and 
assumes that social capital is the basis of cooperatives’ success, with a particular focus on the 
role of organizational social capital. Most research on the relationship between social capital and 
cooperatives takes social capital as an independent variable and the cooperative as a dependent 
variable. However, this dissertation has turned the relationship around. The results of this study are 
therefore relevant to the acquisition of new knowledge within the field of social capital and the 
cooperative structure. The central question of this study was: How does the cooperative structure 
of a bank affect its organizational social capital? In theory, cooperative banks are monitored and 
controlled by their members. The associated social interaction contributes to the production and 
reproduction of organizational social capital. At the same time, this contributes to increased 
levels of trust within these organizations as well as external trust, because the social interaction 
creates opportunities for the expression and reconciliation of a range of different viewpoints and 
opinions. In this way, cooperative banks could contribute to higher levels of trust in banks. For this 
study, five Local Member Banks or Local Cooperative Banks (LCBs) that form part of Rabobank, 
a Dutch cooperative bank, were chosen as research objects (period 2013-2014). The scientific 
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literature indicates that group size may have an effect on the performance of social capital, and I 
therefore chose banks of different sizes and with different numbers of employees (FTE). 
In this chapter, Section 8.2 will summarize my findings in relation to the three research questions 
of this thesis. Section 8.3 will present the overall conclusions of this study in order to answer the 
central question, based on a synthesis of the study’s findings, analysis, and interpretation. Section 
8.4, Theoretical reflections, focuses on the lessons that can be learned and incorporated into 
future research. Section 8.5 discusses the limitations of the research. The chapter will end with 
Section 8.6, Suggestions for future research on organizational social capital. 
8.2 Research questions 
1. What is the nature of cooperative banks and what is their position within the banking landscape? 
The main feature of a cooperative bank is that it has members who are both owners and customers 
of the bank. This fundamental characteristic means that cooperative banks are, in formal terms, 
‘people-centered’ business organizations, owned by the members whom they serve. They derive 
their strength accordingly. Cooperative banks belong to the family of stakeholder value banks, 
and have a special and prominent public utility function within society. The distinction between 
Stakeholder Value (STV) and Shareholder Value (SHV) banks is based on differences in ownership 
structure, corporate governance, and capital structure. As social capital-based organizations and 
social enterprises, cooperative banks may be able to help provide a solution to the problems of 
the banking sector by strengthening social ties with society. Based on their reputation, banking 
cooperatives could, in theory, help to build strong connections between members, customers 
and staff, support local networks and thus facilitate social capital and help to rebuild societal 
confidence in the banking sector.
Since the cooperative banks that went on to form Rabobank first emerged, both the extent of 
cooperation between those banking organizations and their stakeholders and the scale of their 
operations have increased. This has led to significant changes. The original participatory role of 
members – who cooperated in order to provide access to banking services for those who would 
otherwise have had difficulty accessing these – has also changed. In fact, the services provided 
by all types of banks, whether shareholder owned or stakeholder owned, and the way in which 
banks operate have now become increasingly similar. The formal governance arrangements of 
cooperative banks – which were previously their most distinctive feature – have now become less 
distinctive and the formal role and influence of their members is becoming weaker. 
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2. What are the features of cooperatives as organizations?
The cooperative organization is an autonomous association of people, who have voluntarily 
chosen to work together in order to achieve shared economic, social and cultural needs and 
aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled business. This form has specific 
characteristics, which are based on a number of principles and together constitute the essence 
of being a cooperative. Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, 
democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. These cooperative values are a set of six ideals that 
underpin the seven cooperative principles: voluntary and open membership, democratic member 
control, member economic participation, autonomy and independence, education, training and 
information, co-operation among co-operatives, concern for community.
These principles provide guidelines by which cooperatives can put their cooperative values into 
practice. They are not rigid principles that are set in stone; they need to be applied with vision 
and with due regard to the national economic, cultural, social, legal and regulatory context within 
which any given cooperative operates. As mechanisms for collective action, cooperatives can 
respond effectively to market failures and state crises, provide quasi-public goods in the new 
welfare markets and respond to emerging problems in society or in communities.
3. What is the theoretical relationship between cooperatives and organizational social capital? 
Cooperatives were created primarily to address collective problems and to organize collective 
action. By applying the cooperatives principles, cooperatives can, in theory, provide the 
organizational architecture that is required to maintain social interaction with members and 
staff, which contributes to the creation and maintenance of the cooperative’s social capital and 
thus regulates its daily functioning. Theoretically, cooperatives can be defined as vehicles for 
cooperation, and conceptualized as ‘institutions’ and organizational structures. Based on the 
cooperative structure and the application of the cooperative principles, this structure is assumed 
to have an impact on its internal and organizational social capital.
Organizational social capital helps an organization to build, manage and sustain social relations and 
improve its organizational performance. These social relations come together in the cooperative 
(structure). In theory, cooperative banks are monitored and controlled by their members. The 
social interaction contributes to the production and reproduction of organizational social capital. 
At the same time, this contributes to increased external trust in these organizations, because 
the social interaction provides opportunities for the expression and reconciliation of potentially 
divergent viewpoints and opinions. 
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However, social capital is no panacea. It is created and reproduced – or not – through social 
interactions. It therefore follows that social capital requires active maintenance and must be 
deployed on a day-to-day basis if it to be maintained. When organizational social capital is 
neglected or underused, it will drain away rapidly.
4. How does the cooperative structure of cooperative banks affect their organizational social 
capital in practice?
Regarding organizational social capital, and the variations between banks of different sizes, 
the five local cooperative Rabobanks (LCBs) apply cooperative principles to varying degrees and 
therefore each LCB has a different impact on social capital. Based on the assessment of social 
capital, there appears to be a relationship between the size of the LCB (in terms of the number of 
staff employed), from LCB E (smallest) to LCB A (largest) and the score on the three dimensions 
of social capital. As the size of the LCB increases, levels of social capital decrease.
Dependent variable
A. Structural dimension 
1. Social interaction ties (SIT)
At all five LCBs, staff from the local area and from local networks are preferred because this 
is assumed to be beneficial to the LCB’s level of local market knowledge. At the same time, 
however, the interviews revealed that none of the five LCBs knew exactly what proportion of their 
staff actually lived locally and there was currently no official policy on this. The recent period of 
economic crisis, which had led to a reorientation of the Rabobank Group, had caused employees 
to feel less need to actively address their responsibility for developing and maintaining the LBC’s 
local network(s). Rather, significant pressure from external and internal regulators meant that 
staff members were focusing more on quality control and compliance policies. Networking events 
were often held outside working hours, creating a potential barrier to employee participation. 
Accordingly, participation in these events was linked to the intrinsic motivation of individual 
staff members and the assumption was that some staff members simply would not have the 
required level of intrinsic motivation to participate in networking activities or actively invest 
time in building a local network. The interviews at the LCBs showed that as a result of the 
external pressure that was being experienced during the research period, there was less time for 
interaction with members and customers. At the same time, the respondents indicated that the 
process of scaling-up within the Rabobank organization had had the advantage of increasing the 
pace of professionalization in areas such as globalization, virtualization and the proliferation of 
regulatory requirements. The decision had been made to adopt a more mass-market approach 
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and management had decided that active contact and close customer relationships should be 
limited to specific customer groups. Furthermore, no staff members were available to work on 
closer customer contact due to the cost-benefit ratio of such work. Interaction between the 
organization and its members/customers remains essential, according the directors of the LCBs, 
but not necessarily through existing, traditional channels. 
The Members’ Council of each LCB meets four times a year. It has an external focus, so members 
of the Members’ Council, the Board and the management are all invited to attend, and in one 
case their ambassadors too.60 With the exception of one case, employees were not invited to 
council meetings. As a consequence, employees often had no clear idea of what was going on 
at these meetings and no real picture of the matters that were currently relevant or even of who 
represented them in the Members’ Council. The impression given by the local banks was that the 
Members’ Council is still trying to establish a role for itself and ascertain what effect they can have 
on policy, governance and operations. The task of the local banks is, as I have described, to ensure 
accountability to customers/members. At the same time the role of the Members’ Council in this 
is yet not sufficiently clear, and it is not sufficiently embedded within the organization. 
Opportunities for contact may be increasing due to the proliferation of online options, but 
it seems that lack of policy, commitment and attention is causing a decline in the quality of 
customer-bank relations. Direct and active control by staff and management is also lacking. The 
number of contact moments is less important than the quality of that contact, as well as the 
objective of building sustainable relationships. Even very frequent contact does not necessarily 
equate to an intention to maintain long-term relationships — which is what social capital is all 
about, since reciprocity, investing in relationships and creating ties with the local community are 
all meant to strengthen and improve business.
B. Relational dimension 
2. Trust (TR)
The interviews show that all the interviewers felt that both the trust of society in LCBs and 
the trust of banks in society have deteriorated. Due to various excesses, banks are more critical 
toward their customers. Meanwhile, various checks and customer file integrity issues mean 
that employees feel the need to protect themselves against errors by checking and recording 
everything. Most employees have become suspicious even towards each other. When it comes 
to trust in general, the Customer Integrity Policy has had an impact on the levels of internal trust 
between colleagues as well as levels of external trust in relation to members/customers and 
society in general. One reason for the decreasing levels of trust could be increased pressure from 
the new laws and regulations. The interviews showed that the decline in external trust had had 
60 Designated employees representing their LCB outside the organization.
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an impact on the trust that staff members placed in each other. Trust between staff was also 
being adversely influenced by competition among staff. 
3. Norms of reciprocity (NR)
The interviews revealed that an increased workload was causing staff to focus mainly on 
their own work and responsibilities and to have less regard for the bigger picture within their 
department. It also appeared that not all staff valued the needs and desires of the members/
customers equally.
4. Identification (ID)
In order to safeguard levels of internal trust, certain rules of conduct are in place within the bank 
(codes). For instance, keeping an eye on the local news enables the staff to pick up on signals 
from the local area; however, not everyone within the bank actually did this. Despite the feeling 
among the staff that many events and meetings were held for their members/clients, there was 
a feeling that something needed to be done to preserve the distinctive social character of their 
bank. The survey and interviews also showed that not all of the staff shared a sense of belonging 
and positive feelings towards their LCB.
C. Cognitive dimension
5. Shared vision (SV)
From the interviews, it is clear that all five banks focus on efficiency and economic key 
performance indicators (KPIs) when it comes to measuring their performance, and particularly 
those regulations that are mandatory and enforced by regulators. These points of compliance 
involve considerable time and effort for the five organizations. Respondents from the LCBs also 
noted that the active encouragement of cooperative principles was suffering because of the focus 
on these regulations, even in a shrinking organization. But the need for active compliance policies 
and clear communication remains even when the circumstances are not optimal. In some cases, 
increased workload essentially made it impossible for team leaders and managers to make time 
for, for example, the daily kick-off meetings. The interviews revealed that all five CEOs found it 
difficult to explain the difference in services for clients and members, and what the benefits of 
membership are or should be. They also indicated that they expected more support, guidance 
and a clearer vision from Rabobank Nederland, and more specifically from the Board of Directors. 
The other respondents interviewed were also unable to clarify the difference is between a client 
and a member, and what it means for a customer or member to be part of Rabobank.
At the same time, the interviews and desk research revealed differences in the membership policy 
of the five LCBs. A single, clear and unambiguous vision of what profile members should have 
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seems to be lacking. It is not clear why, for example, customers who only use one product and/or 
service should be regarded as less meaningful customers.
Regarding banking services, there are no clear differences between customer service for members 
and non-members. The interviews showed that both managers and directors were unable to 
indicate the differences in services for customers and members. They would also appreciate 
clearer guidance from Rabobank Nederland in relation to this issue.
6. Shared language (SL)
In all five LCBs, those interviewed reported that leadership was lacking in terms of communication 
and policy. Language is the means by which people discuss and exchange information, but also, 
insofar as their language and codes are not mutually intelligible, it can also keep people apart 
and restrict their access. In the case of the five LCBs, the written and spoken communication of 
employees with customers and members was generally perceived positively.
Intermediary variables
The intermediate variables that determine the differences between local banks are:
(A) knowledge of cooperatives, (B) facilitating staff, (C) adequate interaction between staff and 
members/customers and (D) clear vision regarding the cooperative principles. All these may have 
a crucial influence on levels of organizational social capital, as does a lack of a clear policy and 
monitoring of the application of the cooperative principles in day-to-day business. Specific KPIs 
in this area are lacking. The time required for interaction between LCBs and members/customers 
and ongoing layoffs had led to a decline in mutual trust. This had impaired the LCBs’ capacity 
to build and maintain social capital. An important aspect of the explanation of the results of the 
organizational social capital survey lies in increased pressure in relation to certain issues, such as 
ongoing staff reductions and increased supervisory pressure in the financial sector more generally. 
It appears that organizational scale (i.e. number of FTE) and the role of management in the 
application and functioning of the cooperative principles play an important role in the observed 
levels of organizational social capital. These were the factors from the theory discussed previously 
that emerged as decisive in determining the general level of social capital. 
8.3 Answering the central question
With regard to this study’s central question – How does the cooperative structure of a bank affect 
its organizational social capital? 
The cooperative structure of a bank creates opportunities for the alignment and reconciliation of 
varying perspectives, values and opinions. Nevertheless, it appears that an organizational structure 
that promotes collective action is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the creation of 
organizational social capital. 
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We concluded from our theoretical analysis that cooperative banks arose as a mechanism for 
handling collective action problems. On the one hand, the cooperative structure provides a 
coordination mechanism for collective action and thereby contributes to the architecture for 
social interaction that is needed to foster, build and maintain social capital. At the same time, 
however, access to banking services has now become generally available, and the cooperative has 
in this sense fulfilled its original mission. Partly as a consequence of this, the role and involvement 
of the membership has increasingly come under pressure, with the result that the organization is 
less characterized by the cooperative principles and their application in its day-to-day work. The 
decrease in levels of interaction between members and the staff of the organization has resulted 
in a decrease in the social capital accumulated, and this in turn has resulted in a decrease in local 
embeddedness and the easy availability of local market information.
The system of cooperative governance, founded on cooperative principles, remains in place 
and primarily serves the interests of members, and this is consistent with the three cooperative 
principles of the ICA – namely user ownership, user control and user benefits. The cooperative 
structure of cooperative banks affects their organizational social capital through the manner in 
which the cooperative principles, representing the cooperative structure, are applied and enacted 
in the day-to-day governance and management of the cooperative bank. Cooperative banks 
are assumed to facilitate the creation of social capital, and to maintain this through regular 
interaction between staff and members on the member councils, by organizing meetings and 
by ensuring opportunities for interaction with their members, including enabling members to 
monitor and share information. On the basis of this regular interaction, cooperative banks build 
and maintain their social capital. However, fulfilling these roles in practice requires a high level of 
interaction between members and staff within the cooperative. The factor of group size (in terms 
of staff numbers) has a certain influence on this level of interaction, and this factor can lead to 
collective action problems and specifically free riding. Other factors, such as digitalization and 
ongoing staff cuts, were also shown to have had a significant impact on levels of organizational 
social capital. 
The results of this study are consistent with the assumption that solving collective action problems 
is easier in smaller groups, since interaction is more direct, face-to-face and therefore of better 
quality (Olson, 1965; Douglas, 1986; Ostrom, 2004; Fonteyne, 2007; Valentinov, 2007). The 
empirical evidence shows that the overall cooperative score on levels of organizational social 
capital increases when the size of the group decreases. This was found in relation to all three of 
Nahapiet & Ghosal’s (1998) dimensions of organizational capital. This study’s findings suggest 
that the scale of the operation does indeed affect member/customer interaction and that smaller 
cooperatives perform better in this regard than larger ones.
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The findings of this study are also consistent with Valentinov’s argument that, when looking at 
cooperative banks, managers are primarily driven by economic efficiency and operational results, 
rather than prioritizing the cooperative principles. Regarding the cooperative principles, the five 
LCBs that were investigated all seemed to struggle to fully understand and apply these principles in 
their day-to-day activities. 
8.4 Theoretical reflections 
My study began by asking what it is, exactly, in the cooperative structure of a bank that can lead 
to higher levels of social capital. My starting point was the study of the cooperative. Cooperatives 
can generate social capital, but there are also forces that can undermine levels of social capital. 
Past research on cooperatives and social capital that discussed the disappearance of large 
cooperatives due to an erosion of their social capital helped to inform my search for an answer 
to this question. Also, research into the lifecycle of cooperatives gave me an understanding 
of cooperative dynamics. Nevertheless, there appears to be a lack of connection between 
the economic and sociological insights regarding banks, and moreover, research has focused 
exclusively on Shareholder Value banks.
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s work on social capital played a valuable role in this study and their 
model of the dimensions of social capital has been useful. The use of their model shows that 
the cooperative structure can enhance the effects of social capital by providing opportunities for 
growth in the various dimensions of social capital, but equally it shows that social capital can also 
attenuate when it is neglected. In relation to the concept of social capital, the challenge for the 
researcher continues to be the broad scope of the concept and the separation of the dependent 
and independent variables. Considering the different frameworks that exist for looking at social 
capital, disagreement among scholars remains regarding the interpretation of social capital and 
even contradictions within the various definitions that are available. Regarding the exercise of 
power in an (inter-)organizational context, further research should focus on how to account for 
the political process behind resource access and its role within the governance of cooperatives. 
Specific attention should be given to the influence and role of the management of the cooperative 
in implementing and applying the cooperative principles in the day-to-day work of cooperative 
banks. This study provides an insight into how day-to-day processes within five LCBs affects 
organizational social capital and which factors decreasing levels of social capital can be attributed 
to. It has demonstrated the challenges that exist and the role that the scale of operations can play. 
I have also identified other external factors which have exerted a considerable influence on the 
impact of the cooperative structure of Rabobank.
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8.5 Limitations of the research
When analyzing the cooperative principles during the field study for the Rabobank cases, it 
must be noted that a significant degree of freedom was granted regarding the application of 
cooperative principles in day-to-day activities existed within Rabobank. In the survey, Case D 
deviated notably from the average of the other four cases with a response rate of 38%, but it was 
nevertheless included in order to complete the picture of the five banks. The survey results were 
consistent with, and supported by, interviews and desk research, and although the research was 
carried out among a relatively small sample, the combination of analyses, interviews and desk 
research resulted in a picture that suggests that other Rabobank LCBs would presumably have 
yielded similar results. Extensive interviews with respondents from both the LCBs and Rabobank 
Nederland were used to corroborate the findings of the surveys. According to Simon & Goes 
(2013, p. 273), case studies can be suggestive of what may be found in similar organizations. 
While this study and its findings pertain only to five LCBs, it is likely that during the research 
period of 2013-2014 the same results would have been obtained from most Rabobank LCBs. 
The combined results of my survey and the interviews at the five LCBs and Rabobank Nederland 
revealed that a number of issues had occurred simultaneously within Rabobank, which had 
affected all local banks. What is unknown, however, is how other Rabobank LCBs dealt with 
these issues. The case study approach had benefits, but also had one important disadvantage: the 
bank was undergoing a major transition during the research period and this affected the results.
8.6 Suggestions for future research on organizational social capital
The study has shown that a clear structural focus on the cooperative principles is crucial to the 
three different dimensions of organizational social capital. The importance of knowledge of the 
cooperative principles has significant repercussions for organizational social capital. One question 
that arises from the analysis is: how can cooperative reporting contribute to the integration and 
observance (monitoring/imposition) of the seven cooperative principles in practice? 
It would be useful to extend research into different sectors and countries and to involve various 
types and sizes of cooperatives in order to verify whether findings from this study can be 
generalized to other cooperatives and sectors, such as healthcare and housing. As described in 
section 5.5, additional measures were taken to ensure that the research was independent and to 
build in reflexivity, self-analysis and reflection.
The question of how the continuing decrease in face-to-face contact in banking services 
will affect, for example, knowledge of the local market and the relationship between the 
organization and its members/customers, and thereby its organizational social capital, would be 
an interesting subject for further research. The next question to arise would be: how is it possible 
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to maintain and improve levels of organizational social capital as services are increasingly digitized 
and computerized? Cyber-networks are emerging as a major source of social capital, and a new 
era is dawning that will create opportunities as well as challenges for theoretical development and 
practical analysis, and this aspect should be included in future research. One important process that 
is occurring is that the nature of banking and finance is changing in a direction that requires less and 
less direct customer contact. What types of relationships will both banks and members/customers 
want to invest in? Due to the erosion of the preeminent role of members in the cooperative, the 
cooperative principles are continuing to decline in significance. Members provide the basis and the 
justification for a cooperative enterprise. The key point is that without members there cannot be 
a cooperative, and if those members have no voice, a banking cooperative such as Rabobank is 
no longer a true cooperative. Applying the cooperative principles and maintaining (organizational) 
social capital requires frequent interaction between staff and members. Failure to comply with the 
cooperative principles reduces organizational social capital. Truly applying the principles guarantees 
a number of things: interaction with members, monitoring by members, democratic control by 
members. The latter is only possible through genuine contact, interaction and coordination with 
the members and customers and employees, with the role and influence of the members being 
particularly important. It is therefore necessary to continue to reflect on how the members/customer 
are involved and how they can continue to be involved in the governance of the organization. 
The combined results of this study indicate that commitment to the cooperative principles has 
an impact on organizational social capital. For the purpose of further research, it is important to 
provide benchmarks within organizations themselves, firstly in order to build a stronger body of 
evidence, and secondly for organizations to be able to influence organizational social capital in a 
positive way on a systematic and sustained basis and to maintain its cooperative strength. 
The findings of this study also indicate that there is a need to consider further the implications 
of the digitalization of financial services and the ongoing lay-offs in the banking sector. It is 
important to know more about the influence that this may have on the changing interactions and 
roles of both the cooperative as a whole and of its members. What influence could a decrease in 
face-to-face interaction have on the role played by the members? What new possibilities could 
digitalization offer that could help to maintain and amplify organizational social capital? Only 
a follow-up study that uses multiple combined data sources to generate a broader and more 
comprehensive picture can answer these questions. The findings of the present study provide 
useful suggestions on how to develop such a detailed analysis using aggregated data. 
This section on suggestions for future research on organizational social capital after the completion 
of this study concludes the dissertation. The final section is the Epilogue, which discusses the 
future of cooperative banking.

Epilogue
The future of cooperative banking
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Introduction
The research questions have been answered and the analysis is nearly complete. But before this 
part of my research journey ends, I will permit myself a few moments of reasoned observation 
and reflection. What might the future of cooperative banking look like in broad terms, and 
specifically in terms of organizational social capital? This will depend not only on the effectiveness 
of the cooperative(s) as a whole, or their cooperative principles in action. Other factors are 
equally important, such as changing consumer behavior, financial innovations and technological 
developments (e.g. block chain technology and Big Data), which are resulting in a paradigm shift 
in relation to the proliferation of virtual servicing, for example. Other important factors are likely 
to be increased competition and national and international policy and regulations. 
 
This epilogue will consider the developments that cooperative banks underwent during the 
research period, and continue to undergo today, since these are fundamental to the scope and 
interpretation of my research. I will discuss a number of directions in which the cooperative 
banking sector could be heading. During my investigation into the impact of banking cooperatives 
on organizational social capital, the markets were in turmoil, which provided me with invaluable 
insights and firsthand experience into the challenges and changes which a cooperative like 
Rabobank faces at such times. None of the reflections that follow can be substantiated with hard 
evidence; they are reflections at the end of a long and rewarding journey. 
Ongoing developments
While on the one hand studies such as Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen (2012) reveal the risk 
of large cooperatives gradually losing their (organizational) social capital and the relationship 
with and mutual commitment to their members, the United Nations also chose 2012 as the 
International Year of Cooperatives (IYC). This apparent contradiction calls for a critical appraisal 
of established ideas about the cooperative model as a sustainable, resilient and democratic type 
of enterprise.
Through increased oversight and regulatory pressure, banks have made significant improvements 
in the field of self-regulation in recent years, and there have been clear changes, such as the 
introduction of a mandatory banker’s oath in the Netherlands. Banks have, under pressure, 
introduced measures that are proven to be effective, such as increased capital buffers, and 
are therefore better prepared to handle economic setbacks. Apart from the changing banking 
landscape that consultancy firms and governing bodies indicate they expect in the coming years, 
the challenge for banks themselves lies in improving their various existing services and at the 
same time accommodating the needs and preferences of consumers in a digital age. Increasingly, 
local banks are being closed or merged as the number of service points is reduced, and many 
services will be increasingly digitized, a trend that is noticeable in many sectors all over the world.
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As mentioned previously, levels of public trust in bankers and financial institutions fell during 
the series of crises that started in 2008 and this continues to have repercussions to this day. 
Levels of trust are no higher for cooperative banks. In this regard, this study has shown the 
influence that the cooperative itself has on the organizational social capital of five autonomous 
banking cooperatives and how this impacts on the relationship of the organization, in this case 
Rabobank, with its members/customers. It has found, firstly, that there is less and less time to 
interact with customers and members, and secondly that it has become increasingly difficult to 
explain why people should want to join a cooperative. The advantages of becoming a member 
have declined significantly and, since 2016, Rabobank members are no different from the 
bank’s other customers. The one exception is the Local Members’ Council, where members can 
make their voices heard. However, this exception can only matter if the membership are a valid 
representation of the entire society and if those members have real influence.
The shift towards digitalization has direct implications for existing staff and for customers and 
members. This shift is affecting the sector as a whole. On the one hand, digitization offers the 
opportunity to provide 24-hour services, but at the same time it means that fewer customers and 
members visit a bank or have direct face-to-face contact with bank employees. Consequently I 
foresee a move towards consumer banking that occurs entirely through the internet: increasing 
digital contact and diminishing direct contact, whether face-to-face or by telephone, will constitute 
a major challenge for cooperative banks when it comes to social capital. Bankers as well as civil 
servants need to become smarter about embedding digital technologies and big data into their 
operations in order to deliver more integrated and more effectively customized, local services. 
Using Big Data and analytics to improve decision-making and protect critical infrastructure and 
confidential data, is essential, but this will only work if an adequate and mutually beneficial 
relationship with members and customers can be maintained. The shift towards virtual contact 
and virtual customer services is as much a positive development as it is a challenge. Online and 
mobile banking have enhanced the accessibility and availability of banking services for customers. 
And when it comes to interaction, it is not only quantity but quality that is key and has an 
enormous effect on (organizational) social capital.
 
The value of human contact: from physical proximity towards virtual proximity
A virtual revolution is currently underway, and this is having a significant effect on the banking 
sector. Using their mobile telephone, tablet or PC, members and customers are doing their 
banking whenever and wherever they want. At the same time, new competitors have entered the 
banking sector, such as Google, Facebook, Apple and Amazon, who have already built up strong 
advantages in the field of digital services. They have led recent innovations and benefit from 
good brand reputations, enjoying the confidence of a high percentage of the population. Their 
influence will likely extend to future generations as the services they provide also reach young 
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children, in the case of Google and Facebook for example. They are adapting to the technological 
profile and demands of their users. They have large databases that provide significant data on 
individuals and their behavior; this creates enormous opportunities for personalized contact. 
Furthermore, their presence in networks based on analytical technology allows them to conduct 
detailed marketing research and thereby respond to the needs and motivations of consumers 
even better. As services and interaction are increasingly arranged through the virtual domain, 
more and more services are being digitized and converted into programs that require less (direct) 
human contact. This is impacting on the perception of the traditional bank/client relationship and 
directly influencing level(s) of social capital, or at least the way in which this has traditionally been 
perceived. Hence, traditional banks are facing challenges in both evolving their digital processes 
and rethinking how to make use of the social capital that is derived from their activities. The 
Dutch Banking Association (Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, NVB), which represents the 
interests of the Dutch banking sector, has calculated that the number of employees in the Dutch 
banking sector dropped from 121,500 in 2002 to 84,500 in 2014 (NVB, 2015), a 30% decrease 
in staff over 13 years.
The qualitative, personal, ‘face to face’ interaction that has traditionally occurred between 
cooperative banks and their members/customers will become increasingly difficult, not only 
because of the developments described above but also due to the impact of layoffs and cutbacks 
in banking personnel. Rabobank announced in December 2015 that in addition to the layoffs 
that have occurred in recent years, a further 25% of its staff will lose their jobs in the next three 
years. As Rabobank puts it in its announcement: “This reduction in cost together with other 
measures should benefit the profitability of Rabobank.” The goal is to achieve an increase in gross 
profit of €2.1 billion by 2020. The theory of social capital states that people like doing business 
with people that they know and trust. Face-to-face interaction and non-verbal communication 
allow parties to discuss issues and identify potential disagreements and alternative approaches 
in real time, and any ambiguities can be sorted out immediately, resulting in the alignment of 
priorities and direction. Furthermore face-to-face interaction provides reassurance and also 
provides us with an important sense of well-being, whether this is with friends, friendly cashiers 
in the checkout line, or even hostesses in the case of a self-service supermarkets such as Albert 
Heijn in the Netherlands. One example of the possibilities of Albert Heijns’ everyday connections 
is a pilot with (health) care organizations. Albert Heijn sees its supermarkets as local social hubs; 
their employees help for example to identify lonely elderly persons and, where possible, offer 
assistance. 
In the case of Rabobank, the closing down of offices and the removal of ATMs in recent years 
have made relations with members/clients, which were already under pressure, into a more ‘long-
distance’ relationship. Further cuts to the workforce are a danger to Rabobank. Becoming more 
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customer-oriented while your job is permanently uncertain is an impossible task for employees. 
Many employees are experiencing an increased workload and fear for their jobs. With a phased 
reduction in staff numbers of 30-50%, Rabobank will potentially lose many ambassadors, 
including their networks and signals, but it will also lose opportunities to interact within local 
communities. This adds up to a loss of local market information. 
In order for any organization to identify its focus appropriately, the key lies in the following 
questions: how important is the human factor to the organization? And how does the organization 
express this importance both internally and externally? Too much focus on the opportunities of 
digital services based on their higher profitability creates the danger that the official policy of 
the organization is simply a guide rather than a principled way of operating. For social capital, 
as well as in many other areas, it is arguably necessary to appreciate the value of the quality 
of relationships, not merely the quantity. For new customers, reputation, which is an aspect of 
social capital, is very important. But what is most important of all in order to achieve high levels 
of social capital is conveying your message, regardless of the situation. So what will differentiate 
cooperative banks from non-cooperative banks in the future, as direct, face-to-face contact 
continues to decline? The fact remains that ongoing digitalization is causing cooperative banks 
to spread themselves thin when it comes to face-to-face contact. The quality of social interaction, 
which is key to building trust and reciprocity, is suffering. As discussed, research data shows that 
smaller banks tend to outperform larger banks when it comes to organizational social capital, so 
the right ratio of employees and number of relationships (customer/client) is part of the solution. 
This is the human dimension and the question is how to translate this into policy, communication 
and operations.
Rabobank under (re)construction: major changes in governance
The financial turbulence experienced between 2007 and 2010 has led to much stricter and 
better regulated banking regimes. National supervision of major banks, including Rabobank, was 
transferred to the European Central Bank (ECB) in November 2014 with the formation of the 
Banking Union (Groeneveld, 2015b, p. 9). As a result many banks have re-evaluated their strategy 
and cost structure, and adopted new governance plans between 2013 and 2015. This has led 
to a significant decrease in the number of Local Cooperative Banks. In January 2013, Rabobank 
Group comprised 136 Local Cooperative Banks, all with their own banking licenses. By January 
2016 this number had fallen to 106 Local Cooperative Banks operating under one umbrella 
license. During this period, Rabobank’s reappraisal of the most appropriate form of governance, 
both local and central became more evident. As local supervisory board members began to 
focus on their formal supervisory role, “other equally important facets, such as safeguarding 
the cooperative profile, sparring partner and making connections with local communities, had 
somewhat abated.” (Groeneveld, 2015b, p. 11).
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The Libor affair (see Chapter 3) caused consternation inside and outside the organization, triggering 
major organizational changes. For Rabobank, these changes led to the merger of Rabobank 
Nederland and Rabobank International in late 2013. Furthermore, Rabobank has expressed a desire 
to increase profits and increase the global reach of its operations. This reorientation of strategy and 
policy has inevitably affected not only the structure of governance, but has also had a profound 
impact on attitudes and policy towards (organizational) social capital. For example, in January 2014, 
Member Certificates were made available to institutional investors while at the same time Rabobank 
has indicated that is crucial to build, and regain, trust and confidence amongst all its stakeholders. 
A new model has been chosen to facilitate this (new) governance and structural debate. This 
model has two parallel components. Internally, the key factors to be addressed are: supervisory 
issues, such as customer integrity and the rapid rise in the cost of auditing and compliance at 
Rabobank and the Local Cooperative Banks, combined with complex internal rules. Externally, 
there are administrative problems at various Local Cooperative Banks that have attracted the 
attention of the external supervisor, regarding among other things the ability of Rabobank to 
enforce prompt adherence to new legislative and regulatory rules. In order to address these 
issues, in March 2014, Rabobank inaugurated an internal Governance Committee to advise the 
Executive Board. As a result, criteria for possible changes in governance were formulated. 
  
The new model is intended to strengthen the influence and control of all members. All Local 
Cooperative Banks will have a voice in the supreme governing body of the cooperative, the 
General Members’ Council. All the chairmen of the supervisory boards will be represented in this 
council. They will gather periodically to discuss and elaborate Rabobank’s strategy and policies. 
The Executive Board, and also the supervisory board, will be accountable to the General Members’ 
Council. In this way, in addition to reducing costs, Rabobank aims to relieve the administrative and 
regulatory pressure on its local banks. For the same purpose, it is automating and centralizing its 
banking processes wherever possible. This means there should be more time for staff to interact 
and engage in contact with their customers.
The Local Members’ Council forms an opinion about the results of the Local Cooperative Bank, 
which replaces the formal assessment of the financial statements. The influence of member 
councils at the national level should increase; the Local Members’ Council appoints the chair 
of the local commissioners, and he/she acts independently in the General Members’ Council, 
the highest organ of the cooperative members, which determines the organization’s strategy. In 
this way, all Local Cooperative Banks will be represented in the General Members’ Council. The 
General Members’ Council has been given the powers of the abolished General Assembly, as 
well as the assessment function and strategic role of the abolished Central Delegates Assembly. 
Both the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board are accountable to the General 
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Members’ Council. Responsibility for the local banks’ results remains with the local boards. The 
collective implementation of supervision and inspection tasks means that the Local Cooperative 
Banks will, in theory, be less hampered by bureaucratic requirements. However, much depends 
on the representation within councils and advisory committees. Is the General Council, or 
any Governance Committee, a reflection of a broad spectrum of members, and therefore the 
clientele, of Rabobank? Are current members of the Local Members’ Council therefore a proper 
reflection of society? The fact is that due to the way in which members are currently chosen – 
and the basis on which those members are chosen – to be part of the representative bodies, only 
1% of all members have any democratic influence. In absolute numbers, this 1%, around 3,700 
people, may seem a reasonable number, but it implies that 99% of members are not properly 
represented. Several issues arise that are perhaps caused by the sheer scale of Rabobank: is the 
cooperative form really suited to such a large organization from a democratic perspective? And 
do the recent changes in governance take account of the challenges of making adequate use of 
social capital in such a large organization?    
The strength of the representative council is directly related to its relationship with the overall 
governing body and/or Board, and more importantly its distance from it. The greater the diversity 
of representation of different kinds of members, the more both regulatory institutions and the 
public will connect with what Rabobank is trying to achieve, and the better use Rabobank will 
make of its social capital.
Cooperative banking: ‘quo vadis?’
Banking cooperatives were originally formed with the objective of organizing access to financial 
services for demographic groups that either had difficulty obtaining this access or were denied 
access altogether. The survival and direction of banking cooperatives was closely related to their 
‘raison d’être’. However, because other forms of organization also set goals like contributing to 
society or the sustainability of economic progress, such an objective is no longer truly distinctive. It 
could be argued that some banks now continue to coast along on the basis their long-established 
reputations and, in certain cases, that this proud reputation is slowly evaporating through poor 
performance and the absence of significant distinctiveness among failing banks. This reputation 
could be further challenged when larger operators offer cheaper banking services within the 
same set of consumers’ protection requirements and rules. Banking cooperatives will have to 
reinvent themselves again and again in order to prove themselves and revive their reputation 
and future prospects. For customers, there must be options to choose from. Banks tend toward 
centralization, and for various reasons, the need for local offices has decreased tremendously over 
the past decade. Even in land banking, business is increasingly being done through the internet, 
which makes it more mobile and flexible. In short, the general direction of travel seems to be 
towards fewer bank visits, fewer local offices and increasing virtualization. Organizational social 
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capital may come under pressure through a combination of increasingly large-scale operations 
and reduced face-to-face contact with customers. For banks with more members, including 
(foreign) investors, this will make it more difficult to keep them all well informed and on the same 
page, and to facilitate well-considered decisions that members truly support. If members do not 
fully participate and accept the responsibilities of membership, the business cannot operate at 
full capacity or harness its full potential. If declining participation becomes an ongoing issue for a 
cooperative, it risks losing the commitment of its members. Small cooperatives often have a more 
substantive relationship with their members than larger cooperatives, and are thus better able to 
adapt to changes and seize opportunities.
It is unsurprising that the entry of major new players into the banking sector has placed the existing 
business model of cooperative banks under ever more pressure, but it is by no means inevitable 
that cooperative banks will be flexible enough to successfully face up to this development. The 
danger for cooperatives lies particularly in the functioning of the cooperative principles, and the 
nexus lies primarily with members, since it is the members who enable cooperatives to legitimately 
call themselves cooperatives, set up to provide for the needs and wishes of those members. This 
should always be the primary purpose of the cooperative organization. 
Rabobank and the Red Queen Hypothesis
Organisms must constantly adapt, evolve, and proliferate in order for a species to maintain its 
relative fitness within the systems that it is co-evolving within. This hypothesis, proposed by 
evolutionary biologist Leigh Van Valen, is known as the Red Queen Hypothesis. The name is a 
reference to the Red Queen’s race in Lewis Carroll’s Alice Through the Looking-Glass, in which the 
chessboard moves in such a way that Alice must continue running just to stay in the same place. 
This hypothesis can also be applied to Rabobank. Any organism or organization must evolve in 
order to survive.
Governance changes – due to pressure from the regulator in the case of Rabobank – and empowering 
the group as an organization could certainly bear fruit if they are part of a transition towards 
emphasizing the cooperative aspects of the organization more than before, but this adaptation is 
new and the effects are still unknown. However, the link between financial cooperatives and life 
stages (Cook & Burress, 2009) may also mean that at every step and modification in Rabobank’s 
development in recent years (recognition and introspection: step 4), it was always equally possible 
to choose a different course (step 5), such as an initial public offering (IPO).61 
61 Cook & Burress (2009) proposed a dynamic framework to better inform the cooperative degeneration 
hypothesis and suggest actions that the leadership of cooperatives can take to avoid checkmate. Their life 
cycle framework includes five phases: 1) economic justification, 2) organizational design, 3) growth, glory, 
and heterogeneity, 4) recognition and introspection, and 5) choice.
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This means that the possibility of abandoning the existing cooperative model is real. A second 
option would be to become a so-called semi-cooperative bank, owned by a mixture of members 
and shareholders.62 In this case, politicians and legislators will still need to realize that a 
homogeneous banking landscape is, in itself, a danger and that only diversity can reinforce a 
common system. 
There is a challenge of scale for both large and smaller cooperative banks. Compliance regulations 
are being intensified to such an extent that the particular mode of guidance and management 
used by cooperative banks can no longer be maintained. This is particularly true for smaller 
cooperatives in Italy, Germany and Austria. Meanwhile, due to the increasing automation of 
processes and the digital servicing of customers and members, larger financial cooperatives – such 
as Desjardins in Canada and Rabobank in the Netherlands – are reducing the number of branch 
offices and staff, creating dissatisfaction, and there are also other challenges to be faced such as 
the potential consequences of the new regulatory proposals of Basel IV. The development of a 
cooperative is the result of engagement by people. For this reason, it is important for cooperative 
banks to appeal to the younger generation, so that they will one day become new committed 
and active members. 
The sustainability and flexibility of the cooperative model
Many different kinds of cooperatives operate in all parts of the world. They come in various 
shapes and sizes, and are active in various fields such as healthcare, housing, floriculture, 
horticulture, dairy and energy. The question that arises is whether choosing a cooperative model 
is still appropriate for a bank such as Rabobank, with its scope and scale and specifically in light 
of the route that it has now taken. One can consider this question from many different points 
of view. The existential question that arises from the cases studied is whether the cooperative 
structure is truly suited to the scale of the organizations involved, servicing members and non-
members in relation to organizational social capital, and whether Rabobank’s choices mean that 
it is future-proof in relation to social capital. The danger is, perhaps, not the direct collapse of 
this cooperative bank, but rather an incremental hollowing-out of existing organizational capital 
from within. 
62 According to an interview with the director of Rabobank, who supervised the group which was to provide 
the new form of governance. “A cooperative French model, or even an IPO: all options for a new structure last 
year were on the table of the management of Rabobank.” Source: http://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1129561/
hoofdkantoor-doet-straks-meer-dan-alleen-meekijken-met-lokale-rabobanken. Accessed 02/12/2015. These 
stages were also considered in the Rabo document: Rabobank compared to other banks.
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I have observed that, when servicing a greater volume of customers with fewer staff members, 
direct face-to-face contact with customers is all but impossible. The evolving role of the members, 
from the original participatrory and controlling role of members in smaller banks towards a more 
passive and piecemeal role, as now seen within the larger banking cooperatives, throws up 
challenges for today’s banking cooperatives in relation to social capital.
Currently, both large banks and local (cooperative) banks are shrinking in number, and the 
remaining banks are working with fewer staff due to the challenges posed by the changes in 
the ways banking services are being used. Digitization and the decrease in face-to-face contact 
mean there are significant challenges for banking cooperatives when it comes building trust 
and reciprocity between the bank and its members/customers, maintaining and strengthening 
organizational social capital and staying up to date on (local) market information. Quality – not 
quantity – is the key ingredient for generating social capital and social bonds. This is about 
knowledge of your environment, about sharing (digital) information on a personal level and 
about personal involvement with groups as an individual. The advantages of high quality service, 
(online) information and (digital) advice need to be clear, to be emphasized and made to matter 
to all staff, members and clients through all forms of contact. This will mean that members 
and clients feel appreciated and involved, and that interaction, even when it is through online 
channels, adds value and meaning and thus will act as a fuel to continue to improve levels 
of social capital and be a profitable organization in every way. With a focus on the long-term 
interests of their members and clients, this seems to be the only way to restore and maintain 
society’s confidence in banks and financial institutions.
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Appendix 1. Survey letter of Invitation (Translated from Dutch to English)
Within cooperatives, such as Rabobank, social capital is seen as an important success factor. 
Social capital refers to the collective value of all social networks of a person, organization or an 
association (cooperative). The central premise of social capital is that social networks have value. 
This value is dependent upon the degree of mutual willingness exists to help each other on the 
basis of trust.
 
Utilizing and maintaining social capital seems to be very important. Certainly questions exist, 
about the influence of different (types of) cooperatives on social capital. As part of my PhD 
research at Radboud University Nijmegen, I will be dealing with this question. As part of my 
research on the impact of cooperatives on social capital I will perform a study among a number 
of local cooperative Rabobanks. This study includes a survey. You can help.
 
I would like to ask you to complete the questionnaire, which consists of 50 multiple-choice 
questions, via the link below. The survey will remain opened until [date], at which time it will be 
closed and the data analyzed. 
  
[Link]
The research will be conducted at Rabobank Nederland, Department of Cooperation and 
Sustainability as part of my research internship. The completed answers are completely anonymous. 
Both answers as respondents remain at all times anonymous. I would greatly appreciate if you 
would like to complete the survey and hope that this study will contribute to the increase of the 
social capital in cooperatives. 
Completing the survey will take approximately 5 minutes. 
When is spoken of a cooperative, here is meant Local Cooperative Rabobank […]
 
If you have any questions about the survey, please feel free to contact, […], via …..
Sincerely,
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Appendix 2. Interviewees
Table A. The respondents interviewed during the empirical research, listed by reference number, case, and 
function
Number Case Function during research period
1 LCB A Manager Virtual Bank
2 LCB A Cooperative advisor
3 LCB A Team leader Private Banking
4 LCB A Team leader Large Business
5 LCB A Chair
6 LCB A Accountmanager Large Business
7 LCB A Manager Private Sector
8 LCB A Team leader SMEs
9 LCB B Team leader Financial Consultancy
10 LCB B Manager Business Sector
11 LCB B Manager Business Consultancy
12 LCB B Team leader Private Sector
13 LCB B Team leader Customer Consultancy
14 LCB B Team leader Accountmanagement Private Banking
15 LCB B Chair
16 LCB C Chair
17 LCB C Team leader Private Sector
18 LCB C Team leader SMEs
19 LCB C Manager SMEs
20 LCB C Manager Human Resources
21 LCB C Communication advisor
22 LCB C Manager Large Business
23 LCB C Account Manager Large Business
24 LCB C Chair
25 LCB D Financial assistant Private Sector
26 LCB D Chair
27 LCB D Team leader Business
28 LCB D Manager Business Consultancy Department
29 LCB D Manager Large Business
30 LCB D Manager Financial Consultancy
31 LCB D Director
32 LCB D Manager Service Centre Private Sector
33 LCB D Manager Human Resources
34 LCB E Chair
35 LCB E Communication advisor
36 LCB E Director
37 LCB E Manager Financial Consultancy
38 LCB E Manager Private Sector
39 LCB E Team leader
40 RN Sr. policy advisor Cooperation & Sustainability
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Table A. Continued
41 RN Sr. strategic projectmanager Cooperation & Sustainability
42 RN Director Business & Product Management
43 RN Sr. Vice President Cooperative & Governance Affairs
44 RN Sr. policy advisor Cooperation & Sustainability
45 RN Director Cooperation & Sustainability
46 RN Member Executive Board Rabobank Nederland
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Appendix 3. SPSS OSC and Group Size (FTE)
A Structural dimension
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
6. Woon je in het 
werkgebied van de 
coöperatie (Rabobank) 
waarvoor je werkzaam 
bent?
Between Groups 3,177 4 ,794 3,227 ,012
Within Groups 162,722 661 ,246
Total 165,899 665
7. Ben je lid van een sport 
of fitnessclub?
Between Groups 2,393 4 ,598 2,565 ,037
Within Groups 154,348 662 ,233
Total 156,741 666
8. In hoeveel lokale 
netwerken participeer je als 
lid? Denk aan bijvoorbeeld: 
kerk, politieke partij...
Between Groups 7,798 4 1,950 1,643 ,162
Within Groups 779,622 657 1,187
Total 787,420 661
9. Van hoeveel online 
sociale netwerken maak 
je gebruik? Denk aan 
bijvoorbeeld: Hyves, 
Facebook en L...
Between Groups 1,607 4 ,402 ,454 ,770
Within Groups 584,772 661 ,885
Total 586,378 665
10. De leidinggevende van 
de coöperatie (Rabobank) 
waar ik werkzaam ben 
stimuleert/ moedigt mij 
aan...
Between Groups 132,918 4 33,229 34,691 ,000
Within Groups 624,528 652 ,958
Total 757,446 656
11. Mijn leidinggevende 
binnen de coöperatie 
(Rabobank) faciliteert 
mij om deel te nemen aan 
lokale...
Between Groups 57,976 4 14,494 15,018 ,000
Within Groups 629,233 652 ,965
Total 687,209 656
12. Ik krijg van 
mijn coöperatie 
(Rabobank) voldoende tijd 
om te besteden aan de 
relatie met klanten...
Between Groups 7,258 4 1,814 1,020 ,396
Within Groups 1168,454 657 1,778
Total 1175,711 661
13. Hoeveel familieleden 
heb je? (Optelsom van 
gezin en (schoon) familie)
Between Groups 2,063 4 ,516 1,166 ,325
Within Groups 288,873 653 ,442
Total 290,936 657
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A Structural dimension Continued
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
14. Hoeveel hechte 
vriendschappen heb je?
Between Groups 1,626 4 ,406 1,192 ,313
Within Groups 222,942 654 ,341
Total 224,568 658
15. Met hoeveel voormalige 
collega’s heb je vandaag de 
dag nog contact? (Inclusief 
eerdere werkgever...
Between Groups 4,745 4 1,186 1,689 ,151
Within Groups 463,487 660 ,702
Total 468,232 664
16. Ik heb goed contact 
met mijn buren.
Between Groups 1,659 4 ,415 ,542 ,705
Within Groups 498,737 652 ,765
Total 500,396 656
17. Ik ken veel klanten c.q. 
leden (van mijn coöperatie) 
persoonlijk.
Between Groups 26,006 4 6,502 4,976 ,001
Within Groups 850,553 651 1,307
Total 876,559 655
18. Ik zie over het 
algemeen al mijn klanten 
c.q. leden één keer per jaar 
tijdens een gesprek.
Between Groups 4,934 4 1,234 ,384 ,820
Within Groups 2109,157 657 3,210
Total 2114,091 661
19. We organiseren elk jaar 
bijeenkomsten voor al onze 
leden en klanten.
Between Groups 9,184 4 2,296 7,617 ,000
Within Groups 196,241 651 ,301
Total 205,425 655
20. Ik heb zeker één keer 
per jaar een ‘face to face’ 
gesprek en/of telefonisch 
en/of per email cont...
Between Groups ,971 4 ,243 ,141 ,967
Within Groups 1127,482 655 1,721
Total 1128,453 659
21. Elk jaar organiseren 
we voor al onze leden en 
klanten bijeenkomsten.
Between Groups 7,151 4 1,788 5,175 ,000
Within Groups 225,235 652 ,345
Total 232,387 656
22. Contact met klanten 
c.q. leden is belangrijk voor 
mij.
Between Groups 6,966 4 1,742 2,231 ,064
Within Groups 512,020 656 ,781
Total 518,986 660
23. De behoeften en 
wensen van de klanten c.q. 
leden van de coöperatie zijn 
belangrijk voor mij.
Between Groups 5,890 4 1,472 3,089 ,016
Within Groups 313,133 657 ,477
Total 319,023 661
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B Relational dimension
B1 Trust
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
24. Over het algemeen 
gesproken vertrouw ik de 
meeste mensen.
Between Groups ,294 4 ,073 ,205 ,936
Within Groups 234,205 653 ,359
Total 234,498 657
25. De meeste mensen 
in het werkgebied van 
de coöperatie zijn te 
vertrouwen.
Between Groups 1,118 4 ,280 ,803 ,524
Within Groups 226,729 651 ,348
Total 227,848 655
26. De meeste klanten c.q. 
leden zijn te vertrouwen.
Between Groups 1,136 4 ,284 ,916 ,454
Within Groups 201,597 650 ,310
Total 202,733 654
27. De meeste collega’s 
binnen de coöperatie 
(Rabobank) zijn te 
vertrouwen.
Between Groups ,570 4 ,142 ,450 ,773
Within Groups 206,156 651 ,317
Total 206,726 655
28. Ik vertrouw er altijd op 
dat mijn vrienden en familie 
handelen in mijn voordeel.
Between Groups ,787 4 ,197 ,374 ,827
Within Groups 343,616 653 ,526
Total 344,403 657
29. Ik vertrouw er altijd op 
dat mijn collega’s handelen 
in mijn voordeel.
Between Groups 1,621 4 ,405 ,789 ,533
Within Groups 335,643 653 ,514
Total 337,264 657
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B2 Norms of reciprocity
                                                                                            ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
ID Between Groups 26923305,000 4 6730826,250 2818,078 ,000
Within Groups 1659970,000 695 2388,446
Total 28583275,000 699
30. Ik wil mijn familieleden 
altijd graag helpen bij een 
vraag of probleem.
Between Groups ,700 4 ,175 ,570 ,685
Within Groups 196,540 640 ,307
Total 197,240 644
31. Ik wil mijn vrienden 
altijd graag helpen bij een 
vraag of probleem.
Between Groups 2,015 4 ,504 1,822 ,123
Within Groups 178,031 644 ,276
Total 180,046 648
32. Ik wil mijn collega’s 
altijd graag helpen bij een 
vraag of probleem.
Between Groups 2,240 4 ,560 2,041 ,087
Within Groups 175,268 639 ,274
Total 177,508 643
33. Ik wil de klanten c.q. 
leden van de coöperatie 
altijd graag helpen bij een 
vraag of probleem.
Between Groups 7,171 4 1,793 5,667 ,000
Within Groups 202,138 639 ,316
Total 209,309 643
34. Ik volg het lokale 
nieuws van het 
werkgebied van de 
coöperatie (Rabobank) 
door bijvoorbeeld het...
Between Groups 7,310 4 1,827 2,933 ,020
Within Groups 399,942 642 ,623
Total 407,252 646
35. Mensen in het 
algemeen zijn graag 
bereid elkaar te helpen bij 
een vraag of probleem.
Between Groups 4,313 4 1,078 3,066 ,016
Within Groups 225,396 641 ,352
Total 229,709 645
36. Ik verricht op dit 
moment vrijwilligerswerk? 
Denk bijvoorbeeld 
aan helpen bij een 
voedselbank, m...
Between Groups 1,995 4 ,499 2,035 ,088
Within Groups 158,044 645 ,245
Total 160,038 649
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B3 Identification (ID)
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
37. Ik voel een vorm 
van verbondenheid met 
de lokale coöperatieve 
Rabobank.
Between Groups 23,706 4 5,927 13,322 ,000
Within Groups 285,595 642 ,445
Total 309,301 646
38. Ik voel een vorm 
van samenhorigheid bij 
de lokale coöperatieve 
Rabobank.
Between Groups 22,197 4 5,549 13,071 ,000
Within Groups 271,704 640 ,425
Total 293,901 644
39. Ik heb een sterk 
positief gevoel bij de lokale 
coöperatieve Rabobank.
Between Groups 35,948 4 8,987 19,985 ,000
Within Groups 288,701 642 ,450
Total 324,649 646
40. Ik ben trots om een 
medewerker van de lokale 
coöperatieve Rabobank 
te zijn.
Between Groups 41,173 4 10,293 21,968 ,000
Within Groups 301,751 644 ,469
Total 342,924 648
C Cognitive dimension
C1 Shared vision
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
41. Ik ben me bewust 
van de coöperatieve 
doelstellingen van onze 
organisatie.
Between Groups 8,937 4 2,234 7,774 ,000
Within Groups 181,340 631 ,287
Total 190,277 635
42. Mijn leidinggevende 
besteedt voldoende 
tijd aan het coöperatief 
handelen in ons dagelijks 
werk.
Between Groups 15,775 4 3,944 5,837 ,000
Within Groups 427,719 633 ,676
Total 443,494 637
43. Mijn collega’s weten 
over het algemeen waar 
de coöperatieve filosofie 
voor staat.
Between Groups 14,150 4 3,537 9,089 ,000
Within Groups 245,979 632 ,389
Total 260,129 636
44. Het lokale 
management van de 
coöperatie (Rabobank) 
draagt genoeg uit over het 
zijn een coöperati...
Between Groups 56,821 4 14,205 30,282 ,000
Within Groups 297,873 635 ,469
Total 354,694 639
45. Het werken voor een 
coöperatie (Rabobank) 
is voor mij een bewuste 
keuze.
Between Groups 20,160 4 5,040 6,059 ,000
Within Groups 526,575 633 ,832
Total 546,735 637
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C2 Shared language
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
46. De collega’s van de 
coöperatie (Rabobank) 
communiceren schriftelijk 
duidelijk en helder met 
klan...
Between Groups 8,636 4 2,159 5,566 ,000
Within Groups 247,829 639 ,388
Total 256,464 643
47. Collega’s van de 
coöperatie (Rabobank) 
communiceren duidelijk en 
helder tijdens gesprekken 
met k...
Between Groups 7,915 4 1,979 5,708 ,000
Within Groups 219,440 633 ,347
Total 227,356 637
D Membership specific
ANOVA
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
48. Alle klanten dienen 
tevens lid te zijn van de 
(lokale) coöperatie.
Between Groups 29,019 4 7,255 8,238 ,000
Within Groups 560,107 636 ,881
Total 589,126 640
49. De invloed van leden 
van mijn coöperatie 
(Rabobank) is duidelijk 
merkbaar binnen mijn 
werkgebied...
Between Groups 28,456 4 7,114 14,768 ,000
Within Groups 304,919 633 ,482
Total 333,375 637
50. Leden zijn zeer 
belangrijk voor het 
voortbestaan van een 
coöperatie.
Between Groups 10,112 4 2,528 6,278 ,000
Within Groups 256,103 636 ,403
Total 266,215 640

Summary

Summary  •  223
S
Introduction
The growing lack of confidence in banking service providers in our society, in evidence since the 
financial crisis in 2007-2008, has led to a growing awareness of alternative cooperative banking 
models. Cooperative banks performed better during the recent financial crisis than listed banks. 
However, what makes the cooperative model different? Cooperative banks are associated with 
involvement in social networks that are based on reciprocity, trust and reputation. Cooperative 
banks are distinguished by not having shareholders but members with rights and responsibilities 
based on the formal organizational characteristics of the cooperative, which are reflected in 
governance and originate from seven cooperative principles.63 Is it the higher levels of social 
capital in cooperative banks that makes them different from shareholder banks? And if so, how 
is social capital related to the cooperative structure of these banks? 
Research summary
The purpose of this thesis is to provide clarity about how the cooperative structure of a bank 
affects its (internal) organizational social capital. Organizational social capital has often been 
claimed to go hand in hand with the formation of networks and long-term relationships, which 
in turn help to establish shared goals and values across the organization, so that those working 
within it are more likely all to be ‘pulling in the same direction’. The study therefore isolates 
both the implementation of the cooperative structure and the specific effect of the cooperative 
structure on social capital, compared with other organizational variables. It compares five local 
banks within Rabobank which are of different sizes (in terms of staff numbers). The focus in these 
case studies is on the different variables that play a role in the functioning of the cooperative 
structure and its impact on organizational social capital.
The following question is central to the study: In what way does the cooperative structure of a 
bank affect its organizational social capital?
Background
Most research into the relationship between social capital and cooperatives takes social capital as 
the independent variable and the cooperative as the dependent variable. In this study I adopt the 
reverse approach: the emphasis is on how the cooperative form affects the internal social capital 
of an organization. In this study, I adopt a sociological approach to examine five cooperative 
Rabobanks (and Rabobank Nederland). This is done by means of a multiple comparative case 
study, conducted in the period 2013-2014. I study the impact of the cooperative structure on 
organizational social capital in practice. The comparative case study focuses on the degree of 
social interaction, and the implementation of the cooperative principles in the day-to-day work 
of these five banks.
63 Also known as the ICA (International Co-operative Alliance) principles. This global organization represents 
the cooperative movement and supports cooperatives around the world.
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Process
The purpose of the research was to measure the three main dimensions of social capital: Structural, 
Relational and Cognitive. To this end, the Organizational Social Capital Model of Nahapiet 
and Ghosal is used.64 This was to identify possible factors that may affect the organizational 
social capital of these local Rabobanks positively or negatively. There are two focus points for 
organizational social capital, which are related to the basic cooperative structure:
1: the commitment of the staff and management to the cooperative principles;
2: member-customer related activities.
To collect sufficient valid research data, 696 employees filled in a 50-question questionnaire, 
designed to incorporate the three dimensions of social capital. This was followed by semi-
structured interviews with 46 participants in order to supplement and clarify the data collected 
from the survey. The quantitative and qualitative data collection and desk research all took place 
in 2013-2014. Following further desk research in 2015-2016, a description of the changes to 
Rabobank’s governance structure was drawn up. This includes an analysis of various strategic 
documents such as annual plans and policy documents.
Conclusions and recommendations
The creation of organizational social capital involves the sustained investment of both time and 
effort. The cooperative structure can enable banks to generate higher levels of social capital due 
to the structural opportunities for interaction between individuals and organizations that this 
structure provides. 
In this regard, the five case studies yielded the following specific findings.
Higher scores on organizational social capital for smaller banks depend on the ratio of employees 
to customers/members and the number of member/customer relationships. The decline in social 
interaction within the banks investigated can be attributed to several factors: the increasing 
digitization of services, redundancies, the loss of independent local branches, and increased 
regulatory pressure. The economic focus of the Board of Directors may mean that managers 
are driven primarily by economic efficiency goals and operational results rather than focusing 
on the application of cooperative principles. Indeed, the case studies reveal a consistent lack of 
(intrinsic) motivation, knowledge and depth in relation to applying the cooperative principles. 
It was found that employees at all levels and functions within the local bank who participated 
in this study had only limited knowledge of the seven cooperative principles. The combined 
results of this study indicate that commitment to cooperative principles has a significant impact 
on organizational social capital. The decline in social interaction is therefore leading to falling 
levels of organizational social capital and, consequently, to a decrease in local embeddedness and 
operational local market information from the banks.
64 Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998).
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The cooperative structure is beneficial for collective action, but when it comes to the (re)production 
of organizational social capital, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. An organizational 
structure that is favourable to social interaction must be supported by (intrinsic) motivation and 
knowledge across all levels of the organization regarding the application of the cooperative 
principles in organizational practice and the conditional possibilities for social interaction. 
My advice is to strengthen the cooperative structure by establishing a new vision for increasingly 
digitized services and governance from, and with, members, customers and management, 
thereby creating and strengthening social connections and trust levels among all stakeholders 
in a strong, interaction-based model. The focus should be on new forms of and channels for 
social interaction and engagement within the new structure, with the aim of maintaining and 
reinforcing organizational social capital within the organization.
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Introductie
Het groeiend gebrek aan vertrouwen in bancaire dienstverleners in onze samenleving, zichtbaar 
sinds de financiële crisis in 2007-2008, heeft geleid tot een groeiend bewustzijn van alternatieve 
coöperatieve bankmodellen. Coöperatieve banken hebben gedurende de recente financiële 
crisis beter gepresteerd dan beursgenoteerde banken. Echter, wat maakt dit coöperatieve 
model anders? Coöperatieve banken worden in verband gebracht met betrokkenheid in sociale 
netwerken welke zijn gebaseerd op wederkerigheid, vertrouwen en reputatie. Coöperatieve 
banken onderscheiden zich doordat ze geen aandeelhouders hebben maar leden met rechten 
en verantwoordelijkheden op basis van formele kenmerken van de coöperatie, terug te vinden in 
de governance en gebaseerd zijn op zeven coöperatieve principes.65 Zijn het, de hogere niveaus 
van sociaal kapitaal in coöperatieve banken die hen onderscheiden van aandeelhoudersbanken? 
En zo ja, hoe is sociaal kapitaal dan verbonden met de coöperatieve structuur van deze banken?
Samenvatting onderzoek
Het doel van deze thesis is het verschaffen van duidelijkheid over de wijze waarop de coöperatieve 
structuur van een bank invloed heeft op haar (interne) organisatorische sociaal kapitaal. Van 
organisatorisch sociaal kapitaal wordt vaak gesteld dat zij hand in hand gaat met de vorming 
van netwerken en langetermijnrelaties, welke op hun beurt bijdragen tot het vaststellen van 
gedeelde doelstellingen en waarden in de organisatie, zodat degenen die erin werken, meer kans 
hebben om ‘in dezelfde richting te bewegen’. De studie isoleert daarom zowel de implementatie 
van de coöperatieve structuur als het specifieke effect van de coöperatieve structuur op sociaal 
kapitaal, vergeleken met andere organisatorische variabelen. Dit door vijf lokale banken binnen 
de Rabobank, welke verschillen in omvang (FTE), met elkaar te vergelijken. De focus ligt bij 
deze casestudies op de verschillende variabelen die een rol spelen in het functioneren van de 
coöperatieve structuur en haar impact op het organisatorisch sociaal kapitaal. 
De volgende vraag staat centraal in deze studie: Op welke wijze heeft de coöperatieve structuur 
van een bank invloed op haar organisatorische sociaal kapitaal?
Achtergrond
De meeste onderzoeken naar de relatie tussen sociaal kapitaal en coöperaties, nemen sociaal 
kapitaal als de onafhankelijke variabele en de coöperatie als de afhankelijke variabele. In deze 
studie kies ik voor de omgekeerde benadering. De nadruk is gelegd op hoe de coöperatieve vorm 
het interne sociale kapitaal van een organisatie beïnvloedt. In dit onderzoek, bestudeer ik vanuit 
de sociologische benadering vijf coöperatieve Rabobanken (en Rabobank Nederland). Dit wordt 
gedaan door middel van een meervoudig vergelijkende casestudy, uitgevoerd in de periode 2013-
2014. Hierbij onderzoek ik de impact van de coöperatieve structuur op het organisatorisch sociaal 
65 Ook wel de ICA principes genoemd. International Co-operative Alliance. Deze wereldwijde organisatie 
vertegenwoordigt de coöperatieve beweging en helpt coöperaties over de hele wereld.
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kapitaal in de praktijk. Deze vergelijkende casestudie heeft een focus op de mate van sociale 
interactie, en de implementatie van de coöperatieve principes in de dagelijkse werkzaamheden 
bij deze vijf banken. 
Proces
Het doel van het proces was het meten van de drie hoofddimensies van sociaal kapitaal; Structureel, 
Relationeel en Cognitief. Hiertoe wordt het Organisatorisch Sociaal Kapitaalmodel van Nahapiet 
en Ghosal gebruikt.66 Dit om mogelijke factoren te identificeren die het organisatorisch sociaal 
kapitaal van deze lokale Rabobanken mogelijk positief of negatief beïnvloeden. Hierbij in acht 
nemend, twee focuspunten van organisatorisch sociaal kapitaal, die verband houden met de 
basis van de coöperatieve structuur: 
1: Commitment van de medewerkers en management op coöperatieve principes.
2: Lid-klant gerelateerde activiteiten. 
Om voldoende valide onderzoeksgegevens te verzamelen, hebben 696 medewerkers een 
vragenlijst met 50 vragen ingevuld, ontworpen op basis van de drie dimensies van sociaal kapitaal. 
Dit werd gevolgd door semigestructureerde interviews met 46 deelnemers voor voltooiing en 
verdere verduidelijking van de verzamelde data. De kwantitatieve, kwalitatieve dataverzameling 
en deskresearch vond plaats in 2013-2014. Hierna is op basis van verder deskresearch ook de 
beschrijving fase van de governance aanpassing in 2015-2016 opgesteld. Dit omvat o.a. de 
analyse van diverse strategische documenten zoals jaarlijkse plannen en beleidsdocumenten. 
Conclusies en aanbevelingen
Het creëren van organisatorische sociaal kapitaal betreft de duurzame investeringen van zowel 
tijd als moeite. De coöperatieve structuur kan banken in staat stellen hogere niveaus van sociaal 
kapitaal te genereren door de structurele kansen voor interactie tussen individuen en organisaties 
die deze structuur biedt.
In dit verband, hebben de vijf casestudies de volgende specifieke bevindingen opgeleverd.
Hogere scores van kleinere banken op organisatorische sociaal kapitaal hangen samen met de 
ratio van medewerkers (FTE’s) en aantal relaties (lid/ klant). De afname van sociale interactie 
bij de onderzochte banken, wordt veroorzaakt door meerdere factoren: digitalisering van de 
dienstverlening, ontslagen, wegvallen van vestigingen, en verhoogde regulerende druk. De 
economische focus van de Raad van Bestuur kan als gevolg hebben dat management wordt 
aangedreven door economische efficiëntie en operationele resultaten in plaats van door een 
focus op het gebruik van de coöperatieve principes. Uit de casestudies blijkt een structureel tekort 
aan (intrinsieke) motivatie voor, kennis over, en diepgang van toepassing op de coöperatieve 
principes. Er is vastgesteld dat werknemers op alle niveaus en functies binnen de lokale bank welke 
66 Nahapiet en Ghosal (1998).
Samenvatting  •  231
S
aan deze studie hebben deelgenomen slechts beperkte kennis hebben van de zeven coöperatieve 
principes. De gecombineerde resultaten van deze studie wijzen erop dat het commitment op de 
coöperatieve principes sterke invloed heeft op organisatorisch sociaal kapitaal. De afname van 
sociale interactie resulteert derhalve in de afname van organisatorisch sociaal kapitaal en daarmee 
in de afname van lokale inbedding en operationele lokale marktinformatie van de banken. 
De coöperatieve structuur is gunstig is voor collectieve actie, maar als het gaat om de (re)
productie van organisatorisch sociaal kapitaal, is het een noodzakelijke, maar niet voldoende 
voorwaarde. Een organisatiestructuur welke gunstig is voor sociale interactie dient te worden 
ondersteund door (intrinsieke) motivatie en kennisvorming in alle lagen van de organisatie inzake 
de toepassing van de coöperatieve principes in de organisatorische praktijk en de voorwaardelijke 
mogelijkheden voor sociale interactie.
Mijn advies is om de coöperatieve structuur te versterken door het formuleren van een nieuwe 
visie op de toenemende digitale dienstverlening en governance, vanuit, en met leden, klanten 
en bestuur, en hierdoor het creëren en versterken van sociale verbindingen en vertrouwen tussen 
alle belanghebbenden in een sterk, interactief model. De focus dient te liggen op nieuwe vormen 
en kanalen voor sociale interactie en betrokkenheid binnen de nieuwe structuur, met als doel het 
organisatorisch maatschappelijk kapitaal binnen de organisatie te behouden en te versterken.
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